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Abstract
In Kisangani, as in other parts of Africa subject to
political parasitism and economic chaos, people have had
to draw on many channels of access to resources in order
to survive. This pattern of shifting strategies militates
against sustained investment in food supply and thus is a
major factor in the food crisis in Africa.
Thirteen months of fieldwork in the city of Kisangani and
the surrounding subregion of Tshopo revealed how
constantly changing regulations, inflation and poor
infrastructure forced merchants and farmers into
diversification and made long-term investment in rice
production and trade risky. Uncertainty in the supply of
basic resources such as credit, seeds, fuel, spare parts
and produce sacks was linked to the draining of foreign
exchange and development funds toward the nonproductive
activities of the political ~lite.
vii
Controls on agricultural production such as the forced
cultivation of rice led to suppression of African farmers'
initiative. Trade in rice was in the hands of expatriate
monopsonies until the 1970s, but the indigenization of
expatriate businesses and plantations (zairianization)
only served to isolate further the rural areas devastated
by the Simba rebellion of the mid-1960s. In addition,
zairianization fostered parasitism and discouraged
investment.
In the 1980s, farmers were blocked from organizing their
own markets and cooperatives and farm labor was relegated
telwomen. Large traders agreed to maintain controls on
trade which perpetuated the bureaucracy in order to keep
ahead of the mass of mobile small traders. Government
programs, and approaches such as privatization and
liberalization, initiated by Zaire's external investors,
did not change the terms of access to resources within the
Zairian economy and, thus, agricultural productivity did
not increase. These findings support the theory that
multiple survival strategies generated by economic chaos
and circumvention of and collaboration with the state lead
to declining agricultural productivity. This view has
implications for agricultural development policy.
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Rice is Zaire's third largest staple food crop after
man i.oc and corn. It is claimed that Zaire cannot meet the
rising demand for rice in its cities, and imports have
made up the deficit between production and consumption
since the 1960s. From 1985 to 1986, imports increased
from 36,429 tons to 60,048 tons, and represent about
twenty percent of the supply (Clifton and Afifi 1985,
Rdpublique du Zaire/Conjoncture Economique 1987). Haut
Zaire has the largest area of rice under cultivation of
any region, and was the leading rice producing area in the
coLoni al era. It now has among the lowest yields in the
~:j
II country (Clifton and Afifi 1985). Declining productionand low yields have been linked to seed degeneration, lack
of inputs, low farmgate prices and instability in the
market system (Clifton and Afifi 1985, Thaholokya 1983,
Conde 1981, Tshibaka 1989).
Focusing on the trade in rice in Haut Zaire, this thesis
argues that deficits in rice supply in Zaire stem from the
parasitic nature of the Zairian state. Technical
blockages such as lack of road rehabilitation, poor or no
seed and input distribution, and market and price controls
....... ; ,rr'"
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are not in themselves the primary problems but reflective
of the priorities of the state and the social and economic
structures which have evolved to cope with the neglect,
demands and hazards of the state.
The guiding theme underlying the thesis is to honor
informants' strong desire that rice production and trade
bring prosperity, or at least some measure of advance, to
themselves, their families and their region, and to
describe their stories, strategies and frustrations in
trying to bring about this transformation.
The study used multi-locale ethnography combined with
historical research to understand how trade in this
important staple food changed over time. The thesis looks
at the regional, national and world context, showing how a
food supply system operates within the context of a
parasitic state. A parasitic state is, very briefly, one
which extracts revenue from its citizens and returns
virtually no benefits. It fosters the perpetuation of a
non-productive bureaucracy and military at the expense of
productive enterprise. The interactions of the major
actors in the rice trade--traders, farmers and government
officials--reveal how the parasitic state has shaped
investment, production, trade and social relations based
3
on struggles over access to and control over the
commodity.
The study finds that indigenization of the rice trade and
a proliferation of petty traders did not serve to develop
rice production, nor were traders able to unify to better
their own collective situation vis a vis the state.
fifteen years after the collapse of the expatriate-
dominated system and four years after the official
liberalization of prices and markets, the rice trade had
become an artisanal and chaotic enterprise in which
neither traders, farmers nor consumers were served.
Because of the unstable and predatory environment within
which traders, farmers and government officials had to
operate, the rules, institutions and social relations,
including class formation, took on an extremely fluid and
individualistic character. People were forced to
diversify and invest in many possible avenues of survival,
leaving little time and energy for productive enterprise
and rational planning.
These trends have been studied and noted in other locales
and contexts in Zaire by Vansina (1982), Newbury (1986),
Schoepf (1986), Mukenge (1986), MacGaffey (1988)
L
4
By focusing on the rice trade, it was possible to
analyze these strategies and social relations in depth,
and to look at the consequences of this type of social
evolution for the critical issue of food supply. The
timing of the study was particularly fortuitous, as it
came three to four years after a liberalization decree
that was supposed to stimulate agricultural trade and
production, and thus allowed for study of the impact of
such po ldcy ,
The Introduction discusses the theoretical underpinnings
of the study in anthropological theory, research on the
history of agrarian change in Africa, and the African
state, specifically the nature of the Zairian state and
its relation to indigenous capitalism and the agricultural
The s~cond part of the chapter discusses the use
of multi-site ethnography, including the strengths and
weaknesses of this methodology, to capture the shifting
social relations within the rice trade.
The next chapter describes the infrastructure and economy
of the city of Kisangani and its hinterland, the subregion
of Tshopo. The rural economy is depicted as a mirror-
image of the urbenie conomy; that is, in the rural areas
labor is scarce, while in Kisangani there is high
5
unemployment and a proliferation of economic niches. The
lack of investment in rural areas and devaluation of
agricultural labor promotes this unbalanced situation.
Chapter Three outlines the history of the city and the
region from precolonial times through zairianization, the
expropriation of expatriate businesses and plantations in
1973, focusing on rice production and trade, agricultural
policy and changes in the economy which affected the rice
trade, such as the creation of paysannats, state-run
peasant coc.peratives, and the 18imba" rebellion of the
mid-l'360s.
The fourth chapter introduces the actors in the rice trade
of 1986-87--large and petty traders, farmers and
government officials at all levels. It is the struggles
among these actors that give shape to the trade within the
overall context of the parasitic state. In the fifth
chapter, the mechanisms of the rice campaign are detailed,
showing how these struggles are played out in three rice
producing zones. The comparison illustrates regional
diversity in the rice trade and the importance of the
history of the use of a terrain to its current patterns of
competition, trade and production, including differences
in response to liberalization.
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Chapter Six focuses on the period after 1983 and the
effects of liberalization. The chapter first describes
the intended effects of liberalization and then looks at
the actual changes which came about in the rice trade
system. It analyzes the extent to which these changes
came about as a result of policy shifts or other forces in
the local and wider economy. The idea that liberalization
in itself will stimulate the agricultural sector is
questioned with evidence from the constraints facing
indigenous rice traders and producers. A related concept,
that agricultural policy carried out at the local level
will actually reflect national policy goals, is disputed,
as the study looks at the response of traders and local
officials to liberalization. Liberalization instituted
new struggles over the resource and brought about changes
in rules and social relations that more reflected
adjustments to the parasitic state than to new economic
oppor tun i, ties. The consequences for food supply of the
organization of production and trade are also discussed in
this chapter.
Chapter Seven presents case studies in which traders',
farmers' and officials' stories illustrate the themes
addressed e.bove, It specifically addresses the issue of
class formation in Zaire and the extent to which
7
entrepreneurs have been able to act independently of the
parasitic state, a debate initiated by MacGaffey's claim
that Kisangani merchants are an incipient merchant class
investing in production (1986, 1988). An analysis of
social relations and mobility in the rice trade highlights
the difficulty of labeling social actors and depicting
class formation in the Zairian context. The high level of
mobility in turn plays a role in shaping the food supply
system.
The Conclusion discusses the history and social
organization of the rice trade in light of theories on
class formation in Zaire and agrarian change in Africa.
The implications of the findings for development policy
are discussed, and paths for future research are
indicated. In the Appendices, there are maps of the study
area, a translation of a letter from a collectivity chief
concerning a rice trader, and an analysis of the fiscal
environment in Zaire at the time of the research, focusing
on the relationship of the parasitic state, inflation and
other factors structuring the economic environment.
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1.2 Theoretical Background to the Study
The analysis of trade systems has a long history in
anthropology, dating from Malinowski's Rrgonaats of the
Western Pacific. In anthropological works, trade systems
are seen within a context of broader exchange and social
relations. As such, trade systems shape and are shaped by
relations of power, social structure, resource
exploitation and meaning systems. Fo r Malinowski,
a ccurnu1a ted f ood was IIa symb':ll, and a veh ic1e o f powe r , II
Food was not just exchanged for mutual utility but
reflected "the human impulse to display, share, bestow
social ties created t h rouqh human gifts" (1'322:172).
In Africa, markets and the food trade have been viewed as
separate types of transactions from trade in or exchange
of humans, cattle, and prestige goods, although some
foodstuffs such as salt and kola nuts may have unique
distribution channels and effects on a regional economic
system <Bohannan 1955, Godelier 1986:133, Terray 1974).
Much of the research on African food markets and staple
food trade, however, was carried out until recently by
geographers <Good 1970, Jones 1972, Mlambiti 1978, Pehaut
1977), with the early exception of Bohannon ~nd Dalton
(1968) • The emphasis on price and efficiency in market
performance by geographers and economists has been
criticized by Harriss (1979) and Berry (1984). The recent
work of Clark (1988), Trager (1987) and other economic
anthropologists moves the focus from market functions to
the shifting relations of traders and the state in
unstable economic environments.
The dearth of anthropological studies on food trading can
be partially explained by the fact that most
anthropological research has been carried out within the
corrtext of a "peop Le " or a vi llage. In addi tic.n, the
anthropological emphasis on exchange of prestige items and
women as key elements of social organization served to
deflect interest away from more mundane types of
distr Lbu tic.n. There have thus not been many
anthropological models to show how to analyze a process
such as food supply in a regional, multiethnic, historical
ccrrce x t.
The most ambitious exception is Carol Smith'S use of
central place theory to analyze market systems in a
regional economy (Smith 1976). She, and others following
her work, have described how demand arising outside of the
region or the country shapes the structure of market
systems which in turn affects regional economic
t :
... . ---- .... lIIIIlIII.'SV......iIi· .,..
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development. This thesis did not adopt the regional
analysis approach because it focuses more on the
relationships of social actors than on the structure of
the market system for rice. Rice sales in Haut Zaire
rarely take place in markets and thus have an extremely
complex spatial dimension. Nevertheless, the structure of
the market system is taken into account in comparing three
rice producing zones in Chapter Five.
Among anthropological works inspired by Smith's work, the
approach taken here is most similar to that of Appleby in
his study of the trade system in Puno, Peru. There he
looked at change in regional trade over time and the
differences in the marketing of sheep and alpaca wool and
meat (Appleby 1976). He describes changes in social
relations and fhe emergence of a new class of wool
traders. In contrast to Appleby, however, this study
focuses on a commodity with primarily local demand. The
rice trade system is also more structured by the state
than by world capitalism.1
Thus a key element in understanding Zaire's food supply
system is the state. The rice trade described here
1This does not imply that external market factors are




functions within a state which has been characterized as
"parasitic," "premodern," prebendal," "patrimc.nial" and
"authc,ritarian" in the analyses of Callaghy (1984),
Nzongola (1983), Young and Turner (1985), Lemarchand
(1987) and others. The nature of the Zairian state has
been a major focus of scholars working on Zaire, and of
political economists in general studying Africa. Much of
this work describes a type of statism which may be
nominally capitalist, but in reality feeds off the
productive sector. This "parasitic" aspect defines most
cogently the Zairian state at the time of the research.
Kennedy (1988:79) directly addresses the effects of
statism on African capitalism:
What has often prevailed, to a greater or lesser
extent, depending on the country, is a 'zero-
sum' situation. Individuals, elites and groups
have been locked into a perpetual conflict where
narrow interests are pursued at the expense of
others and the wider community. Success in the
attainment of wealth, power and status is
perceived in terms of a struggle where each
contender strives to monopolize the finite and
eventually dwindling volume of national
resources; it is not seen as something which
normally results from productive investment or
the sustained management of resources through
continuous enterprise nor can it be so assessed
or measured in the current circumstances. Bona
fide capitalist entrepreneurs too may be
compelled by the logic of the politico-economic
situation to act in much the same way as
everyone else; namely to seek narrow short-term
gains by plundering the national cake rather
than contributing to its enlargement. Indeed,
12
it may very well be foolish and counter-
productive to do otherwise.
Investment is inhibited because investors lack control and
stability, and decisions are based on political rather
than business needs. Kennedy finds that investments are
made in real estate and luxury goods, or in speculative
activity rather than productive activity because "there
are no compelling political or economic forces at work
capable o f inducing Cinvesto:.rsJt.:.do otherwise" (p.79).
Despite these overarching conditions, some Zairians do
invest in productive activities to a limited extent. That
is, they may obtain land for food and coffee production,
putting minimal amounts of capital into the endeavor, or
they may invest in trade in and transformation of a local
product, entailing purchase of trucks and mills. The rice
trade is one example of an investment in a local product
for local consumption. Farmers grow rice mainly for sale
and traders invest in trucks and rice mills to collect and
mill the rice. The high local demand for rice and the
possibility of growing rice year round in Haut Zaire make
ita p.::otential"engine of deve lopment" f or the region.
The obstacles encountered by traders, farmers and local
officials, created by the political economy of the Zairian
state, in shaping a viable rice supply system are
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described here. Attempts to stimulate the agricultural
sector through policy measures such as the liberalization
of prices and markets, which thec.retically diminish- the
power of the state, are analyzed.
To assist the analysis, the thesis has drawn on several
important works which examine the relationship between the
African state and the agricultural sector in general or
food supply in particular. Several African states have
political systems similar to those found in Zaire, and
agriculture and trade have been analyzed in light of
statist characteristics (e.g. the rise of the black market
economies in Ghana and Uganda, investment of agricultural
surplus in patronage in Nigeria, landgrabbing and monopoly
on inputs by dlites; see Chazan 1982, Kasfir 1983, Berry
1985, Goody 1980, Shepherd 1981).
Guyer (1987) has classified African states in terms of
type of food supply system employed by colonial and post-
independence states. Of particular relevance to Zaire is
her description of requisition econclmies which, "by virtue
of filling in for the absence of a vital food trade •••
prevented its development" (p.33). The area around
Yaoundd was supplied by requisition during the early
colonial era and this system enhanced the power of Beti
14
chiefs. When requisitioning was abolished and cocoa
introduced to smallholders, the chiefs could no longer
function as a planter class. Nevertheless, there were
areas in Cameroon where "agricultural growth was mainly
achieved by the indigenous population. The result was a
level of rural prosperity which either confirmed the
traditional elite in their pre-eminent positions or
created a new grc.l.lpof relatively proape roue farmers"
(1'378: 577).
Zaire's food supply system was driven largely by
requisition in the colonial era but, in comparison with
Cameroon, Zaire's agricultural sector was heavily
controlled by expatriates even in areas where African
farming dominated. Because of the use of rural labor for
construction projects, export crops or support of the
chiefs, peasant sectors in both Zaire and Cameroon
suffered f rom lack .:.f"investment in•.• produ ct Lve
patterns, marketing institutions and indigenous credit
instituti.::.ns"Cp , 5'37, cf. N,:.rthrup1988).
Africanist historians have also described how African
peasants responded to colonial governments' demands for
food, and how this response was later stifled because of
competition from white settlers or demand for labor in
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other sectors (Bundy 1972, Jewsiewicki 1977). In Zaire
during the colonial era and later, the hand-pounding of
rice was forbidden in order to give more of the value of
the commodity to traders and millers.
In Cameroon, compulsory cultivation was phased out in the
1930s, while it continued until the end of the colonial
era in Zaire. Requisitioning was also phased out in
Cameroon and smallholders were allowed to grow and sell
cocoa, although restrictions remained on African trade.
Neither requisitioning nor introduction of cash crops
created a prosperous agricultural class in Zaire because
of the control of plantations, concessions and white
settlers (Chapter Three).
Mkandawire and Bourenane's (1987) volume also describes
agricultural policy in relation to different types of
states. Although Zaire is omitted from the analysis,
similar structural conditions have existed in Ghana, Mali,
Zambia and Nigeria, and shed light on attitudes toward
peasant farming in Zaire. In Ghana, for example,
agricultural development attempts during the Nkrumah years
common ly assigned "a passive role to the peasantry," while
in Mali, "much of the planning in the vari.ouss'grassroc,t'
pr':'.jectswas to be dorie by bureaucrats and techn'::ocrats"
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Cpp, 5, 13). Supply response to price incentives in
Nigeria has been "lc,was a result of low levels of
technical capacity, poor deliveries of necessary inputs,
lack of farm-tested research results and poor marketing
infrastructure and erratic changes in government food
import po LdcLes " (p.19). The authors conclude, in
agreement with the argument in Chapter Six of this thesis,
that this situation "points to a crucial weakness of the
~get-prices-right' orthodoxy that pervades much of the
debate em the Afr ican agrar ian crisis. "
Arnauld's groundbreaking regional study of markets and
households in Zinder Province, Niger combines neo-marxist
and central place theory to analyze changing relations of
production and trade (Arnauld 1982). This theoretical
outlook allows"Arnauld not only to examine changes over
time in the regional political economy but to look at the
effects of national and international policy on trade and
pr odu c t i on , His findings show that the priorities of the
Nigerien state, colonial and postcolonial, have been
primarily responsible for the decline of the agricultural
sector.
Economic policies often set in France or in the
councils of the EEC and pursued over the past
fifty years have indeed affected the
organization of production. They have
impoverished the agricultural sector of the
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economy, put profits into European trading and
transport companies, swelled government
bureaucracy, created a climate of mistrust
between farmers and government, provoked a
nagging natural dependence on food imports, and
produced a situation in which farmers have
little incentive or resources to respond to
government's call for food self-sufficiency, or
to any other government program for that matter.
Bates (1981, 1989) has looked at agricultural policy in
relation to social organization and land use among ruling
grc,ups. His detailed study of Kenya analyzes the relative
success of agriculture in the post-colonial state in
relation to Kikuyu social organization. In Zaire, by
corrtrae t , many Lmpo rt arrt po La t LcLarrs became "farmers" as a
result of the zairianization of plantations, but they were
not and never became a rural-based ~lite. As in Kenya,
"risk and uncertainty played a centr.al role in the
creation of institutions" (Bates 1989:150) formed to
capture agricultural surplus or organize production
("cooperatives," marketing boe rds, proj e cba and
professional organizations), but in Zaire these
institutions were not viable forces for development of the
agricultural sector.
Bates also argues that state policies can influence
development and can perhaps be more significant than world
market/system imperatives in shaping the agricultural
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sector. Chapter Six discusses the national policy of
liberalization and how this policy relates to changes in
the rice trade since 1983. This analysis finds that
national policy is constructed at the local level in
conformance to a political economic structure that has
evolved over decades. Thus, liberalization in Zaire
became but another dimension in the struggle for control
over access to resources, its implementation captive to
the immediate demands of officials and large traders.
Chazan and Shaw's (1988) volume presents case studies and
analyses of the food crisis and the state in Africa. They
differentiate between the issues of food price policies,
food supply (patterns of distribution) and food scarcities
related to declining production. These issues are linked
to patterns of state-society struggle and allocation of
resc.urces. The book is a call to action. As such, it
claims that 1'[BJreaking the vicious cycle of hunger and
scarcity means breaking the equally regressive cycle of
polLbLca I rni.adLrect Lon and Lrnpotence" (p.20).
To respond to the challenge of the food crisis, it is
necessary to depict not only the eXigencies of the state,
but the forms of local level adaptation to production and
trade in staple foods. Thus, while it is essential to
19
place an analysis of changes in the rice trade within the
context of the parasitic state, the anthropologist is
obliged to go beyond describing a trade system, defining
class structure, or categorizing the actions of the state.
As Berry (1982) pcoints ou e, "economic" acts [suchJ as
production, distribution and accumulation ••.are also
social acts, involving people--and, as such, are
influenced by the entire structure of social relations in
a given historical setting--not just by market conditions,
technology and acts of the state explicitly directed
towards the requlet Lon of economi c under takings. "
In trying to make sense of these social acts, Guyer
(1987:226) advises that "the central concern is whether an
interpretation of underlying dynamics can be made without
falling into the closed and circular arguments associated
with holistic apprl:,achesand static typc,l,:,gies."The
anthropologist must thus navigate between the Scylla of
functionalism and the Charybdis of orthodoxy, neither
seeing "ever thing as related to everything else" nor
boxing every actor and relationship into predetermined
categories.
With this advice in mind, the thesis focuses on how the




institutions and rules within the context of parasitism
and economic chaos. Guyer (1987:226) has pointed out that
African food supply systems are "literally in the pro cess
of construction" and as such it has been difficult to
analyze their social relations and predict responses to
policy by different sectors of the food supply system.
It is important to resist the temptation to see social
a ct ora as "in transition" and "emerging" and telassign
institutions and events the status of markers in certain
developmental schema, as they are often depicted in the
political economy and development literature.2 This type
of analysis may serve more to obscure what people are
doing than to illuminate it. Ford and Holmquist, Chazan
and Shaw's volume (1988:232), aptly describe the
consequences of a mechanistic viewpoint. They find that,
in the dominant view of the food crisis,
Africa is told to patiently wait for a
bourgeousie, which will mechanistically initiate
dynamic capitalist development; modernize the
forces of production; create a proletariat;
through an inevitable elaboration of the
bourgeoisie's social and political power,
discipline the patrimonial state; and last, and
2We do not have to abandon the perspective of
comp are t Lve politics for "area studies," as
Callaghy warns against C1984:xi), but only must
take care in labeling social actors and assuming









far off, lay the groundwork for democratic
structures of rule.
Ford and Holmquist go on to assert that the food crisis
stems f rorn litheau tonomoua state and the narrow set o f
interests it serves." The coridI ti,:,nsleading to f ood
crises are not inevitable paths of development but have
resulted from the process of shoring up specific rdgimes.
In the case of Zaire, and perhaps elsewhere in Africa, it
is also necessary to look at the long-term effects of
state-society alienation and economic chaos on people's
ability to organize and adapt to policy shifts.
Another tension in the debate on the food crisis and the
African state is how to depict, on the one hand, the
ravages of the state and, on the other, recreate the
living reality of people managing their lives and going
about their business, however fraught with difficulty.
One walks a fine line between the portrayal of African
societies and economies as victims, thus robbing them of
their vitality (the helpless African with begging bowl),
and ignoring real oppression for the sake of false dignity
(African authenticity confounded with the autocratic one-
party state). The stakes are very high as citizens of






government only to be told that they are not entitled to,
not ready to or not capable of being participants.




trade without placing the parasitic state in a central
r o l e , Yet the rules, relations and institutions which
comprise the trade are of interest in themselves as social
formations and not just distortions of the norm. Hence,
the thesis looks at attempts to redefine the roles of
actors in the rice trade and the symbolic lexicon upon
which these actors have to draw, including long-standing
social and economic patterns within and between ethnic
groups, kinship forms, colonial role models and the highly
structured though contentless party-state apparatus.
It is hoped that this type of analysis helps to fill the
lacuna discussed by Chazan (1988:338) in knowledge of
"intermediate social organizations, their inte~'nal
structure, their aims and activities."
1.3 Historical Background
To understand the approach taken in studying the rice
trade, some observations must be made about Zaire in
relation to other African states and Zaire's history.
(Jewsewiecki 1977, Northrup 1988). The extent of this
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Zaire is a state built on extraction, primarily in the
mining sector but in agriculture as well (rubber, palm
oil). From the earliest days of colonization,
mobilization of African labor was carried out by force,
and persisted in a system of compulsory labor obligations
compulsion was unprecedented with the exception of
Portuguese Africa. Agricultural production was organized
for the purpose of providing cheap raw materials and food
for mines, cities .and plantations. Development of
indigenous agriculture, which came very late in the
colonial period, continued to be heavily controlled and
undercapitalized, relocating people and dictating
precisely what and how much should be planted (Peemans
1'386). Heavy taxation and labor prestations limited the
gains that peasants could make from agriculture.
The Belgian Congo thus never developed a prosperous
peasant class and agriculture was never seen as a means to
advancement in society, as it became in parts of West
Africa. White settlers were almost completely driven out
by rebellion and zairianization, taking with them the
great bulk of resources in the rural areas. Although the
mines and plantations did generate a substantial




with small workforces. Food supply to their hinterlands
was often subsidized and organized by the companies. The















developed were the clerical and the military.
After independence, internal rebellion and civil war
isolated rural areas further from centers of decision
making. While certain studies claim to show the rise of
merchant and kulak classes that invest in agriculture,
these classes (if they exist) have presented no real
opposition to the parasitic state (See Chapter Seven,
Russell 1989a; cf. MacGaffey 1987, Peemans 1986).
In Zaire at the time of the research, the state was the
MPR or Mouvement Populaire de la Rdvolution. It was
called by its founder, Mobutu Sese Seko, the party-state
(parti-etat) and all Zairian citizens were members at
birth. No other parties were permitted in the country,
and the party had a unified line.3 The party apparatus
was involved in every aspect of daily life, either
directly through committees and official functions or
3In May 1990,
turmoil and as of
not been resolved.
be the only party
parties was dictated
the political situation was in
this writing the situation has
Theoretically, the MPR ceased
in the country, but the choice
by President Mobutu.
25
indirectly through a network of spies and informants
(Schatzberg 1988). On the surface, this control appeared
sporadic but its very inconsistency reinforced its power
(Newbury 1984). Citizens were aware that the state might
intervene at any time, in any capacity, and prepared
themselves and their enterprises for that eventuality.
The parasitic state was in the making during the 1960s,
but was brought to full bloom during zairianization. At
that time, in 1973, the revival of the rural economy and
expatriate investment began an inexorable decline which
was further exacerbated by falling world prices for
copper, inflation and debt. More important, it became
clear to Zairians that the key to success was not in
production or even in commerce but in politics and
patr,:.nage. In this, Zaire followed the path of many other
states. What is significant about Zaire, however, is the
extent to which the state's revenues were not reinvested
in agriculture or any productive activity. This trend was
exacerbated by declining copper prices and the pullout of
foreign investment, but the root cause lies in the
con cerrbrat Lon o f wealth at the top and the "prebendal" <t,:,
use Lemarchand's term) system which allowed morsels of the
national wealth to dribble sporadically and inconsistently
into the national economy. Consumer purchasing power was
.'""rIM"'
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severely curtailed by taxation and fining of peasants and
workers at high rates and policies initiated under
structural adjustment measures which kept salaries to a
fraction of living costs.4
External powers were intimately involved in keeping this
unbalanced system functioning, by providing military aid
and intervention and by injecting economic aid to maintain
essential infrastructure (Wall Street Journal 1990).
Foreign powers also contributed a great deal to the
wasteful spending which led to Zaire's staggering national
debt and thus tCIthe rise of the "second ecclnc.my"(Kalb
1982, MacGaffey 1983, Nzongola 1983, Trefon 1988).
It is within this context that agricultural policy was
formulated and food distributed within the country. By
understanding the fundamentals of Zaire's political
economy one can come to grips with the complexity of the
f ood situation. For example, a question that often arises
is "Doe-s the Zai rian state have the power to implement any
4It was not possible to calculate level of
baxa t Lon because SCI much is "unofficial," off-the-
records and in the Quise of fines for a multitude
of infractions. N;vertheless, the chart in Chapter
Five shows that the cost of a trade license in Haut
Zaire rose much faster than inflation. In Bandundu




agricultural policy?" The answer is that the Zairian
state does have power and that power shapes the structure
of the food supply system through taxation, use of unpaid
labor, sporadic terror, and neglect (failure to provide
credit for either farmers or traders or invest in rural
infrastructure). This power is neither consistent nor
comprehensive but stems from the intricate web of
patronage relations that has squeezed out other forms of
social organization that might lead to productive
investment (Callaghy 1987, Mukenge 1986).
are discussed in depth in Chapter Six.
These issues
1.4 Choice of Subject and Methodology
The diversity of approaches used in the study reflects the
desire to fuse ethnography and research on African
political economy dealing with issues such as the nature
of the African state, food supply, agricultural policy,
and "development. II These interests led tCIa diffuse and
multi-leveled study. Rather than a people or village, the
focus was on a commodity and a trade system and, more




At the beginning of the fieldwork, I decided to adopt a
modification of the methodology of multi-locale
ethnography described by Marcus (1986:171-173). These
kinds of ethnc.graphies "e:t;plc.retwc. or mo re Lo ca Le-s and
shc·w their interc':lnnecti.:.nsov er time and simultanec".lsly."
Marcus n.:.testhat "Markets ••• and capitalist m.:.desof
production, distribution and consumption ••• are perhaps the
most obvious views of systems as objects for
e);perimentatic.n with mu Lb L'-Loca Le ethn.:.graphies." As an
ethnographic approach, the emphasis is on social
(encompassing political and economic) rather than spatial
relatic.ns. This approach seemed ideal for the type of
issues to be addressed, that is how to describe a food
supply system with many different actors and capture how
this system changed over time.
Marcus found no examples of multi-locale ethnography in
the literature, a lt hou qh it was seen as an "ideal f o r
e:t;perimentatic.n in realist ethnography." Thus, the
approach was largely developed in the field and grew out
of the exploration of different facets of the trade. The
strengths and weaknesses of the experiment are discussed







the point of this kind of project would be to start
with some prior point of view of a system and to
provide an ethnographic account of it, by showing the
forms of local life that the system encompasses, and
then leading to novel or revised views of the nature
of the system itself, translating its abstract
qualities into more fully human terms.
Thus, this study starts with the view of the rice trade as
a food supply system embedded in a national and
international political economy. It describes the forms
of local life, i.e., the roles of social actors, and the
rules and institutions of the rice trade in an attempt to
get bey.;:.ndstatic 'classifications of s.)cial classes and
trends in development of the agricultural sector.
Marcus (1'386:172) insists that "an ethnography sensitive
to political e coriomv•••must answer the queat Lon , ~why
precisely are you in this lo cale rather than anc.ther?'"
Thus, "Why Zaire and Kisangani?" and "Why the rice trade?"
Feeding Zaire's cities was seen to be a mystery and a
dilemma ih light of the falling standard of living of
urban dwellers and decline in agricultural production
(Miller 1981, Guyer 1987). Kinshasa's immensity creates
difficulties for the lone researcher. Kisangani,
suffering decline in the midst of the agricultural







Early on, it became evident that the rice trade was the
most dynamic and visible food supply system to be studied
in the Kisangani area. Another major staple, manioc, is
extremely diffuse in both production and trade, and
Perrault (1978) had already written about the banana
trade. The trade in vegetables from Kivu carried out by
Nande traders would have been of interest, but did not
incorporate the hinterland of Kisangani and thus would not
have brought into focus the rural-urban dynamic of food
supply. In addition, this trade is specialized and
represents but a small sector of the Kisangani economy.
By contrast, rice mills had evidently proliferated in
Kisangani in the l'380sand the fight between the "rice
pr.:.fessionals"and petty traders Cl o l e msr) was a hot topic
in the local newspaper (Boyoma 1986). Rice had been and
still was a crop grown under forced cultivation and was
seen to be critical to the region's economy by the
regional president of ANEZA, the chamber of commerce,
himself a rice merchant.
Another key issue in the rice trade which was being
debated at the time were the changes which ought to have
and did take place as a result of the liberalization
decree of 1983. This new policy in theory opened up the
rice trade to any individual for virtually the first time
'MUM
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since rice was grown in the region. Initial interviews
revealed, however, that the policy had by no means
effected a straightforward response and that various
groups were struggling to redefine their interests in and
access to the commodity. The international dimension
entered in when it was discovered that substantial
quantities of imported rice reached Kisangani and until
recently had been cheaper than local rice.
The first step in the research was, thus, to make contact
with rice traders in Kisangani, to survey rice mills and
talk to local agriculture department officials about
regulations concerning rice production and trade. Fifteen
rice mills were f ourid and 22 "rice prof esei oriela " or their
close associates were interviewed. The survey proved to
be more time-cbnsuming than anticipated because many rice
mills had gone out of business and it was hard to track
down their owners. Two women rice mill owners were
reluctant to be interviewed and a great deal of time was
spent trying to meet with them.
The purposes of the survey were 1) to find out how many
rice mills actually operated in the city (a 1985 study had
also counted them, thus providing a baseline); 2) to







owners and traders had emerged; 3) to get an idea of the
differences among rice traders in terms of committment to
the trade, investment and organization of business; and 4)
to explore links between rice traders and rural areas.
The interviews and case studies of three rice
professionals are summarized in Chapter Seven.
Government officials at all levels were interviewed,
including the Chief Inspector for Agriculture for Haut
Zaire and other Agriculture Department officials in
Kisangani and Yangambi, three successive Zone
Commissioners of Banalia (one now assistant Commissioner
in Isangi), the Commissioner of Isangi, the Zone
agronomists in Isangi and Banalia, a Groupement chief in
Isangi and CollectiVity chief in Yahuma.
farmers were interviewed in Isangi (Yalibwa), three
villages in Yahuma, in Banalia and Opala (Yab:,lema). In
addition, officials of ANEZA, the Chamber of Commerce and
AFECOZA, the women traders' association, were interviewed
in Kisangani, Bafwasende and Banalia as well as market
women in Kisangani, Banalia and Bafwasende.
The interviews were primarily directed toward
understanding how people participated in the rice trade,
and formulating an idea of how the trade functioned. This
T ::
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emphasis on the rice trade deflected most suspicion about
asking personal questions. It would have been preferable
to have obtained full life histories from all of these
individuals, but it was often difficult to arrange even
short interviews because of people's frequent movement and
other affairs.
Participant observation took place over a period of twelve
months at fifteen rice mills owned by the rice
professionals interviewed. During the time spent
Kisangani, I tried to visit at least one rice mill per day
to track developments. These visits were not systematic
as often rice mills were closed for repairs or because the
owner was out of town and some rice mills were visited
more frequently as good relations were established with
owners and managers. During these visits, informal
discussions were carried out with managers, traders and
Twenty lolema were also surveyed at rice mills,
as it was difficult to track them down for extended
interviews, and the results of the survey are presented in
Table 7.3, Chapter Seven. Nineteen other lolema and
independent traders were interviewed either in Kisangani
or the countryside (Table 7.2 and case studies in Chapter
Seven). The information on the lolema is more systematic
!I Pi!! : • tt ,
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but less in depth than that on several of the rice
professionals with whom I had ongoing relations.
The focus of interviews with officials was also on the
rice trade, including questions on implementation of and
changes in regulations, changing participation in the
trade, observations about trader-farmer relations, "the
role of extension agents, and collection of statistics.
In Banalia and Isangi, I was particularly concerned to
find out about collective bargaining sessions held at the
beginning of the rice campaign season. In Kisangani,
discussions focused on changes observed in the rice trade
over time in the regi.;:.nand con the "of f L cial" view of the
role of extension workers, collection of statistics and
other tasks of the department of agriculture. As a go:,,:,d
relationship was formed with the Chief Inspector for
Agriculture, I was also able to hear his "unofficial"
views as well, especially on the lack of resources
available to the department and how that affected the
performance of department officials. I had access to all
Annual Reports and other documents available at the
Department of Agriculture in Kisangani (not many were
available).




It proved very difficult to arrange to leave Kisangani to
accompany a rice trader on a rice buying campaign, the
second part of the research plan. Trips were canceled
several times because of illness and the research funds
were held up for three months in a bank transfer. Thus
only three short trips to the countryside were made from
October to January 1987 (Yatolema, Bafwasende and
Banal ia) • The illness and death of my father in February
1987 brought me back to the States, and it wasn't until
April that anothe~ trip was arranged with a rice merchant
going tCIYahurna, Later, trips to Yangambi, Isangi and
another trip to Banalia were made.
In Banalia, where I made two visits of several days each,
it was possible to spend time at the market, to go out to
fields, to meet with women from different sectors of
society, to attend Mass, a brideprice ceremony, a meeting
of trader~ and officials, and to observe traders along the
road. Similarly, the month-long trip to Yahuma, though
spent in several villages, provided an extended period for
observation and discussion with farmers, traders and
village leaders. Two visits to Isangi, comprising Isangi
town, Yangambi, Yalibwa and Lotokila allowed for a broad





a modern sugar plantation to a moribund rice farmers'
cc.c.perative.
Interviews with farmers were arranged either by local
authorities (for example, the president of ANEZA in
Banalia) or were conducted spontaneously upon arrival in a
village (Vahuma) bringing together the men and women
available on that day. Although in almost all cases, I
arrived in the village with a trader, it did not appear
that I was identified with traders. This is because white
women are associated with religious missions, often the
only organizations which provide services to villagers.
Even when I tried to buy rice on one trip (to Vatolema) I
wasn't taken seriously as a trader. Villagers did not
hesitate to say negative things about traders.
The focus of these interviews was on the production and
marketing of rice, the division of labor in agriculture,
relations with traders, and changes in access to
resources. In the case of Valibwa village, I was
particularly interested in discovering any traces of the
paysannat system (see Chapter three for the history of the
paysanna t)• In Banalia, differences among women farmers,
traders and wives of officials were explored. Specific
circumstances bearing on investment in the rural areas
7 7 n ormlnrt,,"tf"'£""l""
n aUUErrzrlcrr· -rrrrrnnrsprrnzs"zrrrrzr :: dt'it , W, ,
37
were also investigated such as the opening of the rice
campaign, the situation of the Turumbu cooperative, and
the growth of a new "cc1c'perative"in Isangi. Thus, these
focused interviews were meant to capture a specific aspect
of the rural economy: rice production and trade. TCI get a
wider vision of the rural economy, these interviews were
supplemented with data from other research, my own and
others' observations.
Travelling conditions were very rough. On the trip to
Isangi, for example, for lack of other transport, my (now)
husband and I rode the entire 124 km of a very bad road on
a five horsepower motorbike built for one passenger. In
Yahuma, it was nearly impossible to buy food and the area
was so isolated that, if the truck had broken down, it
could have been weeks, if not months, before another
vehicle passed.
In short, the terrain was not ideal for multi-locale
ethnography. In retrospect, it would have been better
to have stayed in one place in the countryside for a
period ,:,ftime. Originally, Yalibwa village near Yangambi
was to be this site, as it had figured in several other
studies of rice farming (Kilumba 1975, Tshibaka 1983,
Russell 1985). Informants in Kisangani insisted, however,




that this village was not very active in rice anymore and
a later visit confirmed this assertion (see Chapter
Seven) • In addition, a colleague at the University of
Kisangani had completed a very detailed study of farmers
in the area (Mbaya 1980).
Nevertheless, the diversity of sites enabled a comparison
to be made between two quite different rice producing
areas, Isangi-Yahuma and Banalia, and also illustrated
some of the common struggles facing producers in the
Tshopo subregion such as lack of inputs, market
uncertainty, and control by the state of land and labor.
In addition, the flexibility of the methodology made it
possible to seize opportunities which came along. I was
able to make further studies of farmers in other regions
of Zaire in 1988 and 1989 (Russell 1988a, 1989b, 1990).
In 1988, also, it was possible to study the national and
international dimensions of agricultural policy, the
fiscal environment, and the centralized apparatus of the
state as I resided in Kinshasa and worked as a consultant
for a development organization (where I obtained
information which form the basis for Appendix III).
Contact was maintained with Kisangani and a short trip
made there in September 1989.
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The historical dimensions of the study were probed in
research done in Belgium in 1985 which lay the groundwork
for the research proposal <Russell 1985). There the
libraries of CEDAF, the Biblioth~que Africaine, Tervuran
museum and SERDAT were utilized to gather information on
the history of Haut Zaire and Kisangani, colonial
agricultural policy and the structure of trade and
production in the region. M. Drassouchoff, the editor of
Rgricultural Change in the Belgian Congo, was interviewed
as well as M. J. Maes, head of agricultural documentation
at Terveren, the director of SERDAT, Prof. Vanderlinden of
the Universit~ Libre de Bruxelles and author of Du Congo
au Zaire, and Benoit Verhaegen and Jean Claude Willem of
CEDAF. Prof. Verhaegan became my sponsor at the
University of Kisangani, due to his long association
there, and his successor, Gauthier de Villers, was highly
supportive throughout the research.
Ethnographic approaches were utilized in the study in many
ways. First, I understood and spoke two local languages
and French sufficiently well to do without a translator
most of the time. Second, I resided in the cit~, traveled
by local transportation, and socialized with traders and
businesspeople. Because of relations with local people,
ties were quickly made in the countryside as well. The
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interviews (many encapsulated in the case studies, Chapter
Seven) were informal and open-ended.
questionnaires were employed except in the survey of the
lolema at rice mills which was adminstered by myself and a
research assistant.
With one or two exceptions, no barriers to gatheriMg
information were encountered. It is important to note
that I married a key informant in 1989, who had been the
director of a rice trading enterprise in 1986-87, and his
help and insight were invaluable throughout the research
and writing of the dissertation.
Participant observation, according to Bernard (1988:150),
II is nc..t really a methc.d at all. It is a strategy that
facilitates data collection in the field--all kinds of
data both qualitative and quantitative" (italics in
o r Lq i ria L) • This strategy enabled me to understand the
world view of the social actors involved, to make sense of
a complex system. On the rice trading trip to Yahuma, for
example, I worked as an assistant to the cook and learned
what it took to provision a truckful of workers in an area
wi th netmarket. In Yatolema, I sold dried fish in a rural
market and uncoded the method of bargaining--how to get to
the "ccorrect" price.
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Learning a new world view is a complex undertaking. For
example, once established in a community, one hears a lot
of gossip, and it is necessary to try to sort out
"legitimate gc.ssip" from "ma ldcLoua gc.ssip.II This issue
was especially critical when it came to people's
backgrounds. For example, several rice merchants
interviewed insisted that they were not beneficiaries of
zairianization (acqa'rears) because this group of people
had the bad reputation of destroying their businesses and
being corrupt. Others would insist, however, that the
same individuals had definitely been acqa'rears or in some
way tapped into government largesse. Looking at their
style of life was sometimes a clue as to the accuracy of
the accusations. If they lived in a grand house and
travelled often to Kinshasa, but had no visible business
assets, one might suspect political connections. The
suspicions that people had about others had meaning in
themselves, reflecting competition for resources, jealousy
and resentment engendered by the difficulties of survival
and the capricious nature of reward.
It was difficult to get useful information in Zaire
without using ethnographic methods such as participant
observation and social networking. People were, rightly,
very suspicious and had been conditioned by two decades of
, ph
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totalitarian rule to hide a great deal of activity. For
example, it took quite a long time for me to realize that
people never admitted to engaging in barter because barter
was illegal. It often did not seem appropriate to write
notes during interviews, much less to tape them. Being
female and non-Zairian helped in that males and Zairians
are associated with authority.
Two research assistants were employed. The first, a young
woman, helped to census the rice mills, gather statistics
from the department of agriculture, and record the prices
of items in four local markets.e The second, a man from
Yangambi residing in Kisangani, helped with the interviews
of traders at the rice mills and tracked down other
traders and rice mill owners to set up interviews. The
research was shared with colleagues at the University of
Kisangani and published in the Bulletin of the Institut de
Recherche Sociale Appliquee (IRSA), where I was a research
associate (Russell 1987). Seminars on Indigenous
Concepts of Development and on other researchers' work in
progress at the University proved very informative.
eUnfortunately, she left town with the notebook
in which she recorded these data.
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The strength of the multi-locale approach was that it
helped me to model the changes in the system over time and
space. One weakness was that it did not generate a solid
mass of data in the form of surveys, questionnaires, or
intimate ethnographic knowledge of all aspects of a small
population, like a village. The data base was thus very
diffuse and cumbersome, coming from many different
The focus on rice, however, enabled me to become
sc.mething cof a local expert who could "talk rice" at any
level, and it provided a concrete topic which was of
interest to the informants. The emphasis on the parasitic
state emerged out of the fieldwork as I tried to make
sense of a system that appeared very chaotic and
inefficient.
The weaknesses of this multi-site study have led to a
desi re tCIdo a more fo cused "tradi tiona I" st udy in the
area, based in a village. Now that the overall structure
of the rice trade is understood, it is possible to stUdy a
small group of farmers and the traders who buy rice from
them, looking at agricultural and nonagricultural
The patterns of investment of agricultural
surplus at the village level and gender roles in
agricultural labor are of particular interest, especially
bridewealth and polygyny as investment strategies.
44
Difficulties for future research are discussed in the
Con c I us Lon ,
:: etat t t
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Chapter Two: The Setting
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the city of Kisangani and the
subregion of Tshopo where fieldwork was undertaken from
October 1986 to November 1987. The economies of the city
and the subregion are examined in relation to the regional
and national economic system. The actors in the rice
trade are described in Chapter Four and the mechanics of
the rice trade are examined in detail in Chapter Five.
The chapter also looks at some of the factors which create
and perpetuate economic stagnation at the local level.
The Zairian political economy can be depicted as a chain
of linking social actors in unproductive, survival-
oriented behavior; in short, the survival chain.
high up in the survival chain have the ability to command
the resources of those below. Energy in the forms of
time, labor and money is used to extract wealth from those
below or to avoid the extractions of those above rather
than engaging in productive, generative activities.
Economic chaos and the predations of the state have
created a situation in which an individual must pursue a
multitude of channels with the hope that one will payoff.
::=: : t ner,x ... '"
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This strategy makes it difficult to invest in the long
term, however, and limits the payoff from anyone channel
(Cf. Berry 1989a).
One climbs the survival chain by tapping family and
regional connections, through education, military service
and, occasionally, through great effort and luck.
McGaffey (1987) shows how some of the important
businessmen and women in Kisangani managed to rise in the
survival chain.
Lemarchand (1988), Sang-Mpam (1986) and Callaghy (1988),
prefer not to characterize the dominant social relations
in Zaire as a patron-client system because little if
anything trickles down to the clients. Callaghy remarks
that "in many rural areas, patrons have ceased te,
pat rort.i,ze. The elimination of patronage incentives by a
kind of free-for-all system in which local officials,
military men and security spooks are given a blank check
to use their preregatives (and weapons) as they deeem fit,
has already been the rule f or sc,me years." Thu s there is
vast mass of people who are not able to reach even the
bottom levels of the survival chain.
:: 1::
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The following depiction of the local economy helps to show
why it has been so difficult for Zairian entrepreneurs to
invest in productive activities, why business is so
uncertain and why rural areas remain neglected.
Like all countries, Zaire has limited resources from which
to draw revenue. These resources can either be invested
back into the economy or extracted and removed from
circulation. As those at the top extract a greater and
greater share of the national wealth, there is less for
those at the bottom. Zaire's GNP has also been in decline
since the late 1970s, further restricting the wealth
available to extract CPeemans 1986). Thus at the bottom
the system becomes more involuted in the Geertzian sense
CGeertz 1963). This involution is a reflection of
"survival strategies" CR.:.berts1'386,Newbl_lry1'386), ways
in which people spread out their capacity to make a living
through creating and filling ever-smaller economic niches.
The "formal" and the "infc.rmal" e conomy cannot be
analytically separated in this case because the same types
of strategies are used and the same actors are involved.
Policy changes such as liberalization which attempt to
provide people with incentives to channel more revenue
5 dfteS=''TIP7ImrtC';" Tl 'Xlter 'tftsrsltueT'.iTT77W75==7T
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through the formal economy thus become absorbed into the
system, as will be seen in Chapter Six.
2.2 The City of Kisangani
Kisangani is a city c.f300,000 paop Le which, with its one-
stc.ry buildings and dusty streets, has the air c,f a
frorrtaer t,:,wn. The scars of the v Lo Le n b and ch ao t I c
Rebellion years are still visible ,:,nthe buI ldings and in
the hearts of its people. Kisangani has been called the
"third po Le of deveLoprnerrt " in the e conorny o f Zaire yet it
bears little resemblance to the two other major cities,
Kinshasa and Lumbumbashi. For example, the latter cities
have hundreds of kilometers of paved road linking them to
other centers, while Kisangani has only a few kilometers
of paved road leading to the airport and the main road
leading east is often virtually impassible.
The city is divided into six urban zones, five of which
are primarily residential, and one of which is the
commercial center. The zones of Tshopo, Mangobo,
Kisangani, Lubunga and Kabondo were, in the colonial era,
the African cites which surrounded the commercial zone,
Makiso, and the former European residential section, the
Plateal.lBoyoma. The city is bounded on the northeast by
and two breweries, BRALIMA and UNIBRA.
heavily subsidized, and the SOTEXKI plant may be a tax
The breweries are
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t Zail'e vivev bl'sects it in thehe Tshopo Rivel' and the • ,. I
S':'I.I t h.
Thel'e wel'e five industrial firms in the city in 1986-87:
the SOTEXKI plant which manufactul'es cloth, the SORGERI
plant which manufactures soap, cooking oil and margarine,
writeoff for its European owners.G In addition, there
was a branch of a multinational paint factory which is
barely functional.
There were a multitude of businesses in the city but the
vast majority were primarily retail, trading or wholesale
operations. The types of shop most frequently seen were
the pharmacy and the small dry goods store. There was
very little artisanal manufacturing in the city with the
exception of one or two furniture makers, a few mattress
eThe rumor that the SOTEXKI plant was a tax
writeoff was partially confirmed by dil'ect
observation. DUl'ing a thl'ee hour period I observed
ten SOTEXKI trucks of various sizes driving in
diffel'ent directions on the main road. None had
any load or passengers, a stl'ange situation during
a time of fuel scarcity. McGaffey (1987) claimed,
however, that the SOTEXKI plant was designed to







stitchers, cemetary monument carvers, souvenir carvers and
bakeries (bread made from imported wheat). There were,
however, several nightclubs with state-of-the-art sound
equipment, and there was a small bar (nganda) on almost
every block.
There were four military camps within the boundaries of
the city, gendarmaries and "traffic poLice " headquarters
in every zone including two camps of gendarmes in Mangobo
zorie , The military and police presence was pervasive and,
as Schatzberg (1988) points out, it is difficult to tell
the difference between these two entities. No maj o r
crossroads was without traffic police whose sole job it
was to stop motorists to check for registration and
insurance. A Zairian citizen could be stopped at any time
to be checked for identification. When something was
(usually) lacking, a shakedown occured. All the YQutes
into the city were blocked by military barricades
controlling goods coming from the interior and from the
east. Even pedestrians and those on bicycles were
The University of Kisangani has two campuses with schools
of medicine, science, agriculture, psychology and social
and political science as well as a higher institute of
'21
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off to the University in the late 1970s and it had been
steadily deteriorating since then. Many classrooms had no
chairs or light fixtures and a department's sole assets
might comprise one ancient typewriter and a few rusting
file cabinets.
There was a television and radio station playing the state
channel, twenty-four hour electricity--if no breakdown--
provided by an aging hydroelectric facility, and running
water reaching all zones. The telephone system, which
connects Kisangani with Kinshasa and has one outside
satellite line, functioned sporadically despite several
years of Italian assistance to modernize it. Three
national banks and the Bank of Zaire had offices in the
city. The Commercial Bank (BCZ) was by far the most
important for business in the city. There was a
University hospital, two large clinics in the center of
town, a few neighborhood clinics and many small treatment
centers which were essentially dispensaries. The general
level of medical care was very poor.
:: . m' rat Fe t:tT'f'f~
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2.3 The Surroundings of the City
The urban Zone of Kisangani is surrounded by the subregion
of Tshopo which is one of four subregions in the Region of
Haut Zaire. Tshopo subregion in turn is divided into
seven Zones: Banalia, Isangi, Bafwasende, Opala, Yahuma,
Basoko and Ubundu. Each Zone is subdivided into
collectivities (collectivit,), or counties, while each
collectivity is made up of several groapements which are
groups of villages or localities (local it').
There is by no means a tight fit between the categories
cc.llectivity/"tribe" or tribal section, grc'l.lpement/clan01'
locality/lineage, but these administrative boundaries were
originally set up by the colonial government to follow (01'
"create") local social oyganizaticln and to a certain
extent they still do. For example, one of the
collectivities to be discussed here is the Turumbu
Collectivity which borders Kisangani on the west and in
fact delineates the boundaYies of land controlled by
Turumbu ancestors and within which people speak Turumbu.
There are, however, a number of Lokele villages within the




The three rural Zones discussed most in this paper are
Banalia, Isangi and Yahuma, as it is in these zones where
fieldwork was carried out. Short trips to Bafwasende and
Opala, a stay in the town of Lokutu in Basoko and
conversations with traders provide some information on
these other zones. Save for a very brief foray to the
fringes of Ubundu, this zone was not visited.
2.4 Peoples and Languages
The major ethnic groups within the area of concentration
(Kisangani, Isangi, Yahuma and Banalia) are the Lokele,
the Turumbu and the Topoke in Isangi, the Ngando in
Yahuma, and the Bua, the Ngalema, Popoy, and Manga in
Banalia. Other important groups in the city of Kisangani
are the Wagenia, the Kumu, the Mbole, the Nande and the
Arabises (Verhaegen 1985). All of these groups speak a
Bantu language with the exception of the Popoy and Manga
who are related to the Sudanic-speaking Mangbetu and
Azande peoples in eastern Haut Zaire. Kisangani is an
important administrative and commercial center and as such
there are representatives of many if not most ethnicities
in Zaire, neighboring Uganda and Rwanda.
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The Wagenia are a fishing people, renown for their
artisanal fish traps which are placed on the rapids
upstream from the city. The Lokele are a riverine people,
specializing in trade and fishing. Lokele villages perch
on the banks of the Zaire river and can be found as far
downriver as Mbandaka. The Arabis~s, an intertribal
community of Muslims, trace descendency from the Zanzibari
"Arabs" whc. f ound ed the city in the 1840s (see next
Chapter) . They are very active in commercial activities.
The Nande originate in the Kivu region but had come to
dominate the vegetable trade in Kisangani and were
involved in other trading activities as well--including
the rice trade (MacGaffey 1987, Vwykanakazi 1982, 1986).
The other ethnic groups' major economic activities in the
rural areas were farming, hunting and collecting. The
Turumbu, the Mbole, the Topoke and other essentially
farming/hunting peoples have had trade relations with the
Lokele from precolonial times (Cf. van Leyneseele 1979,
Harms 1981). The Bua and the Lokele predominated in
Kisangani economic life in the Colonia era and filled many
political offices after Independence. Though these groups
still had prominence within the city in the mid-1980s,
other groups had developed networks which gave them access
: ::::.
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to resources such as jobs (Pons 1959, Verhaegen 1985,
Lokc'mba 1988)."7
An important sector of foreign nationals continued to live
and do business in Kisangani, despite the rebellion and
zairianization (see Chapter Three). The most important
were Greeks, Portuguese, Lebanese, Indians, Pakistanis and
Belgians. Others include French, Iranians, Sudanese,
Chinese and various West African peoples (all lumped
together in cornrnortpar lance as ISE§n~galais"). Wi th the
closing in the 1980s of the American Cultural Center and
the phasing out of Peace Corps activities in the region,
the American presence, strong in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi,
became negligible in Haut Zaire.B Expatriates are
attracted to Kisangani for the most part by opportunities
to make money in trade, and there is a great deal of
segregation of the expatriate community in Kisangani.
Pakistanis, Indians and Europeans tend especially to keep
themselves apart. Few expatriates not involved in mission
"7For example, the Topoke predominate in the
pushcart business (moving goods from one place to
another).
aOne exception to this trend is two American
businessmen who have bought large tracts of land in




work and development projects lived or travelled in the
rural areas.
Several prominent individuals are of mixed origin, for
example Zairian and Greek or Zairian and Iranian. These
MItis play an important role in the city's economy. While
most M~tis have Zairian nationality, the vast majority of
foreign nationals do not, even if they were born in the
country or have lived there most of their lives. Zairian
nationality is quite difficult to obtain and foreign
nationality brings some advantages. Many expatriates have
become permanent residents, however, in order to do
business in the country.
speak or at least understand some French in Kisangani. In
The national language of Zaire is French and most people
the rural areas, French is spoken for the most part only
by Zone officials, missionaries, teachers and doctors.
The vast majority of rural people do not speak French
although their vocabulary may be sprinkled with French
words.
The two linguae francae of Kisangani are Swahili and
Lingala. Swahili is the official language of Kisangani
and most residents speak it. The Swahili spoken in
rt
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Kisangani differs quite a bit from that spoken in Shaba
and Kivu regi,:'ns,and is seen tc,be more "degenerate" in
the sense that many of the adjective/noun and verb/adverb
concordances are dropped. All Zairian Swahili dialects
are mutually intelligible, however. Swahili is spoken
east, south and northeast of Kisangani.
Lingala is spoken west and northwest of Kisangani.
Lingala is growing in use as young people hear it in
popular music and on television. It is the language of
the military and of the President. Among educated people,
it is not uncommon to hear Swahili, Lingala and French
mixed in one sentence. Lokele is another lingua franca
spoken by peoples in Isangi and Opala Zones, where Lokele
traders ope rat e , In conversations with traders and
villagers in Opala Zone, Swahili, Lingala, Lokele and
Kimbole were alternately employed. Many in outlying
areas, especially women, may understand but not speak the
I ingu.a t r enc ee ,
There is a rich ethnic and linguistic diversity in the
subregion. Traders have to be multilingual and there is a
great deal of intermarriage. Pons' (1959) study of
neighborhoods in Kisangani showed that, by the end of the
colonial era, the different ethnicities were mixed in all
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the residential zones, although some had concentrations of
orie group. Flexibility and diversity have thus been
hallmarks of life in Kisangani, where no one ethnic group
has dominated, where there have been diverse cultural
influences and the population is mainly drawn from
politically decentralized peoples.
2.5 The Transportation Network
Leaving or approaching Kisangani by road or boat is a
hazardous undertaking, as many travellers have attested.
Travel writer Helen Winternitz (1987:178) described her
harrowing journey overland to 80ma from Kisangani in East
~lon9 the Equator.
On our third morning in the mud, the trucks
ahead budged, budged again, and we advanced to
another penurious village at the foot of a muddy
slope at kilometer 436. We waited six hours in
that village, which was strung out along a
denuded, eroded slope. Two derelict road
maintenance machines crowned the village slope,
the remains of a grader and the hulk of a
steamroller. Goats, fond of vantage points,
climbed nimble-footed on the machines. At the
end of the day, we made it up the slope. In
three days, we had gone from kilometer 418 to
kilometer 436, about eleven miles.
Winternitz encountered one truck driver who told her that
II Kisangani needs cropss f rorn Kivu, We can't transport




gets there ••.If the big man knows ,II he said, referring t,:,
President Mc,blltu,"he doesn' t care anymore" Cp , 172).
The Road Network
The major roads leading out of the city are the Goma road,
which runs east through Bafwasende and into the Ituri
subregion, the Isangi road which runs west along the right
bank of the Zaire river through Turumbu Collectivity and
crosses the river to reach Isangi, the Buta road, which
runs north through Banalia to reach Buta in the Bas-Uele
subregion (where there is another rail system), the Lubutu
road, which runs south to Kivu and will reach Bukavu when
construction is finished, and the Opala road which goes to
Opala, southwest of Kisangani, eventually reaching lkela
Theoretically, this road could be used to
reach Kinshasa, but this trip is rarely attempted (see
AppendiX: transportation map).
Of these roads, the Goma road is the most important
economically as it links Kisangani with Uganda and Kenya.
Although the government has occasionally tried to control
or abolish trading across this border (due to smuggling),
Kisangani is still oriented toward East Africa (AZAP
1982). The Swahili language and common history of "Arab"
=::
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domination represent a cultural bond with the east (see
More important, a great deal of smuggling
of coffee, ivory and gold takes place and lower priced
(than European or South African) Kenyan goods can be found
in the Kisangani marketplace. The Nande traders rose to
prominence as a result of their strategic position on the
border and other peoples have profited from the higher
prices for Zairian commodities in border countries
(Newbury 1986, MacGaffey 1987).
After the Goma road, the second most important route is
the Buta road which leaves Kisangani from the north and
crosses the Aruwimi river at Banalia. There are several
trading firms with trucks located in Buta and the area
once had Zaire's most productive coffee plantations.9
Important politicians pushed to have the region's
Institute of Higher Education moved to Buta as well.10
~A vast coffee plantation was taken over by a
prominent Zairian politician, (Victor) Nendaka
Bika, head of the security forces in the 1960s,
during zairianization. During the 1989 visit to
Kisangani, it was reported that these plantations
(PLANKUMU) had been shut down due to lack of
maintenance and poor management.
1°The importance of this northern route is
exemplified by the fact that the trans-Africa
highway has never gone through Zaire because Zaire
wanted the northern route and other countries
wanted to cut through Kisangani (SICAI 1972).
61
This road also links up with smuggling routes into
southern Sudan, the artisanal gold mining area east of
Banalia, the commercially important city of Isiro and the
alternate route to the East.
The road to Isangi, runing along the right bank of the
Zaire river, has declined in importance as Yangambi has
declined as a town and research center. Ninety-sb;
kilometers from Kisangani on the Isangi road, Yangambi was
once a flourishing town which housed one of the finest
colonial agricultural research stations in Africa (INEAC,
now INERA). Without water and electricity in 1986-87, the
institute has transferred most students and professors to
Kisangani and Kinshasa. Headquarters are now located in
Kinshasa (see Chapter Seven, case study of Yalibwa).
Yangambi is also the capital of Tshopo subregion. Its
administrative functions have declined with increasing
inaccessibility. Subregion officials interviewed had no
means of transportation and felt isolated and ineffective.
With regard to the rice trade, the subregion once
supervised licensing of all traders but now this takes
place at the zone level and in Kisangani (Chapter Five).
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The stretch of road from Yangambi to the ferry crossing
for Isangi is very poorly maintained and can be impassible
in the rainy season. From Isangi one can drive to Yahuma
and the right bank of Basoko, which is the town of Lokutu,
the headquarters of Lever Plantations in Haut Zaire (PLZ).
A stretch of this road on the left bank of the Zaire river
is the best maintained road in Haut Zaire, as it link~ two
PLZ facilities. In the interior, however, the road has
been allowed to degenerate. Traders from Kisangani claim
that this degeneration is deliberate on the part of PLZ,
supposedly compensated for road maintenance by the Roads
Bureau, because the huge concession does not want to
subsidize compe t a tion f or buying rice in their "area" (see
Chapter Five).
The route to Opala was found to be very poorly maintained
despite the fact that traders in rice and coffee use it
frequently. None of these traders had the means to
food along this road.
maintain the road, though some had done local repair work.
The military from the large camp near Lubunga also buy
The road to Lobutu in Kivu which runs south from Kisangani
through the town of Wanie Rukula alternated between being
excellent (for Zaire) and Virtually impassible. W,:,rkwas
1
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being done on the worst 228 kilometers by EEC donors to
extend this r,~ute to Bukavu. This work had been ongoing
for ten years in 1986 with no sign of completion. Traders
use this road to buy rice in Maniema (Kivu), but often it
is impassible so they send the rice up in barges.
All of these roads, in fact, are used in the rice trade
and all can be in very poor repair at any given time. The
state of the roads is a key constraint to the rice trade
and constant uncertainty increases the traders' risk, as
has been frequently reported (Pragma 1983, Ariza-Nino and
Mueller 1'388). The Goma road, for example, was out of
commission from October through December 1986 because a
major bridge had broken. Traffic was backed up for
kilometers on either side of the bridge and goods and
passengers were ferried across in canoes. High priority
was given to beer. If this road had been recently
maintained, however, it would be possible to reach Goma in
eighteen hou rs ,
The Waterways
The port facilities on the Zaire river in Kisangani were
very rUdimentary considering that this port connects the
east of Zaire with the thousand mile waterway flowing to
own boats and docking facilities (Boyoma 1981). An ONATRA
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Kinshasa. Companies such as SORGERI and SOTEXKI had their
(the marine parastatal) riverboat arrived approximately
every ten days from Kinshasa. These boats are severely
overloaded with people and merchandise, carrying with them
fl.::.ating"cities" o f travelling traders on attached barges
(Baltimore Sun 1984). Often ONATRA riverboats run'out of
fuel or become stranded on sand bars during the dry
seasc'n. Theft, unreliablity and corruption at the docks
made ONATRA a very unfavored mode of evacuation of crops
f rorn the region. The 1986 Pragma report found that
approximately 85% of the rice shipped from Bumba in
Equateur Region went by private boat due to these
Small traders and some larger ones use the river system in
ot her ways. The Zaire river is very well traveled by
pirogues or canoes which are hollowed out logs holding as
many as fifty passengers. These can,::.esare normally owned
and operated by Lokele or Wagenia.11 The Lokele
specialize in river trade, eating and sleeping on their
boats for long periods of time. At Yangambi, Isangi and
11There are stories which make other people
fear the water, including the belief that a Lokele
crocodile man will eat swimmers and that the Lokele
can control hippopotami.
cannot swim) and extremely fatiquing. The canoes are not
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Lokutu, bimonthly markets are still active despite the
dearth of trucks because they are part of the Lokele trade
network. Some very large canoes used for ferrying people,
bicycles and goods at major crossings are equipped with
outboard mo tore ,
Travel by water is cheap but hazardous (especially if one
built for comfort and passengers must often squat
throughout the journey. Canoes can be overturned and rain
can spoil the merchandise. Nevertheless, some rice
arrives in Kisangani via canoe. One enterprising
farmer/trader interviewed from 1sangi brings his and other
farmers' rice harvest to Kisangani and is trying to buy an
outboard motor for his canoe (Chapter Seven, case study of
Maurice).
The Rail System
The rail system linking Kisangani with the navigable
portion of the upper Zaire river (the Lualaba) between
Ubundu and Kindu is even more unreliable than traveling by
water or road (see transportation map in Appendix). Thl.IS
the five hundred kilometer trip from Kindu in Kivu region
to Kisangani can take from two weeks to a month. This
'7 m
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rail system was designed to transport crops from the rich
Maniema subregion through Kisangani and also to provide an
outlet within the country for evacuating Shaba minerals
via the inland waterways.~2
Analysis of the Transport Network
The river is used to bring goods to Kisangani from
Kinshasa and to ship produce from Haut Zaire to the
capital. It was cheaper than air transport but required
constant surveillance to prevent theft. There were
administrative headaches and inadequate loading facilities
at the port and delays en route. As mentioned above, the
railroad from Kisangani to Ubundu had ceased to playa
role in the transport economy due to its total
unreliability. The road system was unreliable as well,
especially during the rainy seasons.
The only reliable method of transportation was thus the
airplane. The airlines became generally more reliable in
the 1980s as other modes of transport deteriorated. This
reflects the continuing concentration of wealth and power
~2Maniema was made a separate region in
the Kivu region was subdivided into three
This subdivision may not endure, however,





by elites and expatriates. Many traders had turned to
airfreight to move their goods, and there were several
weekly flights f rornKisangani's new "international"
airport.13 There are two national airlines which land
in Kisangani and private companies which fly cargo and
passengers. Ahuka (1976) notes that the rise of
airfreight and decline of other transport modes has been a
trend since independence.
While a great deal of money was spent by donors on road
maintenance in the 1970s and 19S0s, the road system
continued to deteriorate. The Roads Bureau did not
maintain roads regularly because of corruption and
frequent lapses in funding. Donors believed that the
transportation situation could be improved by
privatization (World Bank 19S4b). In fact, much of the
actual road maintenance had been carried out for a long
time by companies, traders and other individuals acting as
concessionaires. The concessionaire system has had uneven
success, as there is little way to verify whether the road
work has actually done and the roads inspectors often have
13The airport was originally designed for
flights out of the country as well as within the
country, but the government wanted to control out
of country flights. Thus the only cities which
connect with other countries are Kinshasa,
Lubumbashi (Zambia only) and Bukavu (Rwanda only).
center of town, the zone of Makiso. This market was being
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to travel at the concessionaire's expense to inspect the
roads. In short, privatization of the roads system, like
liberalization of prices and markets, did not lead to
rural development as these efforts still operate within
the parasitic state (see Chapter Six).
2.6 Markets and Businesses in Kisangani
Kisangani has a central market which is located in the
renovated over a four year period and was not yet
completed at the time of the fieldwork and so the central
market was located on the outskirts of town. Each urban
zone has its own markets as well. Tshopo and Mangobo have
two markets; Kabondo, Lubungu and Kisangani zones each
have orie mar ket. In addition, there are numerous small
markets or uenzes in every zone. At the wenze one could
buy soap, sardines, matches, cigarettes, candles, canned
and powdered milk, canned tomato paste and the like.
Street vendors sell bread, cigarettes, cooked food and
sundries such as key chains and combs.
The large markets swarmed with activity every day of the
week until three or four in the afternoon. Most items had




vendors could sell these items. All women who sell in the
69
market were members of AFECOZA, the women traders'
organization set up by the MPR. AFECOZA members must pay
dues and participate in some group activities, but
organizational meetings are rare, except among the
leadership. For example, the president of the rice
sellers' group, which is part of AFECOZA, claimed that her
group had never had a formal meeting within AFECOZA. The
AFECOZA offices were frequently closed or, if open, the
personnel have no work to do as files were locked away.
The president of AFECOZA in 1986-87 was illiterate and
could not speak French, and so could not participate in
upper-level meetings and conferences. Many, but by no
means all, market women are Lokele. In 1':386-87, the
president of AFECOZA was Lokele, but the former president
was a Metise.
In addition to these markets, there were two stores in
Makiso which sold imported goods and foodstuffs. These
stores are owned by Europeans. The availablity of these
goods was quite variable. Most were imported from Belgium
but some items come from Kenya and South Africa. Some of
the items found were jam, ham, sausage, and cheese,
European toys, canned vegetables, appliances and utensils,




that the shelves in these stores were almost bare, while
in 1986-87 the items described above were consistently
available.
Three large wholesale trading goods stores and several
smaller ones catered mainly to traders and were owned by
large Kinshasa-based merchants of Belgian, Greek,
Portuguese, or Indian nationality with participation from
Zairian partners. The merchandise in these stores
reflects the fundamental role of Kisangani as a trading
center: matches, kerosene lamps, soap, plastic shoes,
fishing nets, sewing materials, batteries and cloth.
There were also specialty shops located in the center of
town that sold clothes, jewelry, records, electrical
goods, and autO parts and were owned for the most part by
Zairians. Virtually all the goods sold were imported. In
every residential zone there were beer depots and small
boatiqaes selling sardines, cigarettes, soap and toilet
paper. These stores are often franchises of the wholesale
stores.
Clustered around the central market are wholesale produce
shops which specialize in one product such as meat, dried
fish or vegetables from Kivu. A few of these stores
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wholesale rice (local and imported) and most carry an
array of merchandise as well depending on availablity:
wheat flour, cement, soap, oil, sugar, candy. These shops
provision market women and traders and are owned by
Indians, Lebanese, Metis, West Africans, Arabises, Nande
The sparse interiors of these stores bely the
wealth of some of these merchants (McGaffey 1987).
In 1'382,34 wholesale fish, 38 wholesale vegetable and
"cement" stores were censused in Makisc. (AZAP 1'382).
MacGaffey courrted 40 "whc.lesale" stc.res in 1'37'3. The AZAP
figures are probably taken from official records which are
highly unreliable, as discovered in the course of tracking
down all the rice mills in Kisangani. The number of large
and small trading goods wholesalers, vegetable and fish
wh.:,lesalers,and "general cornmerce" (cement, flour, salt,
etc.) stores probably did not exceed 60 in 1986-87 but
there may have been fewer stores at that time due to the
displacement of the central market. Precise figures were
impossible to obtain.
Kisangani merchants and people with businesses in the
"formal" sect.::orare represented by ANEZA, the natic.nally-
based chamber of commerce. ANEZA was somewhat effective
in helping businesss combat the excesses of the state.
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For example, in December 1986, the government wanted to
levy a new lOX tax on monthly receipts for all sales
transactions. ANEZA protested and the tax was repealed.
Many similar taxes remain in force, however, and ANEZA has
not been successful in providing affordable or adequate
credit fClr Kisangani businesses. Many people became
discouraged and stopped going to meetings. The 1'383
Pragma report found similar weaknesses in ANEZA in other
regic,ns.
The Service and Informal Sectors
Service businesses which predominated in Kisangani include
tailoring, auto and motorbike repair, haircutting, watch
and st-..:,erepai r, For the most part these businesses were
very small and operated in the open air. There were a ISCI
a few photo studios and copy centers (one copy machine),
including one photo studio owned by a Lebanese with in-
house developing facilities. Kisangani center had five
hotels which hosted tourists, visiting merchants and
government officials. European-style restaurants (with
very limited menus) were found in three of these hotels
and there were four other restaurants which catered to
Europeans, including a Portuguese and Greek club and a
Chinese restaurant. In the citds, there were many small
purchased at the markets and a few bars. Dilapidated
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hotels with primitive accomodations. Cooked food could be
taxis and taxi-buses provided the major form of
transportation in the city as the French-made buses ran
I
infrequently and were extremely crowded.
Prostitution was a major service business that involved a
significant percentage of the population of young women in
Kisangani. It could take the form of being the equivalent
o f a "second wife" or de ux ie me bureau. or being a bar girl
who picks up men nightly. Since unemplclyment was
estimated to be as high as eighty percent in the city
(Verhaegen and Kasongo 1979), there were few opportunities
for these young women in the formal sector (Walu and
Schoepf 1987, Le Soir 1985). MacGaffey (1987) describes
how revenue from services to men can provide income for
women to invest in their own businesses. One woman
involved in the rice trade in Banalia received initial
capital, a building and a rice mill from her departed
Greek "husband" and has used 1iais.::tnswi th clther men to
form economic alliances (Chapter Seven, case study of
Citne. Alinga). One of two women rice mill owners in
Kisangani worked in collaboration with a Belgian husband.
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The informal sector is not easily defined, as it blends
naturally into the formal sector in the Kisangani economy.
Those people who have salaried positions in education,
government or the private sector rarely earn enough to
support a family and so employ a wide array of strategies
to fill the gap between earned income and family needs
(Cf. Walu and Schoepf 1987). A salaried employee's
situation is often exacerbated by the fact that many
extended family members will depend on him or her for
support (Mukenge 1~86). This dependency is often
encouraged, despite much complaining, because a man's goal
is to have many children, several wives or women, and
support many relatives who will in turn work for him for
little or no pay. Thus both social and business
arrangements are defined in terms of patronage relations.
Some of the strategies that salaried individuals use to
augment their incomes include stealing from the company,
extorting money from people (if in an authority position),
loaning company money at exorbitant interest rates, and
working at their own business on company time (Mukenge
1'386). These practices are reported to be so common that
they have become an intrinsic part of the business
environment. In one rice trading business which was





networks of ownership and franchise. Street vendors may
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and litigation over theft and extortion, including
attempts to smoke out the culprits through sorcery, took
up an inordinate amount of administrative time.
Formal and informal businesses are linked by intricate
work on commission for a merchant selling matches,
cigarettes or sundries. Women pick up loads of bread
every day at the bakeries to sell at specific locations in
Many of the boutiques, the taxis, bars and photo
studios in the citd are owned by businessmen and women who
also have businesses in the commercial center.
At home, a man may invest in his wife'S or wives'
businesses which will bring in income for household
The women of the household may make prepared
food such as donuts or fried fish, or sell rice by the
glass, bananas or dried manioc either purchased in the
market or obtained from relatives with fields.
reported that peri-urban gardening had much declined in
recent years because crops were stolen from the fields,
and it was not possible to keep goats in the city because
o f theft. If the household possessed a refrigerator, it
was usually filled with beer to sell for a few cents
pr o f i.b a bot t l e , As one informant noted, it is not the
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profit that is important but the savings factor of
investing in beer. Investment or savings may produce a
net loss with inflation but people put away money for
specific purposes, such as school fees (Gadway 1988).
The household could obtain extra income by selling small
items in front of the house such as charcoal, soap and
cigarettes. Prices for all of these items, even in the
"informa I e coriomv" are corrtrolled. Individuals could not
set any price they wish, as prices and profit margins were
regulated by the state. For example, the legal profit
margin on imported f.~od was twenty percent. It was
difficult to enforce these regulations, however, and
merchants cheat by underinvoicing. These regulations and
practices opened up new avenues for corruption.
It was permitted, however, to charge more for an item at a
distance from the market than in the market itself and
more for smaller units. For example, a pack of cigarettes
could sell for Z50 in the central market. In the cit~,
several blocks from a market, the pack sold for Z55 and
three cigarettes may cost Z10 (thus a full pack per
individually-bought cigarettes cost Z63). Merchants,
thus, profited from the extreme poverty of most people who
in Kisangani (May-October 1987). Gasoline was not at all
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could only afford to buy the smallest possible units and
could not get to the market.14
An example of the mixing of the formal and informal
economies occured during the latter half of the fieldwork
available in the formal sector, that is at gas stations.
At times one had to search allover the city to find a
khaddafy, or black market gasoline seller, with supplies.
Prices sc.ared telover 3001. of the ",:.fficialprice." When
gasoline finally arrived from Kinshasa, it never returned
to the official channels and more elaborate khaddafies
sprang up in town, complete with pumps and promotion
schemes (buy five liters or more and get a discount). The
price was still 100% more than the official price, but
availability was assured. Those at the upper end of the
survival chain were reaping windfall profits, having
bought at the official price, while the khaddafy system
provided income and employment to many people down the
14There is another reason why people buy in
small units and that is that when they buy in bulk
there is pressure to share what thsy have with
friends and neighbors. Personal experience attests
to the immediate response when it is heard that a
household has bought an entire sack of rice.
Relatives feel free to eat any cooked food found in
the house when they visit.
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chain, as far down as to the young men selling one liter
at a time in outlying parts of town.
The informal sector which attempted to operate outside of
official control included a variety of traditional
healers, midwives and sorcerers whose services could be
substantially cheaper than doctors and lawyers. The state
tried to regulate these activities by such policies as
forbidding horne birth or "superstiticlus practice" and any
transaction which involved barter (Annual Report Haut
Zaire 1979, Cf. Russell 1989b).
These people were consulted for all types of problems at
home and on the job, including putting on or removing love
spells, curing AIDS, and detecting theft. Some peop Ie
alsc. ran "p.:ot-smc.kingdens" which attracted regular
client~le (marijuana being substantially cheaper than
beer) and others brewed homemade whiskey, lotoko, in the
backyard. Even here, prices for goods and services were
standardized and community criticism prevented people from
raising prices over competitors. Those carrying out these
quasi-illegal activities had to be on guard for
neighborhood CADERS, a squad of the JMPR, Jeanesse da
nouv emen t: Pop a Le i r e de I e R~volati,~n., the "eyes and ears
e,f the revolution." Their .job was to report any illegal
" $ r'mtr~~mmnt'1 rew"e ....
7'3
activity or dispute which should be brought to justice (an
expensive procedure for both plaintiff and defendent).
Needless to say, the office of CADER became a protection
racket which provided extra income for the functionary (as
it is an unpaid job). CADERS received a percentage of all
fines from judgments as well. Other JMPR cadres played
the same role in rural areas (Cf. Roberts 1986).
Theft was a source of income for some and a major problem
in ~:isangani. People caught out at night by thieves could
be stripped of all their valuables including their shoes
and clothing. Theft was probably the only way that
someone low on the survival chain could get a sum of
money, and the main culprits were the underpaid military
and unemployed youth, although employees often risked
their jobs to steal a sum of money. The wealth stolen in
this way was reportedly used most often to buy alcohol,
clothes and cigarettes because it had to be disposed of
quickly.
Smuggling has been a major source of wealth in Zaire which
is well documented by MacGaffey (1983, 1989 and
forth ctlming). In Haut Zaire, the major resources to be
smuggled are ivory, coffee and gold. Access to these
resources was controlled at the very top of the survival
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chain (Kisangani, cited in Lemarchand 1988). Individuals
also tried to sell to tourists or smuggle rare birds and
animals such as chimpanzees, and okapi and other animal or
•reptile skins.
Another source of livelihood for unemployed men was living
off of relatives. Young men often would show up at a
"rich" o r salaried relative's housse at mealtime. The
family was obliged to serve them, and often they would be
given some menial task to do. Often, wealthy individuals
go to great lengths to support relatives because they fear
witchcraft or because they want to attract potential
clients. This was the case of Cit. Azali, a prominent
rice trader whose story is presented in Chapter Seven.
Potential clients, on the other hand, will use any number
of claims to place a burden of responsibility on those who
For example, after having travelled for a
few days with traders Charlotte and Pierre (Chapter
Seven), her children and even her neighb,~rs tried to claim
f avor a f rornme.
Nothing was wasted in Kisangani so, at the lowest end of
the survival chain, garbage picking and "recycling"
provided an income for some people. Bottles, plastic
bags, cardboard, anything metal and any scrap of paper, no
to wrap fish in the marketplace. This assertion is true
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matter how small, can be used. Several scholars have
bemoaned the fact that archival material in Zaire is used
and the paper shortage was so acute in 1986-87 that
students took notes on the back of beer labels. The old
and poor were allowed to beg on Saturdays, and they went
from store to store in Makiso receiving a tiny sum at each
place. Handicapped beggars frequented the European stores
and the post office.
Analysis of Business Sector
From this description of Kisangani's commercial and
service economy, one sees how businesses and individuals
were linked in the survival chain. At the lower end, the
struggle for survival, literally getting enough to eat
each day, preoccupied the individual. This survival
depended on access to resources obtained by invoking
social ties. Even garbage picking had its territory and
hierarchy and not just anyone could barge in. For
example, members of one ethnic group (Kumu) filled the
niche of sifting through rice chaff for chicken feed at
the rice mills, and mothers brought their daughters into
the "business."
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At the upper end, the cultivation of ties to the
government (patrons) and dealing with the demands of
relatives and employees (clients) were major
preoccupations. Regardless of whether the individual was
directly tied to the state (as a functionary or office
holder), protection was necessary. With the changing
composition of the government, however, assuring this
protection was not easy (see case study of Cit. Tonda in
Chapter Seven). Personnel and rules changed from minute
to minute, providing daily frustration to business owners.
The biggest complaint by rice merchants interviewed in
Kisangani was the welter of taxes, licenses and fines
levied, the neverending parade of officials looking for a
cut, and the constantly shifting regulatory environment.
I sharply recall the dismayed feeling when men in an
eb ec o s t: (nati,:,nalcostume) and sunglasses wc,uld "visit"
during one of my interviews. Negotiations took time, as
usually a price was not settled on in one visit, and the
merchant always tried to stall for more time--perhaps on
the next visit he would be out of town!
Dealing with clients such as relatives and employees was
also frustrating, time consuming and potentially
dangerous. The government had strict laws for terminating
employment and it was thus difficult to fire people, even
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if they were grossly incompetent. The litigation often
cost more than the small sum paid for their salary so
thieves and incompetent workers were kept on rather than
terminated (see case study of Cit. Azali in Chapter
Seven). While relatives were likely to feel that the
resources of the business belonged to them, Mukenge (1986)
points out that relatives who steal can be more easily
tracked down than strangers.
Thus, businesses which require little capital investment
and provide quick turnover and mobility were preferred
(Peemans 1986). These factors accounted for the
proliferation of trading, service and informal sector
businesses. The structure of business and commerce in
Kisangani, in turn, largely determined the opportunities
available to rural dwellers to participate in the economy,
as opportunities in the rural economy drastically
diminished since the 1970s (see Chapter Six).
2.7 Socioeconomic Resources in The Rural Area
We now look at the position of rural dwellers, men and
women, who inhabit Tshopo subregion.
observations and interviews in Banalia, Isangi, Opala and
Yahuma and other studies carried out in these areas, some
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general characteristics of social and economic life in the
subregion can be elucidated (Mbaya 1982, Tshibaka 1989).
Rural people in Haut Zaire are among the most remote and
hence unstudied in Africa, according to Northrup (1985).
For the most part, however, this physical isolation,
stemming from poor transportation systems, has not
resulted in withdrawal from the survival chain.
Integration into national and international markets has
not, however, brought productive investment.1~
There are several loci of integration: 1) Widespread
trade and smuggling in coffee, ivory and gold brings in
outsiders such as the military, traders and gold
proape ctors. 2) Village and hut taxes as well as the
rising cost of bridewealth--paid at least in part in cash-
-make it impossible for an individual to be without some
source of cash revenue. 3) Barter is officially forbidden
by the government ostensibly because barter exploits
farmers, but this prohibition also allows the state to tax
1~One exception was reported by Grinker (1988)
in his field study of Lese and Efe in Bafwasende.
He noted that these peoples are isolated even from
neighboring villages and are reputed to have been
so for a long time. They have now become more
isolated because the road reaching their villages
is completely closed. They do, however, get visits
from the military.
the Yalibwa study CTollens and Huybens 1988). Other
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any cash transactions and to fine people who barter.16
4) The strong military and paramilitary presence in the
subregion makes it difficult for villagers to avoid
taxation, fines and "cc,ntrc.l." 5) The rural e coriomy is
diverse. M,:,stof the "farm hc,usehc,ld's"income in reality
derives from sources other than farming as illustrated in
activities which often provide cash revenue include
hunting, fishing, gathering wild food and gold
6) In some areas, plantations and
concessions still more or less directly control the
economy and thus the farmers' access to resources
CYahuma).
Land
The Tshopo subregion has an average population density of
less than five persons per square kilometer and is
completely within the tropical rainforest. The rural
zones vary in population density from 1.04 persons/km2
1GBarter transactions between traders and
farmers are reported to be exploitative in the
sense that the value of goods bartered to the
farmer is less than the cash price of the paddy,
even at "official" prices. Yet o f ten the farmer
will choose barter because it is the only way to
get merchandise. More often, the farmer has no
choice because there are few other buyers.
(Bafwasende) to 16.27 persons/km2 (Isangi).
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population of the subregion is probably around 900,000
people in a 200,000 km2 land area (Streiffler and Mbaya
1986).
In villages visited, there were no reported shortages of
land for those who wanted to farm although, in the largest
towns, there is conflict over good land which may be as
far away as 12 kilometers from the market center. These
low population densities are caused in part by
outmigration and infertility and as such are affected by
lack of investment in health and other services.
Land is controlled for the most part by patrilineage
elders who distribute it to lineage members. It is also
possible to obtain rights to land for plantations or
"farms." Clan leaders receive small ccrnperiaet Lon for land
used in this way.
Officially the state owns all land in the country but in
practice traditional land tenure is respected, except when
it comes in conflict with opportunities to lease land at
the profit of village leaders as Newbury (1986) describes.
No study was carried out, but it seems that there has been
$'·'Y
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little competition for land in Tshopo because much of it
is inaccessible.
Capital
The capital assets of the average household include the
household articles which belong to women, a locally
manufactured gun which some men possess, clothing owned by
individuals, tools owned by both men and women (men-
machetes, women-hoes), locally produced baskets and mats,
gourds, locally made furniture including a bed for the
adults, a table and a few chairs. Some households possess
a distillery owned and operated by women. The house
itself is made of mud built around a wooden frame. Most
households own a few chickens, ducks and goats which run
free in the village. These animals are rarely eaten by
the family and are used in bridewealth transactions, as
payment for services (e.g. a midwife or a judge), during
marriages or funerals, and to pay extraordinary expenses
such as funerals, hospitalization, medication or fines.
There are no cattle in the areas discussed because of
trypanosomiasis. Pigs and sheep are found in some
villages and the hunting dog, often sporting a belled
collar, is ubiquitous.
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Relatively "wealthy" individuals, in other words, tt-II::.se
who have access to resources either through position,
salary or family, may possess items such as a charcoal
iron, a bicycle, a radio, cabinets, glasses and plates, a
sewing machine or a watch. Households observed owning
some of these items included those of a midwife and former
plantation worker (sister of a trader), a notable in a
large village, a farmer with large coffee fields and a
teacher. It is very rare, however, to find a functioning
radio, bicycle or watch. Data were not collected on what
percentage of households possess these items in Tshopo,
but a study in Bandundu Region showed that 45% of the
villagers possessed no consumer items whatsoever, not even
a non-functioning watch (Pruitt 1984). It is likely that
most Tshopo villagers are even poorer as they are more
isolated. In Yahuma, men liked to pose for group pictures
in which they would display their most prestigious item,
an empty cigarette box. One group of elders pleaded for a
ball to play soccer, saying that there was none in their
or surrounding villages.
Money indeed may be circulating in the villages,
especially after the harvest, but people complain that
they have no way to purchase goods, and they are also wary
of displaying wealth. During research in Bandundu, some
8'3
farmers reported that they gave away their cattle or other
assets due to threats of sorcery and taxation.
Labor
When a man accumulates a certain sum of money, his first
"investment" is a wife and if possLb Le he will plan tCIpay
bridewealth for a second wife. In that way, the household
can cultivate a second field which can bring in additional
revenue. During a rice campaign in Yahuma, men with more
than one wife sold significantly more rice (New Pop 1986).
Women carry out more agricultural and household labor than
do men (Tollens and Huybens 1988). In some cases, women
do virtually all the work in the fields except cutting the
large trees (Chapter Seven, Case Study 7.11). They are
responsible for all the processing and cooking of food as
well as cleaning and other household tasks.
begin to help out as soon as they can walk.
Youriq girls
Fetching
water and pounding manioc roots and leaves are the two
most time-consuming tasks in a woman's day. Nc. villages
visited in Tshopo had capped water sources or wells, and
electricity is only found in a few homes in Isangi center,
at mission stations, and at the bar on Saturday night in
Banalia. Thus there are no electric grinding mills, and
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no hand grinding mills are available on the market either.
Potable water is as far away as three or four kilometers
in some villages.
Women's most time-consuming agricultural tasks are
planting and harvesting, sometimes carried out in groups.
Weeding takes place only once or twice in the season.
Porterage can be very laborious if the field is far away
and the paths inundated with water. Women in Banalia
reported that during the rainy season they occasionally
have to swim across streams with packs (up to fifty kilos)
on their backs.
Men's time is taken up by hunting, clearing fields,
accompanying women and helping in field labor, especially
at planting and harvest time, negotiating with authorities
and kin, and dealing with traders. Both men and women may
be called to carry out salonga or unpaid labor for the
village or collectivity but often this benefits the chiefs
and generates little productive activity (Mokonda 1978).
Women are more often tapped for salonga as they are seen
to more easily controlled by the workbosses and less
likely to escape.
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Neighbors and kin who help out will usually be given palm
wine and food. A man will clear a field for his wife to
plant. If a woman has no husband, she will ask another
male relative or may compensate a man or men to clear the
field. Aside from clearing, there is little communal
labor on the fields with the exception of help from
children and occasionally other close female
relatives. 17 In a polygynous household, wives are
responsible for separate fields.
Village Resources
Villagers develop a deep inferiority complex vis a vis
townspeople, as reflected in interviews <Chapter Seven,
Case Studies of Yalibwa and Bolindo villages). These
feelings stem in part from the fact that very few services
exist in the villages. One doctor covered an entire zone
and rarely, if ever, reached outlying villages. There
were three mission hospitals in the subregion but they are
out of reach of the vast majority. Dispensaries were so
17A clue to this lack of cooperation came from
fieldwork in Bandundu <Russell 1989, 1990). Here
women reported that they do not trust other women
to help out because they may receive a fetish which
will harm them or their family. Jurion and Henry
(1969) indicate that this is a longstanding pattern
in forest agriculture, but Perrault (1978) reports
work groups for rice sowing and harvesting.
inadequately provisioned as to be useless. A dispensary
visited at a collectivity headquarters in Yahuma lacked
any medications, bandages or antiseptics.
Schools existed in the larger villages and in towns but
they had virtually no resources and absenteeism was high.
Teachers had to travel to Kisangani and spend weeks if not
months of haggling to get even a portion of their
salaries, SCI they came to depend on Lo ca l "c,:.ntributi,;:.ns"
to Ii ve. This re~ort to corruption seriously undermined
the quality of education. Female students were much less
likely to continue or even start school because they are
needed for work in the fields and parents fear unwanted
pregnancy from relations with teachers (Perrault 1978).
Nevertheless, the goal of each family was to educate at
least one or two children and people bitterly regretted
the lack of opportunity to do so.
Village Survival
Although trapped in a situation of seemingly hopeless
underdevelopment with respect to the rest of the country,
Tshopo villages were not entirely without resources.
Their most important asset was that easy access to land
made it possible for every able-bodied person to cultivate
fee to plant a field (Tshibaka 1989).18 These Y'ights
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and thus to eat. Thus, Tshopo's veY'y lack of development
was, in some sense, an asset when one thinks of otheY'
fOY'est aY'eas devasted by lumbeY'ing, mining and cattle
gY'azing. Clan-based land tenuY'e gave Y'ights to land to
all clan membeY's and even outsideY's paid only a nominal
weY'e not guaY'anteed, howeveY', as legally all land belongs
to the state and clan eldeY's have been known to sign away
laY'ge tracts of land (MacGaffey 1980). Mbaya Y'epoY'ts that
TUY'umbu faY'meY's had been told that the land did not belong
to them (Mbaya 1983). The lack of Y'epY'esentation I~f Y'uY'al
dwelleY'S in national OY' Y'egional political stY'uctuY'es
bodes ill foY' a futuY'e when land speculation may take
place (Cf. NewbuY'y 1984; Gaudreau and Almy 1986).
TY'aditional medicine and healing aY'e highly esteemed in
ZaiY'e, even by urban dwellers, and village healers can be
sought out oveY' long distances. TY'aditional medicine was
often seen to be more effective than western medicine and
was substantially less expensive if not free. Urban women










or family difficulties could be resolved in the village as
well with purification rituals and payment of fines.
The village lifestyle was romanticized by urban dwellers,
who saw their children become disrespectful, lazy and
selfish. Men praised the village woman as a model of
obedience, hard work and morality, while criticizing city
women as soft, intellectual and unfaithful. Yet urban
dwellers feared the social control that exists in the
village. For good or evil, people's every movement,
investment and attitude is scrutinized and judged by the
community. In this way, those who acquire too much are
punished but weak individuals such as widows and cripples
may become scapegoats. Returning relatives may be cursed
if they are not seen to be generous enough, so most stay
away. City people came to regard villagers in the same
way that Belgians regarded the Cc.ngc.lese,as "un cLviIized II
and incapable of directing their own lives. These
attitudes were particularly striking in officials.
Beliefs in witchcraft and sorcery were incorporated
syncretically into Christianity, which was increasingly
represented in Tshopo by small fundamentalist groups such
as the Pentacostal Church and the Seventh Day Adventists.
Local congregations were one of the building blocks of
:::,; ::'?'$lM?r:IttSrrIi"
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village social life, and provided perhaps the sole
opportunity for organizing to solve common problems
outside of the state.
One example is the Pentacostal Church in Yangambi which
prohibited its members from drinking and smoking, and
encouraged men to be faithful to their wives. Church
members gave moral and monetary support to a woman whose
husband had abandoned her with five children and rejoiced
when he returned several years later. These chur ch
members felt they could trust one another, in many cases
more than they trusted family members. This brust led
them to enter into business transactions with one another
and to take responsibility for transporting and storing
fellow church members' goods (Lokomba 1987). Though to
some extent the church represented an independent voice,
it could not openly oppose government policy without
suffering severe sanctions. 19
Most of the parishes were also very poor in resources.
There were only a few large Catholic or Protestant
missions in the subgregion. Where they exist, these
191n April 1990, however, the council of
Catholic Bishops issued a very strong statement
calling for fundamental political change in the
country (Jeune Afrique 1990).
face of abuses by authorities. Often this advocacy
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missions provide virtually the only services available to
the community and the only advocacy for villagers in the
position is easier for expatriate missionaries to take and
tends to fade when expatriates are replaced by
Zairians.20
2.8 Fundamentals of the Rural Economy
Extractive Activities
As the Yalibwa study and Perrault's work showed, much
hc,useh,::.ldLn come comes f rom "the wild," that is h'.lnting
and gathering, especially forest meat (antelope, monkey,
forest rat and warthog), caterpillars and mushrooms and,
for some, searching for gold and ivory. Collected and
hunted foods are highly valued in towns and cities. A man
can receive as much for one large animal as for a sack of
rice. Men see hunting as a more prestigious activity and
less subject to control than farming. In a Turumbu
village, good hunting territory was five to six hours walk
2°Zairian priests and pastors are not
Llniversally silent, however. In Isangi, it was a
Zairian Abb~ who spoke to us about the abuses of
the "coc.perative.II Expatriates can also be
insulated from the community.
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from the village and men went out to hunt several times a
month. Most of the elephant hunting is carried out by
specialists--outsiders with high powered guns or pygmies.
Hunters also trade in skins of exotic animals and
reptiles.
Gold prospecting once severely disrupted the rural "areas
in eastern Banalia. Reports in Boyoma in 1983 decried the
collapse of agriculture in the wake of the gold rush. By
1986-87 reports from travellers in the area indicated that
feeding the gold prospectors had become more profitable
than gold mining. Food prices in the heart of the gold
area were as high as in Kisangani.
Fishing
Tshopo boasts two peoples who specialize in fishing, the
Lokele and the Wagenia. The area around Kisangani is now
severely overfished and many of the Wagenia try to make a
living in town (IRSA colloquium 1987). The Lokele trade
in all food products as well as fish, and have played a
prominent role in the regional political economy since
before independence. In inland villages, women and men
fish in streams with lines or nets, depending on the local
custom, dam small streams to make fish ponds, or poison
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the stream to stun the fish. In Kisangani, however, most
of the fish sold in the market, which is salted or smoked,
comes from lakes in the Ituri subregion. This fish,
called makayabo, is an important trade good as well and
thus is also found deep in the interior. Some makayabo is
made in Tshopo, especially around Banalia, and the local
varieties are highly prized.
Agriculture
The four main crops cultivated are manioc, plantain, corn
and rice. Manioc is the daily staple, accounting for up
to 80Z of calories consumed (Jones 1959). In se,me areas,
plantain, or manioc and plantain are pounded together to
make Iitama while, in other areas, manioc is made into
porridge or bagali by pounding it into flour and boiling
in water. Another important manioc staple is chikwangae
or kwanga which is manioc flour boiled and fermented in
leaves. Unlike other regions where it is a staple, coyn
is mainly consumed on the cob and used foY fermented
alcohol in Tshopo. Rice is primarily a cash crop, with




Other crops include squash, sweet potatoes, yams, oil
palms, beans and peanuts. Women also cultivate onions or
scallions, pilipili or hot pepper, tomatoes and, in some
areas, eggplant. These items are used for the sauce eaten
with meat, fish or insects and can also be sold if a
market is nearby. Squash seeds are dried and pounded and
cooked in the sauce.
or boIled.
Sweet potatoes and yams are roasted
Beans and peanuts are cash crops, when a buyer can be
Peanuts are also roasted and eated or
ground and put into the sambe (Swahili) or pando.
(Lingala), the pounded manioc leaves which are eaten at
almost every meal. A few other greens are also commonly
eaten but pando. is the most favored food.
Palm nuts are used to make palm oil which is manufactured
in the village either in individual households by boiling
and compressing or in the village ~alaxear or artisanal
oil press, which uses oil barrels and charcoal-fired heat.
A modern palm oil factory operated by PLZ in Lokutu makes
palm oil for the Kinshasa market from the PLZ plantation
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of dwarf palms.21 Palm oil for the Kisangani market is
made artisanally and wholesaled through large companies
such as Hasson et Fr~re, Busira-Lomami and Zimex. Small
traders try to compete in the business as well, often
unsuccessfully.
There was a sugar plantation and modern factory in Isangi
(Lotokila) run by a joint Chinese-Zairian venture. This
factory produced most of the sugar consumed in Kisangani
but was plagued with serious problems. The land was not
really suited for sugar monoculture, the Zairian
partnership (the Executive Committee of the MPR)
floundered, and workers were verging on revolt during two
1987 visits. Recruitment for labor in the sugar fields
was difficult because of low pay and harsh working
21In Bandundu, most of the palm oil factories
have gone out of business. The palm nuts were
collected by men to sell in the factories but
people found it much more profitable to make their
own palm oil in malaxeurs than to sell it to the
palm oil company. The struggle for control of the
business continues, as some collectivities forbid
or heavily fine malaxeurs in collaboration with the
remaining palm oil companies. In one collectivity
visited, a palm oil company was active and paid
workers about $2.00 per month with no benefits.
There was competition for jobs, however, because
the company protected employees from harassment by
the state (Russell 1990).
rr'r
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Several deaths were also reported from
improper use of pesticides (Chapter Seven, case study
7.9) •
Another well-funded agricultural project in the subregion,
the cocoa project at Bengamisa, also had serious
difficulties because the cost of evacuation of the cocoa
made it uneconomical to produce.
Coffee has been an important cash crop in the subregion,
grown both by smallholders and in plantations. C.:,ffee
plantations taken over by zairianization have not fared
well, howe ver, The most extensive, those owned by a
former head of security for the country in the Buta area,
had closed down completely by 1989 due to lack of
maintenance and bad management. A smaller plantation
visited near Banalia in 1986, owned by the People's
Commissioner, had not been weeded for years and workers
were afraid to harvest the beans for fear of insects which
bore into eyes and ears.
Smallholders in some areas have done well with coffee,
depending on the world price, though coffee grown in
Tshopo is of poor quality and the farmers do no processing
to increase the value. One trader, remarking on the
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difference between farmers in Opala and those in Turumbu,
claimed that Opala farmers were better off because of the
extra revenue derived from coffee. The real wealth in
coffee, however, has come from smuggling it across the
border (AZAP 1982).
Though the last twenty years have seen the sharp decline
of plantation agriculture in the subregion, new
possibilities may be opening up. SORGERI, the Kisangani-
based oil and soap manufacturer, bought rights to land on
the left bank for palm plantations, and American investors
took over large tracts of land north of Kisangani for
development (New York Times, December 1989). The next
chapter discusses the history of the plantations in
Tshc,p':'.
Smallholder agriculture remained extremely primitive. No
inputs were used and production was limited by the size of
the field that could be cleared in the forest. The
average field size was .67 ha <Tshibaka 1989). The only
method of soil regeneration was fallow. No system of
rotation was followed and no fertilization technique used
--------------------_ ...
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except burning the vegetation.22 Tools were crafted by
local blacksmiths from scrap metal which is not sturdy.
Manufactured tools were never seen in any local market,
though they were probably made available in plantation
canteens in the past. Fewer and fewer men go into
blacksmithing so tools are often hard to come by.
As mentioned above, seeds available for rice are
degenerating and yields as low as 400 kg/ha were reported.
By 1978, average yields in Haut Zaire were 720 kg/ha while
in the colonial era, yields of 1500 to 2000 kg/ha from the
R66 variety were reported (Clifton and Afifi 1985, Baboy
Longaza 1986). Farmers made their own selection for
storage, however, and some areas (Banalia) have been able
to maintain good quality despite low yields. In other
areas, it was reported that farmers did not store seeds
because, due to extreme poverty, all the harvest was sold
(Chapter Seven, Case Study 7.12).
22Though systematic study on farming systems was
not carried out by this author in Tshopo,
information is available for Bandundu and from the
studies of Tshibaka and Tollens and their students.
From these we know that the major constraint to
improved farm productivity is labor, specifically
male labor for cutting and burning and female labor
for weeding, mounding or other practices which
could increase yields. Henn's (1988) study in
Cameroon showed, however, that men do not
necessarily increase labor inputs when food crops
become more profitable.
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and money from rel.atives in town as well. There were a
Other Sources of Income in Rural Areas
In addition to selling crops and gathered products, men
make and sell charcoal, women and old people make mats and
baskets and women cut firewood and gather fruits such as
mangoes and pineapples, and cut sugarcane. On the
Bafwasende road, villagers, including the pygmy
population, earn money on tourism by posing for photos and
selling souvenirs. Villagers occasionally receive gifts
few salaried positions in rural areas such as teacher,
nurse, government official or mission worker, but these
were rare and it was often difficult to get paid.
Rural Markets
Despite the variety of crops and items produced in Tshopo,
market development was very weak except along the Zaire
river, where canoe-based Lokele markets are held. There
were weekly markets in the zone capitals but in villages
one found only a few bicycle traders and an occasional
boutique selling soap, pens, salt, sardines and tomato
paste. The latter were located in the largest villages.
In one large village in Yahuma, extending four kilometers
along the road, a weekly market had been set up in 1986
i
I
but it had only ten stalls. During the stay in this
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village it was virtually impossible to buy food as there
was no surplus. Several other smaller villages in the
vicinity had no market whatsoever, and the villagers
complained repeatedly that their most serious prc.blem was
inability to buy merchandise or market their crops
(Chapter Seven, Case Study 7.12).
Weakness in market development can be attributed to the
fact that, throughout much of Tshopo, traders and
concession owners had provisioned the villages through
canteens. In archival work in Belgium, sources referred
also to shops run by Indians and Pakistanis in the rural
areas (SICAI 1972). This system lasted until the mid-
1970s when the rural economy collapsed in the wake of
zairianizatic.n. Few shops and canteens were left in 1987
and no Indians and Pakistanis in the rural areas. Rural
stagnation has been linked with nationalization schemes in
other African countries as well (Callaghy 1987:156).
Villagers in Tshopo were prevented by a number of external
and internal factors from developing a local market system
and marketing their own crops in towns. PCII:.rroads were
otten given as the prime reason for this underdevelopment
(Region of Haut Zaire 1986), but roads were a symptom of
officials scared away large investors as well. Those who
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the problem and not the problem itself. The fundamental
issue was that rural people were not actors in the
national or regional political economy. Lacking a power
base, they had no say in how national or regional funds
were spent, they had no access to national or regional
resources, and the authorities retained various methods to
compel farmers to continue to produce food for the urban
areas even when farmgate prices were too low to be
profitable. Farmers had very little bargaining power
except to refuse to sell and, as discussed below,' this was
not really an option. Zairianization and harassment by
remained concerned themselves less and less with
smallholders and concentrated on self-contained
plantations CPLZ, Lotokila, SORGERI).
The workload of the villager, especially women who would
be in charge of food sales, mitigated against extended
trips which are necessary to organize trade. For men and
women, permission was necessary to leave the village and
be absent from salongo. The great majority of villagers
were illiterate and could not fill out the forms required
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by the state to organize a market or a cooperative.23
In any case, a group or organization came under the
immediate surveillance and control of the local MPR cadre.
This control meant taxation and political indocrination.
For example, after the market was organized in the large
village in Yahuma, the market women (now under AFECOZA)
had to spend a great deal of time learning praise songs to
Mobutu and attending rallies, or animation, and had to
contribute to the organization.
People were reluctant to display any form of wealth
because of fear of taxation and banditry. Two shoot outs
were witnessed over ivory and ivory money during the stay
in the large Yahuma village. During the 1987-88 season,
ivory hunters frightened traders away from buying rice in
1sangi by murdering an agent from Busira Lomami, a palm
oil concession, and stealing his cash box.
In Isangi, farmers were discouraged by Busira Lomami from
marketing their own palm oil and rice. A groupement chief
in a Topoke collectivity reported that agents of the
company told villag~rs that, if the road was opened up,
23Mvumbi (1984) found a 97% illiteracy rate
among Turumbu villagers.




bandits from Kisangani would come into the villages. He
noted that many villagers were afraid to go to Kisangani
villagers in Yahuma confirmed that people feared being
stopped by the military and thus rarely left the village.
The Abbe at the Catholic mission in 1sangi reported that
farmers had been stopped from selling their own rice in
the market by barricades set up on the road (see Chapter
Five ori the 1sangi "c.::o':'perative").
Analysis of the Rural Economy
The rural economy was the mirror opposite of that in
Kisangani--few people and many tasks and niches to fill
(Cf. Pottier 1983). The urban population was swollen with
unemployed or marginally employed people--one third of the
population of the Region lived in Kisangani--while the
rural areas around Kisangani are very sparsely populated.
Thus villagers reasoned--correctly--that remaining in the
rural areas doomed them to a life at the bottom of the
survival chain. One article in Boyoma (June 1983),
refering to farm work, stated bluntly that "one single
tractor is worth more than a thousand poor devils,
starving and unpaid f or more than si); mc,nths." The
article went on to say that blaming the exodus from the
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rural areas for poor agricultural production avoided the
real problem of facing the situation of rural people.
For reasons discussed in Chapter Five, producers'
cooperatives failed to provide a base for rural
organizing, and even communal work in the fields was very
limited. The interactions between the rural and urban
economy and the struggles which ensue are illuminated in
the same chapter. It is there where we see that, although
most urban dwellers have few opportunities for
advancement, it is very difficult for rural people to
ascend the survival chain at all. The nature of Zaire's
patrc,nage system means that f or rural dwellers, "in the
vast maj.::orityof cases, prct ect Lon fails bo materialize"
from higher-ups such as party leaders, teachers, chiefs
and missionaries. Thus, "disengagement f rom the state is





This chapter describes agricultural production and trade
from the days of the Arab slave traders who occupied
Kisangani in the 1880s through the period of
zairianization, which brought about a breakdown of the
rural economy. This is not a comprehensive history, as it
will focus on production and trade of rice, and on
important trends which shaped the economics, social
relations and models for systems of agricultural
prc.duction and trade. More than other regions of Zaire,
however, Haut Zaire's economy has been closely bound to
agriculture and the structures set up to produce, process
and evacuate crops are central to an understanding of the
region (Jewsiewicki 1983a:17).
3.1 Precolonial Agriculture and Trade
Prior to European contact, people in Tshopo practiced
slash and burn agriculture, as they do today. The
implements, storage containers and foodstuffs stored in
the Village in precolonial times may have been more
numerous and varied, to judge from descriptions of the
Kisangani area in Stanley's Through the Dark Continent.
In fact, his depiction of large, prosperous and ordered
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villages does not bear much resemblance to the poor, dusty
habitations found today (Stanley 1878, vol 11:254).
Crops which became staple to the diet in Tshopo were
introduced from the New World and from East Africa:
manioc, corn and peanuts via the Portuguese on the west
coast, and rice via the Swahili "Arabs" who invaded and
settled in the region in the 1880s (Miracle 1967, Jones
1959, Vansina 1979). Stanley found manioc and corn
planted in the Kisangani area in 1877. Banana plantain
had once been the most important staple, and it still is
produced and eaten widely around Kisangani, but manioc was
already a dominant crop in the 1800s. Yams and sweet
potatoes, by contrast, are no longer widely cultivated,
though they can still be found in the market.
Stanley encountered markets along the river in 1877.
Trade in food between villages, and probably the markets,
were organized by the Lokele who also bartered fish for
farm products. Certain Lokele clans were ironworkers as
well and produced both implements and prestige money
(likanga) used in bridewealth transactions. The Lokele
system was the glue that held the regional economy
together, through blood brotherhood rituals and
intermarriage that linked Lokele and non-Lokele trading
partners (Lokomba 1972).
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It encouraged peaceable trade
through these rituals and symbols such as the river
mollusks (called lokele) which were used in peace
ceremonies. Lokele was, and to a certain extent still
is, a lingu.a franca used among the peoples of Tshopo
(Isangi).
Lokele dominance of the waterways translated into economic
dominance upon the arrival of the Europeans and the
establishment of settlements, but it is not known if this
dominance was perceived by other peoples before that time
or was linked to the slave trade, as was Bobangi river
trade near Bolobo downriver (Harms 1981). Lokele were,
and still are, restricted from claiming land away from
their riverfront villages and thus there may have been
more of a balance in the past, with Lokele the masters of
the water, and Topoke, Turumbu, Kumu and other inland
peoples the masters of the forest. The fact that the
forest-based peoples lost prestige vis a vis the Lokele
can also be traced to the undervaluing of African
agriculture and the use of farming peoples as plantation
workers, as discussed below.
Vansina (1979) provides a nice sketch of the precolonial
food economy, noting that village densities may be related
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to reliance on fishing or swidden agriculture. The
dispersion of resources in the forest environment and the
need for movement as forest fields became exhausted
favored small acephalous groups linked by exchange and
marriage relations. The fishing peoples in contrast had a
more dense political system based on cooperation necessary
for net fishing.
Though profoundly wrenched during the colonial era and
afterward, the indigenous farming and fishing systems of
Tshopo are for the most part intact, and social relations
adapted to these systems are remembered, if not always
acted upon. Years ago, farmers returned to inter cropping
and stopped planting in lines after submitting to decades
of intervention in their farming systems.24 Hunting and
gathering continue to playa large role in the rural
economy both for subsistence and to sell items such as
caterpillers, mushrooms and medicinal herbs. Most men
still hunt with spears or nets although artisanally
manufactured guns are available to a few. Fishing peoples
24Instability does not necessarily lead to
multicropping as Berry (1989b) demonstrates.
Nevertheless, it is likely that it plays a role in
farmers' strategies in Tshopo as they fear to
invest too much in one crop (which mayor may not
be commercialized). The exception is women's
manioc fields.
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have adopted nylon net and line but techniques have not
changed.
In Kisangani, joking relationships are common expressions
of longstanding exchange and marriage ties between
neigboring peoples such as the Ngando and the Topoke. The
composition of the city's population reflects the
diversity of ethnic groups in Tshopo and the fact that no
one group came to dominate the area. Unlike parts o f
Shaba and Kivu regions, no paramount chiefs wield power.
3.2 Arab Slave Traders, the Free State and the Early
Co Lon.ia l Era
In the wake of Stanley's conquest of the cataracts south
of Kisangani, Zanzibari Arab slave traders moved from
their base in Ujiji north to Kisangani. Ten years after
Stanley's passage, Tippu Tib, the most famed and powerful
slave trader of the era, had established bases at Yambuya
(Isangi) and Banalia. Kisangani under Arab rule was
called "Singhitini" from the Arab singatou.n meaning a
marshy land not favorable for habitation (Nkongolo 1975).
The brief period of Arab dominance and "their conquest of
eastern Zaire, along with disruption, destruction, and
death on a large scale .•• produced an enormous change in
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labor mobilization, including a great increase in
slavery." The captives were used as porters, and "t,;)meet
the labor demands of commerce, conquest, and cultivation,
beginning a practice which continued under the Free State
and Belgian rule" (Northrup 1988:27).
In the late 1880s, Tippu Tib made an alliance with the
Free State and became the Governor of Stanley Falls
district but, by 1890, he had retreated. After several
Free State-Arab confrontations, the territory was secured
for the Free State (Hinde 1897). The legacy of the Arabs
persists in the region, however, in the Swahili language,
the Muslim religion (with few adherents but many cultural
influences), and the descendents of the Arabs, the
Arabises.
The Arabs also introduced the cultivation of rice,
although one source claims that the Topoke were already
cultivating rice upon their arrival (Nkongolo 1975). In
Maniema, south of Kisangani, where Arabise culture is much
stronger, rice is the staple food. In Kisangani, it
became a supplement to manioc and plantain, and an
important cash crop.
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The Congo Free State was ceded to King Leopold II under
the Berlin Treaty and was his private domain, financed by
European capital. By 1898, the Free State was already
giving out concessions around Kisangani. The earliest was
the Lomami Comp any , whi ch sc,on "contrc.lled a vast
concession so completely that the state did not even
collect taxes" (Northrup 1988: 75). Conditions for the
workers on these concessions were scandalous. In 1'304, a
repo rb claimed that Af ri cans "were f o r ced tc, w,::.rksc, muc h
for the Company that they had no time to tend their own
fields" (N,::.rthrup1'388: 75).
The violent e~,;cesses c,f the epc,que .:,f"red rubber" and its
consequences for society have been well documented (Morel
1970-19(7). What needs to be noted here is that the
concession system set up certain patterns of and beliefs
about African labor and agriculture which persist today,
just as the concessions themselves persist, albeit in
truncated f or rn, Foremost among these patterns was the
coercion of labor, the subversion of local authority for
labor impressment and the undervaluing of African farming,
both in the payment of low farmgate prices, combined with
high rates of taxation, which prevented capital
accumulation, and in the constant demands of the state
which interfered with agricultural labor.
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1913, Elskens, studying manioc cultivation at Yangambi
observed that "the worker can't afford tCIwait f or maruo c
to mature [to harvest] because his salary is tCIO lClw."
CreatiQn Qf the ColQnial FOQd Supply System
Outside Qf the the concession areas, agriculture became
highly cQntrolled as well. By 1929, the system Qf forced
cultivation was installed to guarantee supply of staples
such as rice and cotton fQr export and industries outside
o f the region. Forced cultivatiQn was the idea Qf a
colonial adminstratclr who had been "inspired" by a trip tCI
Portuguese Mozambique (Northrup 1988). In 1937, each
adult male (HAV or Homme Rdulte Valide) was responsible
for 2-1/2 hectares, rQtating various crQps (rice, peanuts,
cQtton was the ffiQStCQffiffiOnrotation in TshQpo). Althclugh
this practice was condemned by the International Labor
Organization as early as 1930, it cQntinued to the end of
the colonial era and was justified by the colonial state
by the "backwardness" of Africans with regard tCI
agriculture.
The enforcement of compulsory cultivation requirements,
which were reinstated in 1979, was often uneven and
arbitrary, giving local Qfficials the power to punish
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pec,p1e by agr icu1tura1 labor. It is not surprising then
that agriculture was not a highly favored activity and
continued to be shunned by men.
Transformation of agricultural products, such as artisana1
palm oil production and hand-pounding of rice, was
f,;:.rbiddenas we 11 "ob liging the peasants bo 1imit
themselves to the sale of raw materials" (Jewsiewicki
1'383a:41 ). There was a great deal of social control along
with these economic restrictions, including limitations on
dance and ceremonial, and frequent control of movements.
For the chiefs, polygyny was the sole source of
accumulation, and even that became more difficult as taxes
and fines increased (Ibid, p. 75).
In his economic history of Kisangani, Jewsiewicki
describes the increasing power of the city over the
hinterland in the 1920s and 305, the lack of a free market
on all levels, the imposition of forced cultivation and
the growth of monopolies created by companies which bought
crops in the countryside and resold them to their workers.
He notes that "neither the artisana1 sector nor African
commerce, not to speak of industry, had any place in a
situation marked by the absence of even the right to
private property for Africans" (Jewsiewicki 1978:26).
11'3
This situation hampered the growth of an African
bOIJrge.:.usie.
There was very little industrialization in the city up to
the second world war, with the exception of steam-driven
rice mills. Rice mills were opened in the countryside as
well and the Eastern Province became the most important
rice producer in the colony, with Stanleyville district in
the lead. In 1'325, the Belgika mill was producing 3,500
tonnes of rice per year (Jewsiewicki 1978:20). At least
some of the labor at Belgika was impressed (Buell 1928).
Rice production declined during the Depression, at least
as measured by quantities milled by Belgika. To
"stimulate" production, Depression era measures favored
the concentration of commercial power in the hands of the
large wholesalers and allowed for measures to suppress
African competition. During World War II,
intensification of forced cultivation of rice increased
the total area cultivated from 50,000 to 132,000 ha (Bezy
et al. 1'381:36). The impetus during the middle years was
thus tel "keep Africans on the farm."
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3.4 The Paysannat Scheme
The dominant colonial view was of a backward African
farmer and primitive farming system. Belgian agronomists,
however, made significant contributions to tropical
agriculture and many tried to implement potentially useful
programs such as soil conservation, reforestation, and
introduction of new crops and varieties (Geortay 1956b,
Drassouchoff 1985). One example is the development of
successful rice varieties Y3 and R66 at INEAC at Yangambi
and distributed throughout the country (Baboy Longaza
1986, Krasniansky 1943, INEAC 1947-1960). According to
Miracle (1967:243), at INEAC, "[TJhe volume, scope, and
quality of the •.•research is unparalled in tropical
Africa, and in some instances productivity was increased
impressively. " Drassouchoff (1965:188) claims that on the
eve of independence "INEAe was the most important research
organization in Africa and perhaps throughout the
tropics." For a discussion of the fate of this
prestigious institution which devoted much of its work to
upland rice, see Chapter Seven, case study of Yalibwa.
A particular concern of the Belgian agronomists was the
ultimate transformation of swidden agriculture to a more
intensive system (Jurion and Henry 1969). To accomplish
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this goal, an elaborate scheme was devised based upon the
swidden system and slowly introducing intensive
techniques. This transformation was to take place first
in paysannats or rural cooperatives. One of the most
important paysannats was at Turumbu, which bordered INEAC
at Yangambi. At the end of 1958, there were roughly
200,000 households in paysannats, the highest number
(70,146) being in Haut Zaire (Drassouchoff 1965:154).
Even if the paysannat scheme contained within it some good
ideas, such as cultivation of fruit trees and rotation to
increase soil fertility, it was too little and too late.
The paysannat probably represented the single most
important series of investments made in indigenous
agriculture by the colonial government but, like other
policies, the scheme was paternalistic and tightly
controlled. In the end it represented a very small
percentage of the colonial budget and accounted for only
10% of agricultural production CDrassouchoff 1986, Peemans
1986).
The fields to be cultivated in rotation were laid out in a
straight line behind the dwelling, and did not take into
account clan-based land tenure or even the uneven quality
of the soil CDelhove 1960). The organization of the
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paysannat was structured by expatriates and little
management was left to the farmers themselves. The
paysannat bought all the crops and distributed tools and
consumer items. The "cooperative" nature of the paysannat
was seen tCIbe in hermony with the "natural" coope ret Lon
found in Turumbu society, not taking into account the fact
that colonial rule suppressed many of the mechanisms for
regulating cooperation, and promoted divisions in society,
inc 1uding the stated po licy o f advancing "prc.gressive
farmers"--exclusively men--a theme which persists in
agricultural development projects (Jurion and Henry
1969:366, Russell 1988, Cf. Russell 1990).
The colonial agronomists and sociologists were not blind
to the problems of the original design of the scheme. The
Turumbu paysannat was created in 1944. Around 1954 it was
evident that the scheme was not bringing in enough revenue
for farmers and was too rigid. At that time voluntary
cultivation of coffee and oil palm was introduced on the
best soils. Some writers went as far as to say that
cooperatives should be run on the initiative of
progressive farmers but this never came about (Congo
Belge: de Lai des r.ooperatives 1956).
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Proponents of the paysannat scheme point to the high
levels of productivity they engendered (Miracle 1967). In
1959, the net profit of the paysannat was 1,790,000 francs
of which a third was distributed to 553 farmers (an
average of about $72 per farmer). The paysannat had over
one million francs ($6,666) in the bank, several sturdy
buildings, over 205 km of maintained roads, tractors and
trucks, rice mills and facilities for storage and
treatment of seeds. In 1975, the total revenue of Turumbu
farmers was estimated to be Z126 (Z106 from agriculture,
or about $50) (Banking and Monetary Statistics 1941-1970,
Kilumba 1975, Tshibaka 1986). Producers did not receive
significantly more for their crops during the paysannat
era than they did fifteen years later because two thirds
of their collective revenue was reinvested in the
cooperative. Incomes were also supplemented by credit
policies in canteens and access to health and school
benefits.
In 1987, by contrast, the cooperative which is the
successor to the paysannat had Z30,000 ($150) in the
savings bank, two partly-functioning rice mills (property
of the Kisangani-bMsed manager) and two buildings still
standing (Gakuru 1981). The rest of the assets had been
either burned down during the rebellion (see below) or
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stolen by various managers over the years. Chapter Seven,
case study 7.13 has a more detailed description the
current state of the cooperative and environs.
Thus the investment made under the paysannat scheme was
not sustained and in fact was pillaged until nothing was
left. What remained, however, was the monopsony system
which kept the price of Turumbu rice lower than any other
area around Kisangani and forced cultivation of rice
imposed by the state agronomists (Mbaya 1980).
Jewsiewicki's perspective on the paysannat scheme can
perhaps explain the fate of the cooperative. For him,
"the paysannat was •••a vast fraud designed to reestablish
control over the peasantry and improve the quality and
increase the quantity of agricultural produce while
keeping the peasant outside the market and under
administrative controls" (1980:58). As such, the
paysannat was consistent with other measures which
controlled peasant production and marketing.
Within this restrictive framework, very little was done
until late in the colonial era to prepare for indigenous
management, thus the colonial structure itself could not
have been mastered by the cooperative members. In 1959,
only one college-trained agronomist had graduated in the
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whole country (Drassouchoff 1965). The "peasants"
received training, appropriate to their roles, in road
maintenance, carpentry, mechanics and animal husbandry.
Sadly, even these skills were lost to the next generation,
as machinery lay rusting all around.
Ano t her perspective on the failure to create "rational"
agriculture in Turumbu stems from an analysis of the
indigenous economy. The Belgians found the Turumbu on
first corrta cb tc.be "absc,lutely savage" and undisciplined.
The men especially did not want to work long hours in the
field and they did not seem to care about increasing
Jurion and Henry (1969: 275) remarked that
men "stay up late, get up late, and gel late tc.the fields,
thus losing the best hours of the day as far as yields
from manual work •••lt is useless to hope for an
intensification of agriculture by other means without
first effecting a profound change in the moral and
intellectual attitudes of the rural population." The
rural population's concern was, however, to maximize their
access to forest and river resources through a variety of
strategies, including various hunting and stream fishing
methods, collection of a wide variety of forest foods,
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trading forest and manufactured products with their Lokele
neighbors and planting crops in the same field.2e
It is now known that the fOY'est erivLronmerrt is not "rich"
as was previously believed but rather harsh and
unpredictable (Hart 1979). Resources are hidden and
scattered and there are microclimates within the forest
which harbor different types of plants and animals. The
Turumbu had returned to this forest-based economy in 1987,
with the addition of trade in fOY'est products with
Kisangani. Hunters still hunted whenever possible and
exchanges were still made between Lokele and Turumbu,
though these were based on cash rather than commodities.
The fields were multicropped and distributed according to
clan.
Nevertheless, the Turumbu were still subject to numerous
intrusions by the state and continued exhortations that
they "rational ize" and "improve" rice production wi t hou e,
however, even the economic incentives provided in the
colonial era or viable technological packages. As the
goal of the paysannat and cooperative both was to give the
advantage of price and buying flexibility to the state, it
2eThey also, of course,
theiY' contact with the state.
wished to minimize
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is likely that, with other incentives, Turumbu men and
women would increase rice production.
3.5 The structure of the Rice Trade in the Colonial Era
Rice, like cotton and peanuts, was an imposed crop
throughout the Tshopo region. Each head of household, or
HAV (Homme Rdulte Valide) was required to plant a certain
area (usually one hecatare) each year. The unfairness of
this regulation was evident to some colonial authorities,
since men with more than one wife were considerably better
off than unmarried men or men with one wife, but the
system was never modified, as noted above.
Rice was purchased by rural-based traders (Belgian, Greek
or Portuguese), settlers or plantations, milled in the
countryside and sent to Kisangani and beyond. In the
later colonial era, there was a canteen every 25 km to
provision farmers in merchandise and imported food
(sardines, powdered milk, biscuits) (SICAI 1971). Traders
also offered these items for sale to farmers, but it is
not known if barter was used as well.
At the end of the colonial era, Zaire was a net exporter
of rice. Each miller was responsible for buying rice in
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his zone, distributing seeds on credit, tools and other
manufactured goods. In the concession areas, these items
could be bought on credit or traded in the company store
(Drassouchoff 1965). Tollens (1989) suggested that the
system was set up in this way because it was very
difficult to attract expatriate traders to the vast low
population density rural areas of Zaire and giving them a
monopsony was one enticement. African traders were not
considered to participate in the rice trade, however,
despite their important role in food supply to the city
and the building of roads and railroads took precedence
over development of the waterways. The rice trade as
structured by the Belgians required substantial capital
investment such as trucks and rice mills, credit for which
was simply not available to Africans--nor was it still,
for the most part in the 1980s (SICAl 1972, Chapter
8i);).26
The capitalization of the rice trade thus set up a certain
structure which differentiated it from trade in other
staple foods such as manioc and banana, which were run by
26In 1959, for example, only 31. of credit
available in Kivu for agriculture was given to
Africans, while in 1968, the year of the
"Agricultural Boost," 239 demands for credit were
made and not a single one filled (SICAl 1972).
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Africans within the context of controlled markets and
prices. It was interesting to find that, in Kisangani in
1986, this concept of the rice trade was essentially
intact and the relatively new phenomenon of petty traders
buying rice in the countryside to mill in town was
considered to be a serious disturbance (Boyoma 1986). As
late as 1983, the hand pounding of rice in the village was
forbidden. Thus the petty traders who began to buy rice
were differentiated from those traders who buy and sell
other staples (see Chapter Four).
In 1956, there were 60 rice millers operating in Tshopo,
32 in Stanleyville, and the Belgika mill was producing
25.2 tonnes of rice per day. Rice was primarily for local
consumption, but the Belgian Congo was a net exporter of
rice (Balwisha 1986-87),
3.6 European Settlers, Economic Domination and
Repercussions
The Belgian Congo had more European inhabitants at the end
of the colonial eya than did Kenya, surpassed only by
Southern Rhodesia and Angola (Davis 1986), The total
number of European inhabitants exceeded 100,000 with over
9,000 settlers in the colony, over 5,000 of whom lived in
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the Stanleyville province (Gann and Duignan 1962). Many
of these settlers owned and ran plantations in the
countryside. The area of land controlled by settlers
increased throughout the colonial era, by 25 percent
between 1949 and 1959, and by nearly 50 percent between
1945 and 1959 (Drassouchoff 1965:145).27 By 1959, 15~
(314,000 hal of all the land in the colony was under legal
tenure. These settlers departed from the country in
successive droves, starting at independence. About sixty
percent of plantation owners in Tshopo left permanently
after the Rebellion, and virtually all the rest after
zairianization, when a total of 91 plantations were
zairianized and 80 were simply abandoned (Perrault
1979:45). A few expatriates returned to Kisangani in the
late 1970s and 1980s to start up businesses once
The farms in Tshopo owned and managed by expatriates grew
coffee and European crops. Some had rubber plantations
and rice mills, many in the Banalia area. Owners lived on
27For a novelistic description
in the latter days of the Belgian
Graham Greene's R Burnt-Out Case.
of settler life
Congo, read
2BThe expatriate population reached its all-time
low in 1967 (400), increased to 1,266 in 1973 and
declined again in 1975. By 1979, it had again
doubled (MacGaffey 1987).
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the farms during the colonial era and were largely
responsible for organizing transportation and provisioniog
in their areas. White settlers, plantation agriculture
and cash crops, as elsewhere in Africa, received the vast
majority of credit and support available for agriculture
(Jewsiewicki 1983b).
The success of coLoru.al agriculture was "mainly f rom small
enteprises owned by European settlers. They became the
main ou t Let f or wage labov in the 1950s." On the ot her
hand, as we have seen ab.:)ve,"no base e~;isted for African
rural petty capitalism or peasant agriculture, since the
peasants were is,:.latedf rom rural market mechanisms"
(MacGaffey 1987:37). The vast majority of palm oil
production, coffee, rubber, tea and cocoa was produced on
European-owned farms. These export crops brought in the
bulk of agricultural revenue for the colony (Drassouchoff
1960).
The history of the fate of white settlers in Tshopo is a
story yet to be written, as no published accounts exist.
Many of the state archives in Belgium are closed from
fifty years to the present to protect living individuals
and their families. Hunt's (1988) work will shed light on
the impact of white settlers on African social structures,
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as she completed extensive fieldwork in 1989 on women's
health and maternity in Isangi Zone and had access to
mission archives in London and Belgium.
In the city, European and African societies and economies
were highly segregated, as Pons (1969:41) describes:
There was a sharp cleavage between Europeans and
Africans in every social field. Europeans were
employers and 'teachers'; Africans were
employees and 'pupils' •••Africans in the town
were often landlords and tenants to each other,
but very seldom employers and employees; they
were frequently suppliers and consumers of a
limited range of goods and services, but very
seldom on a large scale.
One ethnic group that stood out amongst the others was the
Lokele. In his study of the social organization of
Kisangani, Pons describes the wealth of Lokele women
traders and the social and economic advancement of the
men. Twenty percent "of the Lokele men were white collar
workers, a figure significantly higher than for any other
tribe. A small minority of Lokele men also entered retail
trade in non-native goods such as bottled beer, tinned
food and cigarettes" (Pons 1969:76). The Lokele thus
formed the nucleus of an African merchant class, whose
influence could still be traced in the rice trade in the
1980s. Political events, described below, however, served
to undermine the group's ascendency.
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By 1978, of the 1700 or so expatriates in the whole
region, only 331 of these lived outside of Kisangani
(Annual Report 1978). Most of these individuals were
missionaries, volunteers and aid workers. One prominent
Greek businessman remained in Kisangani in 1986-87 who had
formerly ran plantations and a palm oil factory near
Isiro. He had weathered the Rebellion and zairianization
by keeping a base in Europe and diversifying his
agriculture-based interests from soap and vegetable oil to
margarine, toothpaste, candy and herbal medicines.
Another long-time resident who had also lost everything in
zairianization, the Indian owner of a rice mill, did not
fare well at all. While he still had a rice mill in 1987,
his trucks had broken down and he could not transport
goods. Aging and infirm, he had been unable to stop
thieves from plundering his rice stores and was seriously
injured in the fight. His business survived catering to
petty traders by keeping milling costs low. This practice
incurred the wrath of other rice professionals, but he
persisted because there was no other choice.
Most expatriates fled, however, and their attitude can
perhaps be summed up by a curator at Tervuren museum in
Belgium, who had owned a coffee farm in Kivu. He
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presented evidence to show that the colonials had left the
country in very good shape in terms of infrastructure,
agricultural management practices, health and education.
He was devastated at the deterioration of plantations on
his return to Kivu in the early 1980s, and could not see
how the mismanagement stemmed from colonial policies or
practices. Reiterating the perennial theme of the Belgian
colonial, he stated that "the Africans are very different
from us, you know, they don't want to work.
idea how value is created by work."
They have no
The significant presence of white settlers, the domination
of trade networks by Europeans and Indians, and the
extreme paternalism of the later colonial era had a
profound impact on the attitudes of the Congolese. While
striving t,;:.become evo t ae s , or "ev,;:.lved"Africans, they at
the same time harbored deep and abiding resentment toward
the colonial rulers, which erupted in political activity
unprecedented in Africa in the 1950s.
From his base in Kisangani, Patrice Lumumba was at the
center of this activity and became the independent
nation's first Prime Minister. Kisangani and Haut Zaire's
role in the emergence of Zaire's most important party, the
Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) is important to an
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understanding of the region's place in the national order.
3.7 The Impact of the Simba Rebellion
At the close of the colonial era, Stanleyville was a
prosperous, growing town of about 60,000 people (Pons
196'3). Main streets had been paved, electricity and water
reached most residents, and pUblic health measures
controlled disease in the citds.
Four years later, Stanleyville captured world attention as
it became the center of the "Simba II Rebe 11ion and
revolutionary government, creating the Republique
Populaire du Congo. The press reported the brutal murders
of white settlers, priests and nuns who had been held
hostage in the"Simbas' attempt to retain control of the
city in November 1964.
The "Simbas" were a rural based movement led by elites
influenced by China's communist revolution and loyal to
assassinated Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba. Lumumba's
power base came from the peoples of Tshopo and Maniema in
Kivu. The Rebellion in Kisangani, however, was linked to
other rebellions in northern Shaba, Kivu and Bandundu
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through a loose revolutionary movement that received moral
but no material support from international communism.
Much has been written about the rebellion and the Simba
(Verhaegen 1966). It was a movement grounded in part in
reaction to world revolutionary movements and in part in
revolt against those who had profited at the expense of
others after independence (see Turnbull 1983 on the "Black
Wazungu"). The magical powers of the Simba were derived
from potions and spells cast by sorcerers, notably two
women from Maniema.
While on one hand, there was ignorance about the means for
creating wealth, as the Tervuren curator asserted, there
was also wisdom in the perception that the new rulers of
the Congo were perpetuating colonial systems of
exploitation. This disillusion was shared by many
Africans shortly after independence. (See, for example,
Ngugi-wa-Thiongo's R Grain of Wheat or Chinua Achebe's
Rnthills of the Savanna.) Because of this disillusion and
desire to benefit from the spoils of independence, there
was at first much support for the Simbas among Kisangani
residents and, especially, rural people. This support did
not endure, however. People say that the Simbas destroyed
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their own power when they started indiscriminate killing
of their alleged civilian opponents and missionaries.
What is of interest in this era to this discussion is the
impact of the rebellion on food supply. Belgika rice mill
was pressured to provision the rebel soldiers, prisons and
hospitals but expatriate-owned businesses were not seized
(Le Martyr September 20, 1964). Food prices were
published in the newspaper and traders exhorted not to
take advantage of the situation by raising prices. What
is remarkable about the short rebel era is the orderliness
of the rebel government as reflected in the party organ Le
Martyr, as compared to Kisangani in 1986.2~ Informants
confirm that the rebellion in itself did not destroy the
local economy or food supply system.
The Simba and their supporters were not able to hold on to
the city for very long, however. Four months after their
capture of Kisangani, they were forced out by mercenaries
(combined force of Belgian, French, American and South
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held out on the city limits for months, however, and in
the interior for years.
More devastating than the passing of the Simba was the
reign of the mercenaries and Katangese (Shaba) soldiers
who controlled the city from 1964 to 1968. Those having
any collaboration with the Simba were put to death ·in
public executions. A bloody swath was cut through the
countryside. Both mercenary groups later revolted for
better pay and more control and their revolts led to
massive killing sprees and widespread devastation.
During much of this time, Kisangani survived by recourse
to international food aid (including PL480 "Food for
Peace" rice sent by the U.S. Government). Marketing was
severely disrupted. People fled to the forest and many
starved there, unable to eke out a liVing from the land.
Turnbull (1983) describes how Mbuti pygmies helped
Villagers to survive in the forest during these years
through hunting and collecting. One hindrance must have
been the inablility to clear land by burning before
planting for fear of being spotted by fighter planes
piloted by anti-Castro Cuban mercenaries s'~rveying the
territory (Odom 1988). It must also have been difficult
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to find seeds and cuttings to plant without attracting
attention.
A Spanish doctor, Sanz Gadea, set up a project in
Kisangani to treat people for malnutrition as they emerged
from the forest in the mid-1960s. Enormous damage had
been done, however, to the region. Many buildings were
destroyed in the city and countryside which had not been
rebuilt in the 1980s. Most of the expatriates fled with
their goods and investments, never to return. In 1986-87,
some residents expressed the feeling that the city's
underdevelopment reflected the current leadership's
continued punishment for the rebellion and the fact that
it was Lumumba's base. This discrimination has had
effects on investment in agriculture and creation of a
regional merchant class. A recent example of
discrimination against the region can be seen in the
allocation of funds for the Banque de Credit Agricole
(BCA) in 1986. Of the total credits available, less than
one percent was allocated to Haut Zaire, while 36i. went to
Kinshasa, 15i. to Equateur and 26i. to Kivu (Rdpublique du
Zaire/Conjoncture Economique 1987).
The Rebellion and its aftermath created or exacerbated
conflict among ethnic groups and clans. Most Lokele were
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strong supporters of Lumumba, who drew on alliegances of
related Mongo peoples of Maniema and Tshopo, but some were
not. After the Rebellion, some Lokele clans turned
against others in bitterness over the killings. The
Topoke became heavily associated with support for the
Simba. The taint of this allegiance thus created
obstacles for Topoke and Lokele to move into the national
~lite, though by the 1980s many had done so. Many
powerful individuals who were not supporters of the
rebellion were eliminated by the Simba. Thus, at the
critical time of transition to independence, Kisangani was
deprived of most of its nascent bourgeoisie.
3.8 Zairianization: Final Blow to the Rural Economy
By 1968, the University was reopened and many expatriates
returned. In 1972, SICAI reported that the "commercial
sector is stilr substantially in the hands of
expatriates." There was a continued strong military
presence as well. According to SICAI, in 1971 there were
28,792 soldiers in Haut-Zaire and an astonishing 581. of
the residents of the region depended directly on military
salaries. In the same year, no credit was available
either through Credit Agricole or Credit Congo for
agriculture (SICAI 1972).
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The government started a series of measures in 1972 to
take over businesses and plantations owned by expatriates,
starting first with the expulsion of West Africans and
Pakistanis. By 1973, all but the largest enterprises were
"zairianized" by giving them over to loyal political
supporters of the ruling clique.
MacGaffey (1987) has drawn our attention to the fact that
zairianization did open up business opportunities for some
Zairians in Kisangani, and not all zairianized businesses
ccollapsed. It was at this time that some Zairians entered
the rice trade as "official" buyers, while in the late
1970s demonetization and the further collapse of the
economy pushed many individuals to enter petty trade,
buying small quantities of rice in the countryside.
Structurally, however, zairianization contributed heavily
to the decay of the economy, especially as credit and
external investment dried up. More significantly,
informants in Kisangani noted that zairianization was also
the beginning of extreme corruption. People saw that it
was possible to get something for nothing, and that being
well-placed politically could garner a great deal more
than working hard.
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Zairianization also generated a great deal of anger on the
part of non-beneficiaries toward Zairian business owners.
With Zairianization and the resultant burgeoning of the
"acquirers" (acqu.ereu.rs), who benefitted from the
expropriation, the gap widened between the ordinary worker
and the business owner. The acquereurs were soon in bad
repute (Boyoma 1983). For example, several rice
professionals interviewed claimed that they were not
acquereurs while others interviewed insisted that these
individuals really had been acquereurs.
From 1972-1974, the rdgime further consolidated power by
establishing state ownership of all land and, in an
attempt to capture agricultural revenue, marketing boards
were established for virtually all important crops.
Production declined and food imports increased. Under
pressure from the International Monetary Fund and donors,
most of the boards were dissolved in 1978. Nevertheless,
the damage had been done. Zairianization had outlawed the
rural canteens and shops and most expatriate traders were
expelled, but the marketing boards did not replace them in
provisioning rural areas (Mueller 1988; see Pehaut
1978:323 on similar conditions in Senegal).
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The 1978 plan f or agriculture (Relance 119ricole, or "Year
of the Agricultural Boost") was very ambitious and
entirely unsuccessful. It was in 1977 that copper prices
began to fall and the economic bubble that sustained
grandiose development schemes burst. Agriculture in that
year was alloted 3.6i. of the national budget, less than
that for radio and television. Only health and education
fared wc.rse. "The amoun t borrcwad f or agricultl.lre•••was
equivalent to 8 percent of that borrowed for the INGA-
SHABA complex and 15 percent of that allocated to air
transpor t" (World Bank 1'380:38) .30
In the late 1970s, the zaire was devalued, wiping out the
savings of many individuals and small businesses. This
act had the effect of utterly destroying people's trust in
the formal economy and turning them inevitably toward the
"par-allel" system. President Mobutu himself acknowledged
that the state could not be responsible for people's
welfare and urged citizens to se debroailler (manage by
your-self). Thus began the famed "System D" which
categorizes the struggle for survival of the average
citizen, a m~lange of scrounging, corruption, networking,
30The Inga-Shaba power line hooks up the
hydropower- fr-om the cataracts in Bas-Zaire to
mines in Shaba, but provides no electricity
areas in between.
the
f o r the
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smuggling, begging, subsistence agriculture, petty
trading, influence peddling and progressively lowered
standards of living described by Vansina (1982), Newbury
(1986), and many others.
By 1980, it was announced that government could not solve
the problems of agriculture and the Programme Agri~ole
Minimum (PAM) was formulated. This scheme, too, produced
no noticeable results. Donors had begun to get
discouraged. For example, the World Bank concluded in
their 1980 report that due to the production-oriented
private sector's inability "to draw Government's attention
to its problems in a way which would generate prompt and
adequate policy responses •••it is apparent to most
observers that the eventual development of Zaire will come
largely f rom private sectc.r activity" Cp, 87).
In the early 1980s, based on an analysis of development
problems and possibilities in Kivu, another World Bank
reporb found that "SUppOY"t servi ces as pY"esently organized
in Kivu probably have a negative impact on agricultural
production" and "the quality of education in Kivu is
gradually deteric.rating" <1984:32,7). A 1982 repo rt on
rice pY"oduction and commercialization in Bumba, EquateuY"
Region, came to similar conclusions, finding that, for
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producers, "rice is an economically and politically
imposed culture to which there is no incentive to promote
quality, no effective extension system to diffuse improved
seeds/practices (such as insecticides), and no appropriate
improved technology on hand to diffuse" (Pragma 1983:56).
It is within the context of the continued decline of
agriculture and the push for privatization that the
liberalization measures discussed in Chapter Six were
taken. Before these are described, however, it is
necessary to introduce the actors in the rice trade and
describe the mechanisms of the rice trade system as
observed in 1986-87.
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Chapter Four: Actors in the Rice Trade
4.1 The Rice Mills
Rice mills began to proliferate in Kisangani in the early
1980s. There are three main reasons for this
proliferation. First, the interior became more and more
inaccessible as roads deteriorated after zairianization.
Second, the electricity provided in Kisangani became a
much cheaper and more reliable source of energy than
diesel fuel used in the interior. Third, as Zairians
began to take over the rice trade, they prefered to
centralize their operations in the city because relatives
and employees could not be relied upon to safeguard their
assets in the countryside (see case study of Cit. Azali,
Chapter Seven). Only a few companies maintained rice
mills in the interior in 1986-87, and these had a fleet of
trucks in good condition. This trend served to further
isolate rural producers after the deterioration of
plantations taken over in zairianization.
By 1986, rice mills had integrated into the city's economy
and created new economic niches. At that time, rice mills
were surveyed and most of the rice mill owners were
interviewed. As detailed in Chapter Seven, this group is
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very diverse in background, ranging from an ex-banker to
an illiterate woman trader, and representing several
different sectors of the population including Lokele,
Arabise, Nande, and Metis. The operations were small-
scale with one or at most two Chinese or Indian-made mills
and a handful of employees--machinist, bookeeper, manager.
They were scattered throughout the city (see map in
Appendix) despite some attempts to concentrate them in an
"industrial park" on the outskirts of tc,wn. This scheme
had failed to attract support because no electricity had
yet been provLded f or the "industrial park."
There were 17 rice mills functioning during the time of
the fieldwork, out of more than 40 listed by ANEZA and the
Department of the Environment, to which each business must
pay a tax in order to operate. Only one had been in
existence in 1982, and 9 in 1985 (Balwisha 1986). Many
rice mills closed down during slack periods in the rice
season for repairs. Excessive taxation, the high cost of
spare parts, mismanagement and lack of clientele closed
down ot hers ,
The rice mill receives paddy brought in from the
countryside either from the mill owner or from farmers and
independent traders. The paddy is processed into white
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rice and sold at the mill to wholesalers or directly to
the consumer. Prices change rapidly depending on supply,
and there can be price discrepancies from mill to mill
although these are usually minimal. The real price gap
comes from the price paid to the producer and that at
which the rice is sold in Kisangani, as discussed in
Chapter Five.
When the paddy is brought in by a small trader,
transportation costs are often paid either by the rice
mill or by a rice broker who will sell the rice to market
women. The latter system, called bosaseli, spreads out
the profits from the rice sale. When the rice is sold by
the intermediary or the rice mill, the profits are
returned to the trader minus the transportation costs and
the fee for selling the rice. Some traders work on
contract for the rice mills. If the trader has collected
only a few sacks of rice, the profit is only enough to
support her or him to get out into the countryside again.
There are various strategies for increasing profit margins
which will be discussed later.
If a mill owner sends his or her own trucks out to buy
paddy, s/he will sell directly to market women or to
consumers after the rice has been milled. The profit is
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much higher, but all the risk is taken by the mill owner.
As discussed below, these risks can be very great.
Guyer (1'387:43) remarks that "the ways in which operators
at all levels shift their resources in and out of the food
system and graft food on to other economic activities
remains orie of the great une xp lored activities." In the
case of the rice trade, it was found that merchants may
shift quickly out of the rice business when something else
looks more profitable, less risky or less vulnerable to
For example, two rice mill owners switched to
buying and processing coffee when coffee prices were high.
One of the most successful rice merchants in Kisangani
sold his rice mill and truck after the 1'387 rice buying
season and opened a store for building materials. He
closed down the rice trade, despite having made windfall
profits in 1986-87 because it became too difficult to buy
rice in Yahuma. Chapter Seven provides further details of
rice traders' and producers' strategies.
4.2 Market Women
Market women buy one or several sacks of rice at the mill
to sell in the market, either themselves or to other
vendors. A very small profit ($1 or less per sack of 65
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kilo) is made at this end of the market chain and all rice
of the same quality sells for the same price in the
market. Women may buy a quantity of rice in the market
and sell it by the glass in front of their houses,
attracting customers who cannot get to the market. Fraud
is occasionally practiced by filling the bottom of the
glasses with candle wax, but usually customers demand that
market women overfill the glasses and add on a matabiche
of a handful of rice if several glasses of rice are
purchased.
There is a group of women who specialize in selling rice
in the ~arket. The group is part of AFECOZA, the women
traders' association. It has a president and vice
president who are two traders who have been in the
business a long time. Many of the women sell other
commodities in addition to rice. The group does not meet
regularly, if at all, according the president. The
function of the group is theoretically to regulate
disputes with market authorities and among rice sellers
but often a large portion of time is taken up in political
work such as singing and dancing at rallies (animation).
The market women do not deal with individual traders but
buy through the rice mill. The rice mills thus playa
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central role in regulating the trade. Some small traders
sell their own rice in the market but competition for
space and fees to set up a table may discourage them.
Most significantly, the small traders do not want to spend
the time it takes to sell their rice and want to get back
to the countryside as quickly as possible.
While rice traders can reap large profits in the rice
trade, market women are not in a position to bargain for
greater profit margins on rice. Their organization,
AFECOZA, is without any real power or authority and is run
by large traders rather than market women. There is thus
no group which really represents the interests of market
women.
4.3 Rice Traders
Starting at the top of the survival chain, the largest
firms which participated in the rice trade were two or
three wholesale trading companies with national
distribution. One of these firms, Hasson et Fr.re,
reportedly ran a rice mill in Isangi where the company
bought rice and traded extensively in palm oil. Another
firm, Mboliaka, had a fleet of trucks that bought rice in
several different zones. Lever Plantations (PLZ) and
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Busira-Lomami bought rice for plantation workers and sold
rice in their canteens in 1sangi and Yahuma. Beltexco was
the largest supplier of imported rice and traded in local
rice to a limited extent. These companies had access to
bank credit for buying campaigns and to supplier credit
such as that provided under the U.S. Government's PL480
program and by the government of Thailand. They were
owned by foreign nationals with some Zairian
participation.31
The second level of the chain is represented by the Rice
Professionals (RPs). This group was a collection of
Zairians from various backgrounds (Lokele, Nande, Arabisd,
and Mdtis; see chart in Chapter Seven for breakdown) who
owned rice mills and at least one truck. Some were
affiliated with ANEZA through the rice professionals'
organization. A few individuals owned rice mills but did
not buy rice. jhe RPs had access to some bank credit
(overdraft and short term loans) and, in a few cases, to
loans from SOF1DE, the development bank. They were
established businessmen and women with interests in other
31It is necessary to have a Zairian partner,
preferably someone with high political or military
ties, in order to do business in Zaire as a
foreign-owned company. Several expatriate business
owners privately complained that their Zairian
"partners" did nothing but extract profits.
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businesses, including nightclubs, a furniture factory,
coffee and general commerce. In education, they ranged
from an illiterate woman who spoke no French to a former
banker and European-educated economist.
The third level can be characterized as the Independents.
Some of these individuals owned trucks, others rented
them. These traders bought paddy in quantity (over 50
sacks) but did not own rice mills. In some cases, groups
of individuals rented trucks. There is a gradation from
Independent to petty trader, but the dividing line can be
set--perhaps arbitrarily--between those who own or rent
entire trucks or, in one case, a canoe, and those who pay
truck owners on a sack-by-sack basis for transportation.
The Independents were a diverse group including former
military officers, schoolteachers and politicians (see
Chapter Seven).
Petty traders or lolema represent the lowest level of
trader on the survival chain. The word means "bat" in
Swahili and refers to the fact that these traders hang
from trucks like bats and often trade at night away from
official controls. They had little or no capital and had
to be in motion constantly to beat inflation by turning
over their money quickly. It was not possible to census
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independent traders or lolema as their numbers are far
larger than the rice professionals, they have no fixed
locus of operations, and they move in and out of the
trade. For example, during the paddy season in Banalia,
two or three trucks departed daily from Kisangani for
Banalia and Buta, loaded with dozens of traders.
Despite their precarious existence, market women and
producers aspired to become lolema because there was a
greater chance of making money and evading controls. A
lolema's average profit margin was calculated from data
collected at rice mills in October 1987 (see Chapter Seven
for greater detail). From this table, it can be seen that
the average lolema could make more each month than a mid-
level salaried person (for example, the director of a rice
trading enterprise). They lacked security, however, in
that they received no benefits for sickness, children,
housing or transport that a worker might receive, and of
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Average No. of sacks collected
Number of trips per month
14
1.85
Total average monthly profit Z11,448
(Rice trading enterprise Director earned Z10,OOO)
*Does not include food, lodging, carting of
rice or transport back to countryside
Some lolema are "on contract" to a specific rice mill
which in some cases will go as far as to advance money for
medical expenses. A few are based in rural areas and
bring in their and other farmers' paddy to the market.
Not many farmers market their own crops, however, because
of fear and unreliability of transport (see Chapter Two).
Twenty percent of the lolema surveyed in rice mills in
1987 were farmers, but a rice mill manager in a rice mill
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catering to lolema claimed that the percent of farmers
selling at the rice mill is more like ten percent.
Lolema can be roughly divided into two categories:
professional traders and newcomers. Professional traders
are, for the most part, Lokele women and men whose people
have dominated the food trade around Kisangani for
generations <Lokomba 1972). These individuals trade in
other kinds of food crops as well--plantains, manioc
products, vegetables, peanuts and beans. The Lokele also
catch, smoke, and sell fish in the markets, to passing
riverboats and door-to-door in the city. In Banalia,
women traders arrive a day before the market opens to buy
crops in bulk from farmers who have walked from their
villages. The traders then sell retail in the market in
Banalia or wholesale to market women in Kisangani.
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, Lokele have had
longstanding trade relations with the Turumbu, Topoke,
Mbole and other peoples in Isangi, Basoko and Opala.
Lokele dominance of trade has not always been accepted by
farmers, however. In the 1960s, Topoke farmers tried to
organize against alleged monopoly by Lokele traders and
complained about low farmgate prices, while in 1987 in
Banalia traces of resentment of Lokele traders could be
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found.:!l2 With the influx of new lolema, however, the
Lokele no longer dominate petty trade. Only three out of
twenty lolema surveyed at rice mills in 1987 were Lokele.
The newcomer typically had some education, often attended
secondary school and held a salaried position (see Chapter
Seven) • He or she had slid down the survival chain as
opportunities closed up or salaried employment proved to
be unremunerative. Clark (1988:9) reports that in
Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia as well "increasing
numbers of government and industrial workers, even at the
upper levels, must supplement their wages with unofficial
incomes to survive." SClme women invested money earned
through prostitution or as a deu.xieme bu.reau. to start a
trading business. Other individuals saw becoming a lolema
as the only way to survive because there was no other kind
of work available. It was not uncommon for a
businessperson or salaried person to set up a child or
"yc,unger brother" as a Lolama (Chapter Seven, case study
of Mahmet). A group of people in a bar in Kisangani once
commented, when asked to define "lc,lema," that anyone
32For example, it was rumored that a Lokele
river monster had devoured a child in Banalia.
This story was linked to fear of Lokele traders
dominating the Banalia market.
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could be a lolema and more and more people were becoming
lolema.
Lolema has the significance of itinerant trader, and is
not restricted to rice traders. It usually connotes a
trader who does not buy a trade license, though many
lolema claimed to have purchased licenses. As Clark
(1988:6) points out for traders in other areas of Africa,
"legal status seems t,;:tf uncbLorias a disputed asset rather
than an enterprise characteristic." In other words, the
state retains the option to deem this small-scale trade
illegal if it suits the interests of officials or large
traders." There are parallels with ocher activities in
Zaire, such as artisanal palm oil manufacture in Central
Bandundu which alternated from being illegal to being
taxed and controlled (Russell 1990).
Some lolema sell merchandise in rural marketplaces and
thus have to be known to market and zone authorities. The
lolema who buys paddy at night, however, may avoid
controls on licenses and taxes. To enter Kisangani, all
trucks were checked by road blockades, but the matabiche
demanded may be smaller than paying for a license. The
system of taxation and licensing is discussed in the next
chapter.
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The rise of the lolema has given birth to a distinct
lifestyle that evokes comments from Kisangani's citizens.
In particular, lolema women are said to be nduDba or "free
women/prostitutes." Some lolema women are seen wearing
pants (at least under their pagnes or wrapped skirts) so
that they can mount trucks, which is remarkable as women
traditionally are not supposed to climb. Priority is by
no means given to women and children, and women are
responsible for transporting their own goods. As Lokele
women have had the role of food trader for generations,
women's hardiness is never questioned. On the other hand,
Lokele women were considered models of domestic obedience,
while the new lolema are not held in high esteem.
In the countryside, lolema rent rooms (often collectively)
or even sleep outdoors, bathing and washing clothes in the
river. Lolema are also found to be raucous and crude,
creating noise and jostling other passengers on the truck.
Indeed, fighting for space on an overcrowded truck is an
art which the lolema must learn to survive, along with
patience and endurance to cope with frequent breakdowns,




At the highest level of the survival chain, the President
of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, and his national and
international advisors, directly shaped policy on
agriculture, transportation and credit. These policies
affected the rice trade in several ways. First, it was
evident that government revenues were not channeled into
agriculture in any significant way in the Kisangani area.
In general, agriculture has taken up a small portion of
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Source: Conjoncture Economique 1987
One dollar = approximately 120-180 zaires in 1'387
In 1986-87, there was only a very small and illfunded
research and seed distribution program on rice operating
two or three villages.
out of INERA at Yangambi, perhaps affecting the closest
Main roads were often impassible,
to say nothing of agricultural feeder roads. For example,
the road leading from the rice research station to the
nearest village (five kilometers) had been impassible for
over a decade. Throughout Tshopo, paddy had to be
headloaded often dozens of kilometers to reach a point of
sale.
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Credit for agricultural buying campaigns was scarce and
credit for capital goods (trucks, rice mills) proved to be
expensive and politically tied, if available at all. One
informant waited three years for credit to buy trucks only
to find that inflation had made the credit too expensive.
Another rice trader nearly went out of business paying
back a loan. Five out of twelve firms (for which dossiers
were available) that received credit for capital goods for
the rice campaign in Haut Zaire never actually invested in
the rice trade.3~ Out of twenty-two rice traders
interviewed, only two made good on credit from the
development bank--the president of the rice traders
association, a former banker with the Bank of Zaire, and
the Regional President of ANEZA, a prominent businessman.
Despite the rhetoric of liberalization, marketing and
production were still controlled by the state. New
regulations gave local authorities more control than
before liberalization in some instances (see Chapter Six).
Taxes and licenses were costly and dealing with
authorities exhausting and time consuming, to the point
where many people give up their businesses in frustration.
33This figure was arrived
all the available dossiers on
agricultural campaigns (paddy)






One informant who gave up virtually his entire operation
in Kisangani remarked that it was more difficult to do
business in Kisangani (than in Kinshasa, for example)
because officials were more desperate for income and there
were fewer sources of income available. Thus, those
businesss which were visible and operational were hit very
hard. These difficulties had implications for the
operation of businesses devoted to productive enterprise,
as they require capital outlays and visible investment.
The responsibility for stagnation and decline in the
agricultural sector lay at the very top, despite a shift
toward decentralization, because decisions were made in
Kinshasa.34 For example, decisions on credit from
SOFIDE for Kisangani businesses were made in Kinshasa.
Plans for road rehabilitation were made by donors and the
national roads bureau. As noted above, even the
34According to studies done at USAID,
decentralization will only be viable in Shaba
region, which has the resources to fund local
government. Decentralization at the local level
means that the central government provides no
revenue and the smaller administrative units
expected to fund dll their own costs as well
contribute to the larger units. This policy
provoked "a proliferation of new taxes,
particularly at the level of the collectivity in
the rural areas and the zone and sub-region levels





headquarters of the agricultural research institute at
Yangambi relocated to Kinshasa in the 1980s.
Kisangani residents were sensitive to the lack of control
they had on their own economy. An article in Boyoma, the
Kisangani weekly, in 1983 baldly stated that the Zairian
merchants who took over from the expatriates after
zairianization pillage the rural areas and send all the
profits to Kinshasa where they are invested in
nonproductive activi ties. "All these mer chants seem to
develop a certain undefined psychosis every time they are
asked about investing in the region," states the article,
which cortcludea that "Not hLrrq, abso:.1I.\telyn,:.thing,is left
f or the Region" (Boyoma 1'383). Interestingly, this type
of critique was not found in Boyoma during 1986-87 despite
the region's desperate fuel situation during that time
perhaps because the newspaper had become part of the
centralized network. By 1987, the editor had moved
Boyoma's editorial division to Kinshasa.
MPR officials explained that this centralization was
necessary to guard against tribalism which could throw the
country into another civil war. For example, if local
branch managers could make decisions on credit, they would
give credit to "their people" and discriminate against
165
others. They might be sUbject to undue pressure from
relatives and associates. While there is certainly truth
in this assertion, centralization had not proved to avoid
corruption but only to move it to higher levels, as a
review of the SDFIDE dossiers demonstrates.
International donors, especially the IMF and the World
Bank, were engaged in seemingly endless struggle over the
structure of the Zairian economy and how best to raise
agricultural production during the 1970s and 1980s. No
alternatives to the or t hodox "Berg repo rt " view were ever
seriously entertained, however, despite many scholarly
studies-which show that serious flaws exist in plans which
reIy ort "market f orces" and "the private sector" and the
unresolved question of what to do with the state apparatus
that hindered private investment as well as peasant
production (African Studies Review 1984, Berry 1989a,
Schoepf and Walu 1990).
As for the Zairian government, orations, cabinet shuffles,
five year plans, "new directions" SI.IChas liberalizati,::on
and debt rescheduling did not resolve the problem of
declining production or even pose the right questions. An
example of a scheme introduced in 1988 by the department
of agriculture illustrates the point. The department's
166
most ambitious and heavily-funded new project of the year,
Projet Autosufficance Alimentaire <PRAAl), required
farmers--the vast majority women--to plant collective
fields at the collectivity and village level. The revenue
generated was used to fund local government and the
farmers did not control the harvest. If they did not work
in these fields, they were fined. If they could not pay
the fine they were put in jail where they provided
additional unpaid labor for the officials. This type of
"proj e ct " was a direct t hrcwba ck to colonial forced Labor
schemes and provided no incentive for farmers to increase
their own productivity <Russell 1990).
Thus the structure of the national economy as it was
molded by the President, donors, large businesses and top
advisors had a direct impact on the structure of
agricultural production and marketing. Through subsidies
of imported rice channeled through well-connected
Americans and Zairians, the international food economy had
a direct impact on rice producers and indigenous traders
as discussed in Chapter Six.
Activities in the "informal" sector or illegal activities
did not provide a real alternative to this system leading
to a productive merchant class, as it is sometimes argued
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(MacGaffey 1983). First, it is often government officials
and the military who control or sponsor these activities
at the highest level (Boyoma 1984).3e Second, those
activities in the "second economy" which are survival-
oriented present no organized opposition (Cf. Berry 1978).
Third, these activities in themselves are extractive
rather than productive. As Newbury (1984:114) puts it,
"it is in the interests ,;)fthe state--and the grc,ups who
control it--to further such underground functions, both
because this assures that power will devolve to the rich
and because it means that the maximum number of people are
dependent on the corrup t Lon of the state." These
activities do not lead to the state's destruction but
"peradox IceLl y ••• one o f the state's primary functions may
be to assure its own 'morbidity' (in Western terminology);
and in such decay, therefore, the state is very much
alive."
3elvory hunting is the best example. Witnesses
in Haut Zaire report that ivory hunters are
equipped with sophisticated weaponry such as Uzi




The Governor and regional officials have some impact on
the rice trade. For example, the Governor approves
applications for agricultural cooperatives to become
legally incorporated and thus tax exempt. In one case the
Governor of Haut Zaire assigned the management of one rice
producer's cooperative CTurumbu) to a Kisangani merchant.
In another, he allowed a former politician to obtain
cooperative status for his development efforts in Isangi
despite the fact that no farmers are involved in the
cooperative.36 The Governor also approves taxation and
licensing regulations for agriculture.
The Governor can play a positive role in promoting
agricultural development. During the fieldwork period,
the Governor of Haut Zaire hosted an agricultural
conference which brought together the major actors in
agriculture throughout the region--except the farmers, as
one conference attendee dared to mention. The conference
sparked lively debate and important exchanges of
36Both the cooperative
and neither saw anything
that their cooperatives
farmers on the model of
(see Chapter Five).
managers were interviewed
unusual about the fact
were run with no input from
the early paysannat scheme
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information. Very little, if any, action resulted from
the conference, however, because the major problem was
seen to be that the "peasants" were not well organized (by
the state or by traders) (R~gion du Haut Zaire 1986).
Transport problems were depicted as an external variable,
not tied to allocation of resources for the region.
Nevertheless, the Governor displayed a great deal of
knowledge about the situation in agriculture and was at
least willing to hear about problems and complaints.
Newbury (1986) describes how the Governor of Kivu played a
key role in support of grassroots development and against
corrupt local politicians in her area. The Governor of
Bandundu was also reported in 1989 to have bold new ideas
for agriculture. These officials' ultimate fates,
however, were not linked to performance but to
demonstrated loyalty to the MPR (Callaghy 1984).37
The regional headquarters of the Department of Agriculture
receives annual reports from all of the zones in the
37It was often the case that officials
interviewed at every level displayed a great deal
of knowledge about problems and were sympathetic to
those they governed. This knowledge and sympathy
often did not translate into action because of the
insecurity of the office, lack of means or
inability to confront problems stemming from policy
originating higher up.
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region. Often these reports were late or never received
and the zone agents complained that they had no paper or
typewriter to complete the report. The reports were often
quite sympathetic to the farmer, talking about lack of
improved seed in the area or problems of rampaging
elephants (Zone reports Yahuma, Opala 1986). It was
evident, however, and largely acknowledged by the
department statistician, that the statistics compiled of
agricultural production and commercialization were
fabrications, simply building each year on the figures of
the previous year.
In 1986-87, the Department lacked utterly the resources to
help farmers or even to help itself. The building which
housed the headquarters looked like it had been bombed
out. There were no lightbulbs or even electrical outlets
in the building (presumably all stolen) and the "archives"
lay moldering in the corners of forgotten rooms. The
Regional Inspector, a veterinarian by training, had only a
motorcycle and the occasional use of a landrover--when
fuel was available--with which to cover an area the size
of France. In 1974, the Department had 10 landrovers
which was seen to be totally inadequate by Perrault
(1'379:>•
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Theoretically the Chief Inspector supervises the work of
all of the zones. In reality, he rarely spent more than
two or three hours at work each day. The number of
extension agents was drastically reduced in the early
1980s to one for every ten localities, although at the
time agriculture had been deemed "priority c.f pric,rities."
The Zone Level
One cannot regret too much the dearth of agricultural
extension agents (monagris), however, as their impact on
rural life has been less than beneficial. Their job is to
organize--encadrer--the farmers in the zone, essentially
making sure that obligatory crops are cultivated, land is
distributed, and taxes paid. Attempts t.:,introduce "new"
technologies, such as planting rice in rows, have failed
completely, as the farmers see the monagris as agents of
the state who wish to enslave them and because the
organization of their economic life differs from the
priorities of the state (Chapter Two, Mbaya 1980).
Nevertheless, many monagris are knowledgeable about local
farming systems and could potentially playa positive role
(Chapter Seven, case study of State Agronomist Loso). One
third, however, have no formal education beyond primary
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schc.ol and their written reports are "unclear, inadequate
and unread" (Vengroff 1983:38).
The problem is that these agents are very poorly paid if
at all. The only way for them to earn a salary is to
extort it from farmers. Zone officials, including the
monagris, are also paid off by traders both at the zone
capital and at farmgate. Each zone has a Secretary for
Agriculture and Rural Development who supervises a number
of agents and each collectivity is supposed to have a
trained agronomist supervising the monagris.3&
In a study of local adminstration and development in
Zaire, Vengroff interviewed 100 zone officials in Haut
Zaire. He found that, for the Zone agronomists, emphasis
was placed "on applying state directives ••• CIJt is quite
clear that these burdens severely limit the possibility of
direct field experience and interaction with the local
e:r;tensi.::onagents and their clients" (1'383:44).
The monagris have the power to coerce farmers as they are
backed up by the military. There is a military barracks
38The Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Rural Development are separate
ministries in Kinshasa but in 1'386-87 they were
united at the zone level, causing much confusion.
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and jail in every zone capital and large town, and
soldiers assigned to each collectivity. The soldiers are
not reluctant to beat or arrest recalcitrant farmers, as
the cost of any arrest, trial or jailing is born by the
defendent (whether guilty or innocent). This policy is
called (ata uina ya leta which means literally "buy ink
for the state" in Lingala and refers telthe practi ce of
charging defendents for the pen and paper on which to
write the deposition and sentence. Villagers complain
that when a person is sought for a crime and cannot be
found, another member of the family is taken.
Death can result from detainment by the military, as was
witnessed in Lotokila in Isangi when a local man died in
detention after having allegedly been tortured. He was
accused of stealing a canoe. In 1978, there were 5,181
civil cases in Tshopo for offenses punishable by 30-60
days in jail (Annual Report 1978). These offenses
included adultery, failure to plant obligatory crops,
divorce, insulting neighbors, public drunkenness and
"vagabondage." There is, thl.ls,fertile ground for finding
punishable behavior in the village. Prisoners are used as
free labor force for domestic tasks and farming on chief's
lands.
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The Zone Commissioner plays an important role in the rice
trade as he meets with traders, farmers' representatives
and zone officials to set the price and the terms of the
buying season. He approves traders to enter the zone and
can give instructions to block "illegal" trade. In
Isangi, for example, the Zone Commissioner reportedly
allowed roadblocks to be set up in 1987 to discourage
farmers from marketing their own paddy, and to enforce a
ruling that all traders doing business in the zone had to
invest in the zone. In Banalia, the annual rice campaign
bargaining session set up after liberalization in 1983 was
initiated in part by a former Zone Commissioner (see
Chapter ,Seven). The local presidents of ANEZA and
AFECOZA, who are part of the MPR cadre, may play a relle in
these deliberations.
Vengroff's study included a sample of Zone Commissioners,
and found a negative correlation between education and
training and administrative performance. In other words,
the better educated and trained, the poorer the
performance. Three quarters of the bureaucrats retained
administrative models which did not emphasize flexibility
and 62X stated that important people must be given special
treatment. "[AJscriptive criteria and patrcln-client
relationships are still viewed as most important in
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obtaining promotion in the real world" (Vengroff 1983:26).
Vengroff concluded that, under the present r~gime, efforts
at training and upgrading personnel could perhaps provide
"a more solid base for a future regime which might be more
serious in its efforts to promote development" (Ibid, p.
70). Callaghy's (1984b) very detailed study of MPR cadre
is the most important resource on motivation, organization
and functioning of the bureaucracy in Zaire.
As for the functioning of the zone administration,
Vengroff found that there was no coordination among the
various services and the head of each service acted
Thus, "local develc.pment eff,:,rtsunde rt ake n
by the various services are contradictory at worst and
poo r Ly coordLna ted at best" <Vengroff 1983:31:1. The
bureaucrats themselves believed external factors <such as
salary delays and inadequate budgets) to be the most
important factors retarding rural development. Internal
constraints included poor communication between
territorial administrators and traditional authorities,
and lack of coordination between technical services.
The People's Commissioner is the representative of the
people of the zone in the national Parliament. This
individual is almost always an important businessman or
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woman although he or she may also be a religious leader or
academic. In actuality, the parliament has very little
impact on national policy, as some members have privately
confided. Many members do very little for their
constituents as well, remaining in Kinshasa most of the
year to pursue their own business interests.
Nevertheless, vc.ters get to choose their representatives
in a controlled election (the candidates are preselected
by the Governor) and surprises may result. For example,
the voters of Isangi turned down the representative of the
zone's largest trader and most powerful boss, who was
widely perceived to be trying to corner the rice market.
Each collectivity also elects representatives to the
regional assembly (from preselected candidates). This
body, according to informants, does little but ratify MPR
policies and bring them back to the people. In 1982,
popularly elected councils were introduced at the. .
collectivity level. Newbury comments that
[IJn some areas councillors have actively
confronted local administrative authorities over
budget projections and management of local
government revenues. Administrators,
unaccustomed to such supervision, regard these
activities as an incursion into their monopoly
of power. It is unclear how long this overt
conflict between member [sicJ of the state
bourgeoisie and the councillors (aspiring
entrants?) will be tolerated. Many councillors
177
expect an early suppression of their more
outspoken colleagues (Newbury 1984:113).
My research in Bandundu and Shaba regions leads to the
conclusion that collectivities which have local
entrepreneurs and educated people (school teachers) have a
better chance to create viable independent councils.
These council members are not by any means allied to the
local peasantry, however, about whom they retain often
surprising ignorance.3~
The collectivity chief is nominated by the zone every five
years but is a resident of the collectivity. He is
usually designated as the representative of the farmers in
any bargaining which takes place with traders and
government officials at the zone level. This choice is
deliberate as this individual is not a clan leader but a
state appointee. Inserting an individual loyal to the
state in this position dates back to the colonial era.
This chief receives a cut from all rice sales that take
place within the collectivity (see next chapter). The
39For example, in Bandundu, one councillor
expressed belief that compulsory cultivation was
necessary to induce people to produce enough to eat
and sell. He had been told by the monagris that
the local farmers were too lazy to work without
some kind of control.
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groapement chief is usually a clan leader and may also
playa role in bargaining with traders.
The village chief usually plays no role in the bargaining
process at the zone but is present at rice sales in his
village. He, the notables or clan heads, the capitas or
workbosses and other village officials receive small cuts
on these sales. Half of the lolema interviewed in 1987
reported giving something to village leaders during rice
sales.
The capitas are descended from corvde workbosses who
organized labor gangs in the village during the colonial
era. In each village there is usually a person designated
as the representative of the JMPR, the MOPAP
(Mobilization, Propagande et Animation Politique), the
CONDIFFA (Condition Fdminine and Familiale), the
Department of Agriculture and the Environment. There are
also CADERS in each village who represent "the eyes and
ears" of the village chief. The individuals cited above
are the Village dlite, along with educated people such as
180
The chiefs and many of the other older men interviewed in
Yahuma had worked at one time as mechanics, drivers,
factory workers or boys and had returned to their villages
during the Rebellion only to find that economic
opportunities later dried up and there were no more jobs
available. One village chief pleaded to return to
Kisangani as a boy saying that he would give up his wives
and children to be able to have some access to resources
only found in the urban areas. This chief's plea serves
to illustrate the place of the rural people in the
survival chain.
4.5 Rice Producers
Rice production and the situation of rice farmers is
largely covered in Chapters Two and Five. Interviews with
villagers are also described in Chapter Seven. It is
important to reiterate a few points, however, concerning
the situation of rice farmers. First, rice has been a
crop cultivated under compulsion since the colonial era.
Second, it is labor intensive for both men and women
because a new field must be cleared and the rice must be
dried and winnowed before it is sold. Third, the
commercialization of rice is very uneven. In some zones,
whole seasons can pass without any rice being sold, while
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in other areas near main roads competition makes rice
scarce even at the beginning of the season. Finally,
where there is a market for rice, it is reported that
farmers increase production. Rice is seen as a valuable
crop because it stores well, unlike manioc and banana, and
can be eaten, unlike coffee. Consumer demand is high for
rice as compared to corn in Haut Zaire and demand is
increasing CMukuna 1982). In short, rice is a crop which
is difficult to cultivate but which can potentially bring
in more revenue than any other food crop.
When speaking of "rice farmers," it must be emphasized
that men and women have different roles in the rice
farming enterprise. Rice is a "man's crop " in the sense
that sales are usually handled by men. The Y'eason for
men's involvement is that theiY' labor is used in cutting
the field for rice, and they can also participate in
sowing and harvesting. Women, however, do most of the
latter tw6 tasks, and virtually all of the weeding and
transpc.rting.
Rice is intercropped with corn and bananas, often fruits
and green vegetables, and lateY' OY' simultaneously manioc
may be gY'own in the field. The latter cropa are "women's
crops " grown, so ld and brartsf orrned by women.
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The paddy dries for the most part in the field, but it may
also be spread out in the sun for a few days after
harvest. It is transported from the field to the village
by women on their heads and backs. storage is very
limited. Most people do not have granaries and paddy is
never stored together in communal granaries. It may be
stored in a room in the house or in the rafters. Post-
harvest losses from insects and rats are thus very high.
The issue of seed conservation is discussed in Chapter
Seven, Case Study of Yalibwa village.
Men may be involved in winnowing the grain in two ways,
either by beating it or by letting it fall from a small
scaffold. Dropping the paddy from the scaffold is men's
work, as women (except lolema!) are not allowed to climb.
Women further sift the grain as it falls to the ground.
Any hand decortication of paddy is done by women.
Single women and widows may grow rice and get help for
clearing the field from children, brothers or neighbors
but no woman was seen selling rice directly to rice
traders, thus these women may use an intermediary for
these transactions. Wives were present at the sales,
however, and some received the money directly from their
husband's hands.
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There is thus no typical rice producer or rice producing
area. One farmer interviewed in Banalia had cultivated
enough to sell eighteen bags of rice in one season, while
in Yahuma the average amount sold to a trader by one
person (representing a household) in the 1986 season was
323 kg (a little over three bags) (New-Pop 1986). Conde
surveyed rice producers in Turumbu in 1981 and found that
77 percent grew rice for cash, and 80 percent for
consumption, although only 30 percent of the crop was
actually consumed in the household. Seventy-one percent
found rice to be the most profitable crop, after manioc
and corn. There may be significant differences in this
evaluation, however, between men and women, as seen in the
case study of Banalia and noted by Newbury and Schoepf
(1989:103).
Terms of Trade
Determining whether farmers in Tshopo have experienced a
decline or increase in terms of trade since liberalization
is problematic. From 1987-1989, it seems that the
farmgate price of rice almost kept pace with inflation and
the price of cloth in Banalia (Table 5.1). This area is
one of the most active in the subregion, however. In
Yahuma, in 1987, farmers said that price was not their
184
major concern although farmgate prices there had risen
only fourteen percent since the last year. They were most
concerned about the lack of supply of goods, and the
paucity of schools and clinics (Chapter Seven, case study
of Bolibo Village).
Theoretically, with increased access to cash, farmers
could organize buying cooperatives and fund their own
schools and clinics, like a cooperative visited in Shaba
(Russell 1988).42 The organization of cooperatives in
Tshopo has not brought benefits to farmers, however, as
discussed in the next chapter. Thus the question of terms
of trade must be viewed in light of the power that
producers have over their own lives, and their ability to
influence policy which might affect ~hem. As Pehaut
(1978:318) notes as well, the question of terms of trade
may be irrelevent due to the very small quantities
commercialized and the resulting very low buying power of
the individual.
42The cooperative in Shaba achieved its greatest
success when it was most isolated from the rest of
the region. When a bridge was repaired linking it
to the rest of the zone, officials and tax
collectors were the first to cross and one of their
first acts was to forbid traders from outside of
the region to buy at the cooperative.
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The description of the political system in the village in
Chapter Two makes it clear that producers have very little
power, and virtually no means to effect change aside from
sorcery threats to "rich" relatives in the city. Rural-
based rebellions of the 1960s were so mercilessly quelled
that the regions involved--Haut Zaire, Bandundu and North
Shaba--have never recovered (see Lemarchand 1979 on
continued repression in Bandundu). Thus a rise in
farmgate prices in a system where people lack basic
control over resources does not necessarily translate into
a higher standard of living (Cf. discussion of USAID
stUdy, Chapter Six).
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Chapter Five: The Mechanics of the Rice Campaign
This Chapter deals with the preparation for and execution
of the rice campaign in Tshopo. It first looks at what is
necessary to participate in a campaign and the actors
involved. Then a comparison of the rice trade in three
zones is made, showing how the history of the use of a
terrain creates different configurations of the trade.
This comparison illustrates the fundamental dilemma facing
the organization of agricultural production and marketing
in Zaire. That is, given the former predominance of
monopsonies and concessions in shaping the rural economy,
and continued lack of investment in rural areas, there is
little advantage for producers either in a more
liberalized system or in a continuation of monopsony
control. This dilemma is illustrated by specific cases of
competition between large concessions and traders and
large traders and small traders attempting to control the
trade.
5.1 Seasons
Despite the fact that upland rice can grow year-round in
Tshopo, farmers are obliged to adhere to a planting and
marketing schedule. These schedules are supposedly based
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on optimal planting times with regard to the rainy season
and coordination of buying campaigns with sufficient time
to harvest and dry the paddy. The evidence is scanty,
however, that these "optimal" schedules really correspond
with optimal planting times (Perrault 1979:91). There is
conflicting evidence that Tshopo even has a marked rainy
season (Orassouchoff 1965). Perrault could not find a
correlation between micro-climates and the agricultural
calendar.
In Shaba region, it was observed that imposed marketing
schedules were detrimental to the farmers, as corn dried
in the fields and was eaten by birds because traders had
to await the official buying season. Traders in Tshopo
complained of the same problem.
These schedules provide a means for local officials to
control the buying campaign, for example, by setting up
roadblocks to catch and fine off-season buyers. They are
a relic of the monopsony buying system which allowed the
permitted buyer to buy as much as possible at the outset
of the campaign and then opened up the season to other
buyers. The growing and buying seasons facilitate the
work of the monagris, many of whom reportedly only visit a
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village during the harvest and buying campaign in order to
get a cut of any sales.
In northern Tshopo <above the Equator), the rice buying
season begins in October or November, the exact date
depending on the zone. Clearing and burning the field
take place in February and March, planting in April and
May, harvest in August and September. The paddy must be
dried in the sun after harvest and winnowed to remove
chaff and dust. South of the Equator, in Ubundu Zone and
in Maniema, Kivu, the buying season starts in April, thus
planting takes place in November-December, harvest in
March-April. Kisangani and Zaire in general are therefore
well positioned to have an almost year-round supply of
rice.
5.2 Preparation for the Rice Campaign
Sacks
The rice trader prepares his or her rice campaign in
different ways, depending upon the scale of the
enterprise. All traders must buy sacks, which they
furnish to farmers before the sale. There is only one
company in Zaire which makes sacks, Tissakin in Kinshasa,
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but imported sacks from Bangladesh and plastic sacks are
often dumped on the market at lower prices than the
Tissakin sacks (Pragma 1983). Tissakin depends in part on
local jute, grown in Bandundu, to manufacture these sacks
but local supply has become so unreliable that most jute
is now imported.
Thus, the supply of this very important component of the
rice trade is uneven and externally determined. During
the 1986-87 campaign and in 1985, sacks were in short
supply and expensive ($1 per 100 kg sack). Some traders
were using very poorly made plastic sacks which could
only be used once. Smaller sacks (60 kg) from the sugar
refineries were also available in the marketplace, but
finding affordable full-sized (100 kg) was a constraint to
traders in maximizing their buying power that year and in
1985 as well, according to ANEZA reports.
Credit
Credit was also a constraint. The Kisangani-based trader
needs to bring cash or merchandise to exchange at the time
of sale. If the trader owns a truck and a rice mill, the
major determinant of the amount of rice slhe will buy is
the amount of cash available.
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Very few traders interviewed had access to credit from the
commercial bank. In 1986-87, the commercial bank gave
credit of Z9,550,OOO for paddy. This was sufficient to
finance about three campaigns (Z3,OOO,OOO per campaign as
estimated by the president of the rice professionals'
committee). It is impossible to determine how much of
that amount actually went to buying paddy, however. Some
of the large traders reportedly had overdraft and informal
loan priveleges if they were good customers of the
bank.43 As discussed above, a review of the dossiers
accepted for loans from SOFIDE, the development bank,
which purported to finance the paddy campaign in Haut
Zaire revealed that almost half of the firms were not
active in the trade.
Conversely, one of the most skilled and active rice
traders in Kisangani was never able to get credit from
SOFIDE despite the fact that he owned several other
businesses and valuable real estate in the center of town
(Chapter Seven). Like other large traders, he used the
profits from his other businesses to finance the rice
campaign. In turn, the profits from rice were reinvested
in his other businesses.
43At least one case of this type of loan was
reported by an informant.
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Some traders calIon family for loans. This is especially
true of the Arabis~s and the Nande who are known for their
close family ties and "entrepreneurial" spirit. Lokele
traders may also pool money to buy merchandise (Kadima
1986). The individual who can count on these ties is
fortunate because, in most cases, a Zairian trader cannot
count on anyone to safeguard either money or property
(Mukenge 1987).
Despite the difficulties, some merchants do employ
relatives to work in the mill and on the campaign. Others
hire people referred by friends and relatives. If the
trader owns a rice mill, he or she will already have
workers for milling and general labor to whom they pay a
small wage, and supply rice and medicine. Since the
unemployment rate is very high in Kisangani, it is not
difficult to find men willing to work for the very low
wages offered.44
44When the SOTEXKI plant
men showed up to apply for
disappointed to find that
postpc.ned.
was to be opened, 2,000
work and were bitterly
the opening date had been
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Aside from the rice mill laborers who will haul the rice,
a driver, cook, record-keeper and foreman may be hired for
the campaign itself. The driver is the most important
member of the crew. Given the state of the roads in
Tshopo, he must be alert and highly skilled. He should
know when the road is likely to be very muddy or where a
bridge may be so fragile that all cargo must be removed
from the truck before crossing. In some cases, the boss
or a close relative will drive the truck. Part of the
driver's payment is revenue from any passengers, including
lolema, getting a ride or transporting goods. The workers
may receive "perks" as well during the campaign, like
liquor or a choice piece of game sold by a hunter.
Getting a License
Until 1983, licenses for paddy had to be purchased at the
subregion capital, Yangambi, in Isangi. Now a license is
purchased in Kisangani, at the Regional level, and a tax
for buying food crops is paid at the collectivity. Some
sort of permission is required as well at the Zone level.
The license increases in cost every year, more than
keeping pace with inflation, as is seen in Table 5.1
It is not known what happens with the revenue from
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these taxes but it is not apparently used for improving
roads or other services to farmers and traders.
Table 5.1 Comparison of prices and exchange rate to










1'387 ZlS/kilo Z2,OOO/6 yds Z140/$1 Z2,250
1989 Z50/ki lCI Z7,OOO/6 yds Z440/$1 Z30,OOO
Increase 2777. 3507. 3141. 1,3337.
*Parallel rate
Many small traders don't purchase a license and must
bargain with authorities when caught with paddy at
r-oadb Lo cka or in the Village. These "unlicensed" traders
caused a furor among the rice professionals, as discussed
below. Many of the lolema surveyed in 1987, however,
claimed to have paid for a license and to have given
primes to village leaders (small sums, cigarettes or
soap). In theory, farmers do not have to pay for a
license but may have to pay an "evacuation tax."
194
In reality, the system of taxation and licensing is so
confusing that from year to year no one knows how much
should be paid or even where to pay. The region,
subregion, zone and collectivity all have some
jurisdiction over rice sales and all have need for
revenue. The region is able to get a major portion by
having the large traders purchase a license in Kisangani.
At the zone level, traders can be harassed by roadblocks
to contribute if they have not stopped at the zone. The
collectivity has no power to coerce but its leaders can
use their influence to assure sales to the trader (see
letter in Appendix).
The rice trader is also expected to give a prime to the
village chief, his notables and capitas. This prime may
be in the form of a few zaires per sack (Z8-10 in 1987) or
cigarettes or soap (reported by lolema). An evacuation
tax of Z20 per sack is also paid. The experience of
participating in two campaigns leads us to believe that a
trader will also leave something with any collectivity or
groupement chief with whom he has contact, in order to
prevent disturbances.
Thus, further down the chain, the revenue from taxation
and licensing becomes smaller, more personalized and
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uncertain. A trader may be paying Z30,OOO in Kisangani
for a license and distribute a few cigarettes in the
village. Villages and even collectivities cannot generate
substantial revenue in this way from traders and thus must
depend on fines and taxes on producers.4~
5.3 Negotiations with Officials during the Campaign
When a large trader (RP or Independent) enters the Zone to
buy rice, slhe is expected to calion the Zone
Commissioner to report on plans for the campaign. There
are variations in the system. This visit has become
formalized, for example, in Banalia, by an annual
collective bargaining session hosted by the Zone
Commissioner and the Department of Agriculture officials
for the Zone (Chapter Seven, case study of Agronome Loso).
4~Zone authorities can block rivers as well as
roads. In Bulungu Zone, Bandundu, in 1989 we came
across a little stand set up at a ferry crossing.
A small sign read Service de Recou.vrement. The
man at the stand said he was "working with tradersll
by demanding Z1,200 per truck which crossed. The
funds collected were put in an account for the
Zone. There are lIinformal" ways in which Villagers
can get money from traders, however, including
blocking roads so that assistance will be needed to
get through. One story has it that villagers
diverted an entire stream to inundate a well-
traveled road in Haut Zaire.
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In contrast, at the d~but of the season in Isangi in 1987,
no such meeting was held although the Commissioner claimed
that it should be held. A Topoke chief rushed to Isangi
in anticipation of the opening of the season and, after
waiting several days, returned to his village in great
disappointment. In Yahuma, traders do not even pass
through the Zone capital.46
The collective bargaining sessions are an attempt on the
part o f local officials bo regulate the "liberalization"
of agricultural campaigns. Although trade was supposed to
be liberalized by 1987, authorities did not hesitate to
say that revenue was needed from licenses and fines to run
Local g':lvernmentand that traders should II invest" in the
zone where they were buying rice. Officials also remarked
that it was not possible tor the trade to be completely
liberalized because tarmgate prices might then rise too
high or traders might make too much profit. Officials
claim to protect the farmer in attempting to impose a
minimum price per kilogram at the beginning of each
48The Zone Commissioner can affect the work,
however. One rice trader in Yahuma began building
a bridge to get to the rice growing areas. On his
return through the area, he found that the
Commissioner had ordered the bridge dismantled and




This minimum price is, however, treated as a
maximum price by those traders who find themselves with
little competition. As noted in Chapter Four, the
farmers' representatives in these meetings are usually the
collectivity chiefs who will receive a small sum for every
sack purchased, regardless of price.
By participating in the collective bargaining sessions,
the rice professional legitimizes his or her status vis a
vis smaller traders and as such is willing to endorse
restrictions on trade. There is, thus, a continued
collusion between merchants and the state to restrict the
activities of smaller operators (including farmers) who
might, in actuality, evacuate the crop more efficiently
because of lower overhead.
5.4 The Rice Trade in Banalia, Isangi and Yahuma Zones
The observed variation in terms of the structure of the
rice trade is discussed in this section. This variation
is reflective of a zone's economic history, location and
resources. In Isangi and Yahuma, the enduring presence of
large concessions conditions the options open to farmers
and traders, while in Banalia "free trade" has grown to a
certain extent. Neither monopsony control nor "free
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trade," however, has traslated into palpable investment in
peasant agriculture.
The capitals of Isangi and Banalia are roughly
equidistant, about 120 km from Kisangani. Banalia is
north of Kisangani on the left bank of the Aruwimi river
which meets the Zaire river at Basoko. Isangi is ~est of
Kisangani, on the left bank of the Zaire river as it flows
toward Kinshasa. Both zones were visited twice and
traders who frequent these zones were interviewed in
Kisangani and in the local markets. Yahuma Zone was the
site of a month-long field visit, traveling with a
Kisangani-based trader during the 1987 rice campaign. It
is located downriver from Isangi and stretches to the
border of Equateur Region. (See map in Appendix.)
Two groups of women were interviewed in Banalia and time
was spent with individuals in the field, at meetings, at a
marriage ceremony, in the market and on the road. Groups
of men and women were interviewed in five villages in
Yahuma, and one village group was interviewed in Isangi
(Yalibwa), along with several individuals connected to the
rice trade, workers at the Lotokila plantation, zone and
church officials.
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Isangi and Yahuma Zones
Isangi Zone is inhabited by Turumbu, Topoke, Lokele and
Foma (sedentarized Lokele), all closely related and
formerly economically interdependent peoples. The area of
Yahuma zone visited is inhabited by the Ngando, another
Mongo-speaking people with whom these other groups have a
"mc.ther's brot her" type j.::.kingrelati.::.nship.04?'To a
certain extent these groups are still interdependent. For
example, the Turumbu make the canoes that the Lokele use.
These have become cash transactions, however, rather than
exchange or barter.
Lingala is the main lingua franca in both zones, although
Lokele and Swahili are also used in some areas. Principal
food crops are manioc, banana plantain and rice. Cash
crops are coffee and palm oil. Rice is also a cash crop
and corn is grown mainly for whiskey production.
04?'In Zaire, whole peoples come to have familial
relations with each other by way of common ancestry
and/or desire to maintain alliances. Thus, a
MoNgandu can (and shou ld ) call a To poke II unc Ie" and
insult him. All the Mongo speaking people of Haut
Zaire are linked with the Tetela and Kusu peoples
of Maniema and provided the ethnic base for Patrice
Lumbumba's rise to power.
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Large concessions and plantations have dominated the area
since the late 1800s. Lotokila sugar complex, a joint
Chinese-Zairian venture located in Isangi, consists of
hundreds of hectares of sugar cane plantation and a modern
sugar processing plant. It employs local people,
especially Topoke, but workers come from as far away as
Bas Zaire. See Chapter Seven, case study of Commissioner
Kassa for more detail.
Busira-Lomami is another large concession and marketing
enterprise for palm oil in Isangi. The company was
created in 1898 primarily for the exploitation of rubber
and copal. During the colonial era, it enjoyed virtual
"free state" status to po lLce the zone and control its
people, though it encountered determined resistance from
the Topoke (Walle 1981). The company still attempts to
control people by exerting pressure on palm oil producers
to sell to them and limiting access to markets (no road
maintenance in their area), but its investment in the zone
has declined steeply, as witnessed by the abandonment of
company buildings in Isangi town.
The "Topoke Coclperative" is a palm .:,ilmarketing grc".lp
which is in fact controlled by the Kisangani-based company
Hasson et Fr~re and an Isangi merchant. The Turumbu
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Cooperative, created primarily to market rice to
Kisangani, had also been turned over to a Kisangani
merchant after local managers brought the cooperative to
bankruptcy. In 1985, a powerful Lokele boss (a former
secur ity chief) set up another II coope re e Lve , It COOlS, in
Isangi to market palm oil and rice. His company, Zimex,
already had the monopoly for Isangi palm oil for the Kivu
market, in collaboration with Busira-LOmami. This market
accounted for 32% of the total trade from Kisangani to two
major cities in Kivu (World Bank 1984). The structure of
these cooperatives is based on the paysannat principles of
external management and control of production and
marketing, embodied by the principle of encadrer les
paysans (organize and control peasant production).
Yahuma is the home of Lever Plantations (PLZ) in Haut
Zaire with its 12,000 ha palm oil plantation and modern
palm oil factory on the river at Lokutu. Until the 1980s,
PLZ enjoyed a virtual monopsony in rice buying from local
farmers. This monopsony was broken to some extent by
Zairian traders until the roads became impassible from
neglect of maintenance (PLZ being the attribataire for
this maintenance). By 1989, it was reported that no
Kisangani traders were buying rice in Yahuma.
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Banalia Zone
The major ethnic groups of Banalia include the Bua, the
Ngalema, the Manga, the Boro, and the Popoy. Some pygmy
groups live in the Popoy collectivity as well. The lingua
franca of the zone is Swahili, although Lingala may be
heard in the markets and just north of the zone in Buta.
All peoples in the zone are farmers and hunter-collectors.
There is some fishing activity on the Aruwimi but it is
not as intense as that on the Zaire river. There are two
distinct subgroups in the zone: the Popoy and Manga are
Sudanic peoples, while the Bua, Ngalema and Boro are
related Bantu peoples. There is not the same type of
exchange-based economy as found along the Zaire river and
the Lokele do not dominate the local markets.
Principal food crops are banana plantain, manioc and rice.
Banalia is also an important entrep8t for smoked game and
other forest products. Cotton and peanuts are cash crops
whose cultivation is, in theory, obligatory. All cotton
is bought by SOTEXKI at fixed prices for their textile
factory in Kisangani. Local cotton production is,
however, totally insufficient for the factory's needs. It
depends thus on imported cotton, which is purchased in
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part through credit provided by USAID.4B Refer to
Tollens (1975) for the history of cotton production in the
area just north of Banalia.
When gold marketing was liberalized in 1983, artisanal
gold mining attracted a large mass of prospectors to
Banalia, especially the Popoy Collectivity. At one point,
this activity was seen to threaten agriculture in the zone
and several articles in Bayama condemned it (1983).
Farmers were leaving their fields and alcoholism and
banditry were on the rise. Soon, however, farmers
discovered that they could make more money selling food to
the prospectors. In Panga, the capital of Popoy
Collectivity, food prices were reportedly as high as in
Kisangani and there were many consumer items available for
sale in the village, despite its being almost totally
inaccessible by road.
There was one experimental cocoa plantation active in the
collectivity of Bengamisa, which is also the location of
4BTheoreticaily this credit is hinged in part on
a pledge by the company to aid smallholder cotton
farmers in its hinterland, but this conditionality
has not been fulfilled according to a 1987 USAID
study (in which I participated as it also concerned
the impact of imported rice on local rice
production).
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the national agricultural college. The cocoa plantation
appears to be a boondoggle as its inaccessibility renders
evacuation very difficult at a price competetive with the
world market.
Important political bosses own coffee plantations (many
taken over in zairianization) in the zone but these have
been so neglected that they are for all purposes non-
functioning, as discussed in Chapter Two.
The town of Banalia is on the way to Buta, a town of
expanding activities and one with connections to important
political bosses. Buta is also linked by road to eastern
and nothern Zaire, on major export--and smuggling--routes.
The road east from Buta leads to Isiro, a major commercial
center and alternative route to East Africa.
Thus in Banalia there were no large-scale (functioning)
plantation areas and the cotton monopsony does not exert
the same kind of control on small farmers as the palm oil
companies in Isangi (due, perhaps, to reliance on imported
cotton). Banalia farmers have gained some bargaining
power as a result of the active trade taking place in the
zone and one ethnic group has never dominated this trade.
This bargaining power is reflected in significantly higher
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farmgate prices for rice in Banalia as compared to Isangi
and Yahuma zones. Large traders have, in fact, been
discouraged by these high prices and many have switched to
buying in Opala, despite--or perhaps because of--the very
poor state of the road.
Accessibility and Market Development in the Three Areas
The Zone capitals of Isangi and Banalia are about the same
distance from Kisangani but Isangi is less accessible than
Banalia. First, it is necessary to cross the Zaire river
by ferry to get to Isangi. The ferry operates only when
there iS'a vehicle crossing on the Jsangi side. If it is
not on the Turumbu CKisangani) side of the river, it is
necessary to fetch it with a canoe and the vehicle will be
obliged to "donate" a certain amount of fuel for the
crossing. Time and money are lost in the process.
Second, the stretch from Yangambi to the ferry was very
poorly maintained and could be almost impassible in spots
after a heavy rain. In the interior of Isangi and Yahuma,
the roads not directly linking PLZ facilities were
extremely poor. Farmers who wish to commercialize their
own crops use canoes to get to markets and Kisangani.
Even in Turumbu Collectivity, close to Kisangani, villages
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had been cut off for years by a few kilometers of bad road
(Chapter Seven, case study of Yalibwa Village).
Due to Banalia's and the northern towns' economic
activities there was a much larger volume of road traffic
from Banalia to Kisangani than from Is~ngi to Kisangani.
The interior of Banalia, however, was also inaccessible by
road but traders entered by bicycle and on foot because
there was money to be made. A schoolteacher residing in
Banalia traded on the Panga road with his bicycle and was
able to build a house with a metal roof and buy nice
clothes and consumer goods for his family. A Popoy from
Kisangani regularly drove to Panga on his motorcycle and
one Lebanese trader made the trip in his landrover once or
twice a month. Banalia traders were trying to get funds
for this road in 1988 and a Zone Commissioner from
Bafwasende was also trying to open up the road to Panga in
1989. Evacuation of paddy, thus, depended on people's
interests in getting at the lucrative gold area.
The market day in Banalia is Sunday and there is another
large market the following day at 96 km from Kisangani.
The Banalia marketplace remains active during the week.
The market was enlarged and renovated in 1988 and there is
an active group of market women in the town, represented
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by AFECOZA. On the day before the market, producers
arrive from surrounding villages and sell their crops in
lima»ga or pre-markets at wholesale prices to market
women, who in turn sell to Kisangani traders or in the
market. Rice is sold directly to traders along the road.
The traffic to the market facilitates commerce by small
traders who depend on transport in large traders'
vehicles.
In Isangi, the market is tied into the river trading
system run by Lokele women and there is much more river
traffic than around Banalia. As such, small traders have
access to travel by canoe, but this can be time consuming,
hazardous and limited (in terms of quantities
transported). On the market day in Isangi, which takes
place every eight days, no trucks were observed whereas in
Banalia on the the market day ten trucks from Kisangani
were parked by the market and four more were observed
buying paddy along the road on the market day. On non-
market days in Isangi, there are only a handful of women
selling basic food items in the market space. On a trip
from Kisangani through Isangi to Yahuma, by contrast, only
two commercial vehicles were observed other than those
belonging to PLZ. One vehicle had broken down and, on
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return from Yahuma three weeks later, the passengers were
still stranded.
In the interior of Isangi and Yahuma markets were very
small and sparse, due to the predominance of the company
store. It is only in the mid-1980s, as the canteen
system ceased to function, that people were trying to
organize markets but it is difficult because so few
traders work the interior and women are merely selling
what other women also produce (Chapter Seven, case study
of Bolibo Village).
5.5 Competition between Concessions and Rice Traders
Isangi and COOlS
In Isangi, Busira-Lomami has given exclusive rights to
palm oil for the Kivu market to a local firm, Zimex, owned
by a prominent local businessman and former head of
national security. This man has created a cooperative in
Isangi for community development and commercialization of
local crops, notably palm oil and paddy. The
establishment of the cooperative demonstrates the
differences between Isangi and Banalia and illustrates the
struggle for control of the rice trade between large
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concessions and land-based interests and independent
traders.
The cooperative, COOlS, ostensibly promotes the
development of the Zone of Isangi. Some local residents,
however, claim that CaDIS is attempting to create (or
preserve) a monopsony under the guise of community
development. Indeed the cooperative, although modeled on
the guidelines for rural cooperatives codified in 1957, is
up until now governed by Kisangani-based intellectuals and
employees of Zimex. The administrative body which would
include representatives of the collectivities (farmers)
had never met and in fact had not been organized in 1987,
two years after the creation of the cooperative.
One local informant reported also that COOlS blocked
producers from selling their own paddy and attempted to
prevent other buyers from entering the zone. Others
claimed that COOlS officials influenced agriculture
department officials to set up roadblocks (ostensibly to
check for commercial licenses) and influenced the Zone
Commissioner to enforce a ruling which would prevent
traders from buying in Isangi unless they invested in the
zone. This last report was confirmed by COOlS officials
who argued that COOlS was making a major investment in the
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zone and others should be required to do so as well, to
restore some of the investment lost as Busira-Lomami's
operations diminished.
It was difficult to determine the extent to which COOlS
actively pursued control of the rice trade. An
interaction between the boss of CODIS/Zimex and an
independent trader (Cit. Azali, case study 7.1) occured at
the outset of the 1987 rice campaign which was hard to
interpret and may have been influenced by the presence of
the outsiders, including myself. The two are both Lokele
and know each other well. The boss is senior to Azali and
summoned him to dine at his house when he arrived in the
zone capital. Azali was reluctant but showed up. Nothing
was mentioned about trade until the end of the meal, when
the boss cautioned Azali not to buy all the rice.
Azali had been very successful in Isangi and Yahuma
because he was hard working, supervising every detail of
the sale, and because he paid cash for paddy on the spot,
while the large concessions (PLZ and Busira-Lomami) paid
two or three months after the sale or barter for
merchandise in the company store. (The latter practice was
to be followed by COOlS as well.) Despite his earlier
success, however, he left the rice trade soon after this
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encounter with the boss, and in fact relocated most of his
business dealings to Kinshasa. He claimed that it was
because ivory hunters shot and killed one merchant, robbed
a depot of Busira-Lomami and wounded the Zone Commissioner
who had dug up their c~che. In addition, the road out of
Isangi had deteriorated further. He was concerned about
the risks of carrying around cash and losing his truck.
Independent traders were thus at a disadvantage in this
volatile environment because of personal risk, but the
power of the boss of COOlS may have also played a role in
discouraging competition, as alleged by other informants.
A church official said, for example, that the Zone
Commissioner was summoned by the Governor to explain why
he had let Cit. Azali trade in the zone.
In support of this allegation, it was found that other
competitors left Isangi in the wake of the 1987 elections
for People's Commissioner (RP21 and RP22 in Chapter
Seven). One resident rice merchant ran against the boss's
godson and a COOlS candidate. He attempted to accuse the
boss of forming an alternative political party, which was
illegal in Zaire. The boss's godson won the election, the
trader lost and moved his business out of Isangi. Another
rice merchant also relocated his business to Kinshasa.
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An interesting element in these elections was the fact
that the COOlS candidate did not win and that the boss's
godson was not on speaking terms with the boss.
Significant opposition existed to COOlS, especially from
the powerful Isangi Catholic diocese. It should be noted
that, with the departure of the other rice merchants, the
diocese was one of the last remaining buyers and millers
of paddy besides COOlS. Thus through various means,
intentionally or unintentionally, COOlS was c~eating a
power base that began to squeeze out other players.
PLZ in Yahuma
Farmers interviewed in Yahuma, dominated by PLZ,
complained at length about the practice of delaying
payment for rice sales and were very happy to see the zone
opening up to new buyers who were willing to pay
immediately. The farmers willingly put aside the sacks
distributed by PLZ and filled the sacks of Cit. Azali.
The farmers agreed to weigh the paddy and to a low
farmgate price because they feared that their paddy would
not be evacuated or that PLZ would buy it and not pay them
for months, during which time their money would be
devalued.
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The farmers were unhappy with the new traders, however,
because they came to buy paddy or coffee but often did not
bring merchandise, especially expensive items such as
cloth (see letter in Appendix). Some traders said that
they did not bring these items because the farmers could
not afford to buy them and, put off by the prices, would
feel that they had been cheated. The traders also did not
have time for extensive sales of merchandise because they
wanted to return quickly to Kisangani. The inflationary
environment, lack of credit and instability thus limited
potential markets for the traders and greatly restricted
villagers' access to merchandise.
An interview with the Director of Plantations for PLZ shed
some light on PLZ's concept of the small farmer (Dodd
1988). He said that PLZ was not interested in the
smallholder or even in sharecropping schemes. While PLZ
purchased rice from nearby farmers, the Director would
prefer to interplant rice on the oil palm plantations and
harvest everything by machine thus bypassing the local
farmer completely. PLZ was weary of the responsibility of
maintaining the roads, especially with "liberalization"
bringing in competition.
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Roads around the concession area were indeed in very poor
condition. In one case, a bridge had to be completely
rebuilt in order to pass. Other bridges were on the verge
of collapse. Cit. Azali, who repaired the bridge and made
other road repairs, tried to use this work as a bargaining
chip in negotiating with the local authorities (see letter
in Appendix). He made the point that he paid for the
repairs from his own funds, while PLZ was (theoretically)
reimbursed by the Roads Department for road maintenance.
In 1989, rice traders in Kisangani reported that no one
was buying rice in Yahuma because of poor roads. The
underlying dilemma is that none of the traders from
Kisangani had the means to maintain the roads, or to
provide other services such as clinics and schools.
Traders did not even have the time or initial capital to
provision these areas in merchandise to the detriment of
their own business interests. These services were
provided by the concessions and the state had not taken
over these functions.
The monopsony system, with all its flaws, at least
provided these services. COOlS sought to reproduce this
system, and was building a hospital and providing other
services for the zone. In return, they expected to
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control the flow of goods, at least within their
membership. Seeds were distributed in 1987 to farmers in
surrounding villages and these farmers were obligated to
sell all their harvest to COOlS.
The parasitic state shaped these struggles by the simple
fact that it provided no services to communities which
supported it by taxes, fees and fines. The protection of
a large and powerful entity was necessary to ensure a flow
of services, but these entities extracted a price--the
continued passiVity of the producer.
5.6 Competition Between Rice Professionals and Lolema
In Banalia another type of struggle is taking place, that
between rice professionals and large independent traders
and lc.lema. As described above, Banalia is more open to
the regional economy and more active economically. The
activity there has opened up opportunities for lolema to
operate. There are vehicles making the trip to Banalia
and Buta daily and several commodities can be bought as
well as rice, including game, plantains, vegetables, and
peanuts. Fourteen out of twenty lolema surveyed in rice
mills were buying along the Banalia (Buta) road, and
eleven of these had established regular ties with farmers.
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In 1986, two articles in Boyoma described the rice
professionals' difficulties with the lolema (Boyoma 1986a,
198Gb). The RPs decried the anarchy that the lolema's
activities were injecting into the rice trade in Banalia
and met to devise ways to put a stop to unlicensed buyers.
One of the plans was to increase the price of milling rice
so that the lolema could not afford it. This scheme ran
into difficulties, however, because not all rice mill
owners were rice traders, and several depended on lolema
clientele to stay in business. Some rice mills
specialized in attracting lolema and one mill kept its
milling price so low that it almost went out of business.
One of the practices that stung the RPs was the lolema's
purchase of rice by sack rather than weighing. Weighing
had become a bone of contention between rice traders and
farmers because farmers (rightly) suspected traders of
using rigged scales.4~ Rice traders, for their part,
did not like to buy by the sack, as the farmers often
stuffed the sack with chaff or poor quality rice. Lolema,
however, were more client-centered due to fewer options
and stiffer competition, and did not possess scales. They
4'This practice was observed
reported by an informant on the
trading business.
on one occasion and
inside of a rice
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also purchased white rice hand-pounded in the village
which brought considerably more revenue for the producer.
Hand-pounding rice and selling white rice had been illegal
until 1983 (and perhaps afterwards).
Thus Banalia began to lose RPs. In 1986, Citne. Alinga,
the president of ANEZA and AFECOZA for Banalia, hosted a
well-attended collective bargaining session between
farmers and RPs (Boyoma 1986b). The next year, only five
traders attended, two RPs and three independents. One
other RP reportedly bought a license to buy in the zone.
At the bargaining session, the price was fixed at Z9/kilo
but traders were already paying Z1800 per sack (of
approximately 100 kilos) and buying at night. The zone
had increased the cost of a license to a minimum Z2,500
from Z500 but the zone agronomist claimed that "as many as
ten women were operating under one license. " He also
noted that the lolema had an organization which negotiated
with the zone.
By 1988, informants reported that "Banalia was infested by
lolema and no RPs were buying there" (Yuma 1988). The
increased competition in the zone did not appear to
translate into increased investment in agriculture or even
goods and services for the population, however. In that
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domain, Isangi appeared more prosperous because of the
investment made by COOlS in electricity, water and
building a new hospital.
The zone agronomist in Isangi was not able to get any rice
seed for distribution in 1987, although it was promised by
the Governor. The agronomist went himself to get some
selected seeds from Yangambi but they did not grow
well.eo The fertilizer project was also non-functioning
because the price of fertilizer was too high. There was
no electricity in the zone capital in 1988. In 1984,
there had been three rice mills in Banalia but, by 1986,
there was only one left, the antiquated mill belonging to
Citne. Alinga. One seed multiplication project was
started in the zone in 1987 with 10 ha under cultivation,
but no distribution program was yet underway at the time.
In any case, this project could only serve 50-70 farmers.
The agronomist and other informants noted, however, that
rice production had significantly increased, fallow time
had decreased and farmers had to go longer distances to
eOWe also had observed this "new" variety, IRAT
112, in Isangi and noted extensive insect damage.
The Banalia agronome confirmed that this variety,
which was the only one being distributed in the
region, was not resistant to pests.
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cut new fields for rice. Thus farmers were investing time
at least in rice production. It is unclear whether both
men and women are equally enthusiastic about rice,
however. During a meeting with a group of women in
Banalia in 1986, many women complained about the distance
they had to travel to get to rice fields (up to 14
kilometers) and several said that they preferred to use
land closer to town for growing manioc. The revenue for
any manioc sold belongs exclusively to women, whereas the
rice revenue is shared. Women reported that a certain
portion was usually shared with them or that the money was
used to buy them cloth or household items.
Farmgate prices for rice were significantly higher in
Banalia than in Isangi or Yahuma, reflecting this
competition. In 1986, farmers in Isangi and Yahuma were
getting Z7/kilo near the end of the season, while in
Banalia at that time paddy was selling for Z10 or Z12 the
kilo. The next year, the price jumped almost immediately
to Z18 the kilo in Banalia, while in Isangi traders
thought that producers would be offered Z10-15/kilo. The
sl~rvey of lolema in 1987 revealed that prices for paddy
paid in Isangi may have been less than this as the two
lolema who bought there paid Z800 and Z1300, while sales
on the Banalia road ranged from Z1300 to Z1800 (N~14).
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In Banalia town it was possible to purchase consumer items
such as radios, watches or household utensils (at least on
major market days), but in more remote villages it was
very difficult. Villagers feared travelling to Kisangani
to buy items because of the risk of theft and confiscation
by the military (for example, for lack of bills of sale
for items or any pretext). Children were sometimes sent
for education in town but often overburdened relatives
could not cope with more people coming in from the
village.
Some informants noted that bridewealth costs and polygyny
were on the rise, while others claimed that young men were
deferring bridewealth payments because they had no means
to pay (Lokomba 1987). These two trends are not
necessarily contradictory, as discovered in fieldwork in
Bandundu region (Russell 1990). They reflect, on the one
hand, the increased differentiation between elites
(chiefly clan members, MPR officials) and others in the
village and, on the other hand, the lack of other means of
accumulating wealth.
Hence, while increased competition apparently led to
higher farmgate prices in Banalia, these increases did not
bring the opportunity to invest in more intensive methods
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or even, in most areas, increased access to goods and
services. The agronomist in Banalia was concerned about
this trend, as he watched fallow time diminish and more
land further away from town be cut for rice fields. Women
were upset as well, as many had no husbands or absent
husbands, and said that they were doing all the work
themselves (including even cutting the forest).e1
e1These problems were found as well, in a more
aggravated state, in research done in Bandundu
Region in December 1989. In the area studied,
there was little forest land left and yields were
declining dramatically. At the same time, women
were increasing manioc cultivation, under the
compulsory system and on their own, without any
technological change. In fact, they had dropped
some techniques to increase soil fertility because
of time constraints (see Russell 1989b).
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Chapter Six
Food Supply and the Parasitic State: Assessing the Impact
of Liberalization
6.1 Overview
We have now looked at the history and structure of the
rice trade as it is embedded in both the urban and rural
economies of the region. In Chapters Two and Three, the
historical and structural background to decline in the
agricultural sector was discussed. The roles of different
actors and their struggles for control of the trade were
described for Isangi, Yahuma and Banalia in Chapters Four
and Five. This chapter examines in detail the changes
which took place in the rice trade after a 1983 policy
shift toward liberalization of markets and prices.
The major issues addressed in this chapter are 1) the
intended benefits of liberalization in Zaire; 2) actual
changes in the rice trade after the liberalization decree
of 1983; 3) the evidence concerning the impact of
liberalization on the commercialization and production of
rice in Tshopo; 4) the continuing structural obstacles to
investment in agriculture, and their impact on food
supply.
223
While liberalization in itself may not have generated much
change, it is necessary to address the issue of the impact
of this type of policy, as they have received a great deal
of attention in the international debate over the decline
of African agriculture (World Bank 1981 and 1984c, African
Studies Review 1984, Berry 1984). In the case of Zaire,
liberalization was seen to be a key step tl~ward the
revitalization of the agricultural sector.
Donors began to acknowledge the corruption and
"inefficiency" of the Zairian state in the late 1970s and,
as discussed at the end of Chapter Three, saw Zaire's
salvation in the private sector. This belief was
bolstered by the rise of Reaganomics in the United States,
with its emphasis on privatization. Emphasis thus began
to be placed on removing controls to privatization and on
channeling evelopment funds to private voluntary
organizations (PVOs) and businesses. This approach in
fact merely avoided the issue of the nature of the Zairian
state, through which any project or policy would have to
be implemented.
To get in line with this new outlook and keep monies
flowing, in 1983 Mobutu made several sweeping policy
changes. Donors claimed that he had finally gotten
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serious about reforming Zaire's corrupt and inefficient
economy. A year after these reforms were announced, a new
stand-by agreement was reached with the IMF for $160
million and Zaire's creditors once again were held at bay
(Africa News 1985). Despite some retrenchment in 1986 and
1988, this support was generally continued through 1989.
For agriculture, the most important of these new policies
was embodied in the law which states that "the sale price
of products and services are freely fixed by those who
make the offer" (Ordonnance-Loi No. 83/026, September 12,
1983; my translation). This law represented a significant
departure from agricultural marketing practices inherited
from the colonial period, as discussed above, and in place
until 1983. The success of liberalization in Zaire would
confirm the privatization approach to development, showing
that the private sector, when unhampered by government
controls, would invest in agriculture.
6 ~.L Liberalization: Theory and Practice
Liberalization is part of the package of structural
adjustment policies which is promoted and, in many cases,
rendered mandatory by the IMF/World Bank conditions for
further loans and development assistance. The goal of
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structural ajustment is, ultimately, to open up the
economy to external investment by paying debts on
schedule, dropping tariff barriers, and implementing
economic policy reforms. Ideally, "reforms in the key
sector of agriculture aim at improving both export and
food production and include a comprehensive rural
development program focused on smallholder production,
liberalization of pricing and marketing strategies to
provide production incentives, and finally, renewed
efforts in agricultural research and e):tensic.n"<Leslie
1'387). el2
In this chapter, we look at one element of agricultural
policy reform: the implementation of liberalization
measures which eliminate or modify internal economic
structures inhibiting access to or growth in agricultural
marketing and production, including state marketing boards
and parastatal monopsonies, and controls on prices and
market access. These measures are attempts to create
"budgetary and pricing policies .••that will switch the
internal terms of trade toward agriculture" by attracting
more traders, thereby increasing competition which will
el2This emphasis on rural development was not
necessarily part of the package in other countries
and came to be emphasized in later attempts to deal
with the "sO::lcialcosts of adjustment."
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bid up prices to producers. These developments will in
theory provide a means to expand production and investment
in farming (IBRD 1984: 2).
In Zaire, liberalization was also a recognition of the
growth of the "underground economy," people's attempts tCJ
evade controls on production and trade (MacGaffey 1989).
It was theorized that the entrepreneurship driving the
underground economy could be channeled into productive
investment if controls were removed. Theoretically, it
could also promote large-scale capitalist agriculture as
well or at least stem its decline (halting, for example,
the phase down of operations by large companies such as
PLZ and Busira-Lomami).
To exemplify the efficacy of this type of reform, Elliot
Berg described the liberalization of the rice market in
Madagascar in the mid-1980s, claiming that production had
increased three-fold, and that farmers, not traders, had
benefitted. This increase was accomplished simply by
raising the farmgate price (Berg 1988).
Many Africanists, however, have called for a more
sophisticated analysis of African political economies and
less simplistic "cures" f or complex and lc.ngstanding
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problems (African Studies Review 1984). Berry (1984)
argued, f,:)rexample, that "getting the price right" may
not always be simple or effective in increasing
agricultural production, and Bates (1981) cautioned that
eliminating marketing boards and other structures which
capture agricultural surplus often runs counter to
interests of elites and urban consumers.
In practice, liberalization has not always proved to
stimulate production. An economic analysis of
liberalization in Kenya and Tanzania revealed that
"respc.nses tel liberalizatic,n may differ radically in•••
economies [such as Tanzania's] from the predictions of
converrtLone I analysis," and concludad that "ort hodox
remedies are •.•inappropriate in an e conomy like Tanzania"
(Bevan et al. 1987:xviii, 53). Mabbs-Zeno (1989)
demonstrated that the liberalization of tropical beverages
(coffee, tea, cocoa) in the world market would not
necessarily be beneficial for African economies.
In Zaire, seven out of eleven marketing parastatals were
eliminated in the late 1970s, including those for cereals,
coffee and cotton, and others' roles sharply reduced. The
gold and diamond trade was liberalized in 1983--with
implications for investment in agriculture--as well as, in
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theory, the markets for rice and corn. Yet, price fixing
and limits to market access were still very much features
of the local economy in 1986-87, as described in Chapter
Five.
6.3 Change in the Rice Trade since Zairianization
It is essential to look at the way in which the rice trade
system actually changed in the fifteen years after
zairianization before focusing on liberalization. The
institutions and social relations of the rice trade which
emerged from the post-zairianization era were adapted to a
rapidly degrading economy and an increasingly parasitic
state. Any policy enacted in that environment, thus,
would be also molded by those forces, unless structural
changes were made in access to resources and power.
The most significant trend of the 1970s was the
indigenization of the rice trade, as most expatriate
investors fled the country. This transformation was not
the result of a "natural" evolution of Zaire's merchant
class but of the confiscation of the expatriate merchant
class' assets. With the departure of the expatriates,
access to resources such as credit and foreign exchange
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outside the state declined and state resources were
allocated along political lines.
Some people were able to tap into the party apparatus to
accumulate wealth; others lived on this wealth second-
hand, as family members, concubines or hangers-on. At
least one-third of the rice professionals interviewed had
been acqu.~r€u.rs or had access to state coffers in other
capacities. These resources were no guarantee of success.
Two merchants had essentially left their businesses in the
region, one was almost bankrupt, and two others had
severely neglected their rice businesses.
The rice trade was not an easy business to enter or in
which to make easy profits. One rice professional (RP2--
see Charts 7.1 - 7.3 for list of all interviews) lost a
great deal of money when one of his trucks was stolen by
an employee. With three trucks, he never approached the
rice sales made by Cit. Azali, who had only one truck but
personally supervised the entire campaign. An Independent
trader (13), an investor from Kasai region with money from
gold trading, funded a disastrous rice buying campaign run
by 12, Azali's cousin. They first leased a truck and the
chauffer died, canceling the trip. They then followed
Azali on his rice campaign, trying to pick up the dregs he
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left behind. Their truck did not have four wheel drive
and was constantly getting stuck or breaking down. The
campaign ended up as a net loss.
Even true Zairian entrepreneurs had to do business in a
deteriorated environment. Some, like Cit. Azali,
prospered nevertheless, mostly by capitalizing on the
changing needs of the population and adjusting qUickly to
new conditions.
There were no safeguards in the business except
diversification, which accounts for the fact that
virtually all rice professionals had other businesses,
often more important than their rice business <Balwisha
1986). Diversification meant that little time or effort
could be spent on planning the buying campaign, in long-
term investment or committment to work with other traders,
one reason for the failure of the Committee of Rice
Professionals and CICA.
Zairianization of plantations brought about the
deterioration of the rural infrastructure which was in
part responsible for the shift of rice milling from the
countryside to the city. The focus of the rice trade thus
moved away from the rural areas. It must be noted that
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colonial policies of production and trade had already
inhibited artisanal milling of rice and the growth of
petty trade in the commodity, thus stifling incentive in
rural areas.
Before 1983, the structure of the colonial system of
assigning buying zones for rice remained intact, at least
in theory. In reality, lolema began to playa greater
role in evacuating paddy in the late 1970s. The growth of
rice mills in the city responded to the rise of the
lolema.
Rice mills were not a stable investment, as witnessed by
the fact that over half of those listed as paying taxes in
1986 could not be found in the same year. Nevertheless,
after their rapid proliferation, they created a niche in
the local economy, hosting a swarm of activity, inclUding
intermediaries such as rice brokers and scavengers such as
the Kumu women who sifted through the chaff left from
milling for tiny broken pieces of rice to sell as chicken
feed. These activities represented the increasing
"involution" of the urban economy, the creation of ever-
smaller niches to try to gain access to resources.
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Few lolema interviewed saw the trade as a profession, but
rather something that could be done to earn money because
other opportunities were closed. Lolema also invested in
other trades, as seen in Table 7.3, Part 3. It was
rumored that a lolema organization existed and operated in
Banalia, which could have arisen from the increased trade
in paddy in that area. This organization was never
located, however, although one trader encountered in
Banalia claimed to be its president. Most lolema,
nonetheless, puraued the food trade "with a savage
individualism born of penury" (Pain, quoted in Guyer
1987:43).
Though the lolema represented a vital part of the food
economy, they were not respected and were continually
subject to harrassment. On one hand, the small scale and
Lnd LvLdua Liam of their operations and their "pirate"
status mitigated against development of the trade. On the
ot her, they were perceived as being "higher class" than
farmers due to their mobility and access to resources in
the city and were resented by the farmers (Case Study of
Cit. Alinga, Chapter Seven).
The situation of rice farmers, and rural people generally,
deteriorated a great deal since zairianization in terms of
services available, access to resources and guaranteed
revenue. The grip of the plantations was eased and few
people remained as full-time plantation workers, in this
gaining some measure of freedom but losing access to
merchandise, medical care and schooling. Farming
represented a small percentage of labor output by the mid-
1970s, however, especially by men, as they turned to more
remunerative and less controlled activities (Tollens and
Huybens 1989). In the 1980s, farmers welcomed
liberalization, but were discouraged by continued
inflation in the price of merchandise and, more important,
its unavailability. Their leaders were either tied into
the system, as MPR officials, or powerless to effect
change, as traditional chiefs who were old and
illiterate.e3 As seen in Chapter Five, cooperatives
were not a path to empowerment for Tshopo's farmers.
The regulatory situation was constantly changing in the
1980s through the time of the fieldwork, in contrast to
the stability of the monopsony system. No one knew from
year to year how much a license would cost, or even where
it should be purchased. The fixing of farmgate prices was
e3In Shaba, a few villages visited had begun to
elect younger, more educated chiefs, for example
.school teachers. This trend did not always sit
well with the older generation (Russell 1988).
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still theoretically enforced but no one knew exactly what
that enforcement entailed: Was the price a minimum or a
maximum price? Did all farmers have to offer the same
price or were farmers allowed to bargain? The collective
bargaining session in Banalia was an attempt to come to
grips with changing circumstances arising from the decline
of the monopsony system, while still retaining the
privileges of larger merchants and control by authorities.
Rice professionals in the colonial era who had access to
credit felt secure in their businesses, benefitted from
good infrastructure, and generally could count on a return
on their investment. For example, the Belgika mill
functioned for over three decades and significant
investment was made in research on rice at INEAC.
By contrast, after having studied the vicissitudes of the
rice trade in 1986-87, its continued functioning seemed
almost miraculous. The time and energy spent by farmers
and traders on unremunerative activity, dealing with
obstacles and simply waiting created a net deficit in the
supply of rice to Kisangani. This shortfall was used to
justify the import of rice (see below). It was said that
low yields resulting from simple technology and were the
main obstacle to increasing supply (USAID 1987).e4
Nevertheless, the Belgian Congo had been a net exporter of
rice in the colonial era under much the same production
conditions (with higher yields resulting from improved
seed and greater control over farmers) and Tshopo was the
most productive rice growing area.
Conditions after zairianization, including soaring
inflation, demonetization and constant political shifts,
resulted in a highly uncoordinated, inefficient system of
rice production and supply. Major roads could be
impassible for long stretches of time during the rice
campaign. Rice professionals found it more difficult each
year to obtain the hard currency necessary for spare parts
for rice mills and truckS. Even the relatively mobile
lolema Constantly faced being without transportation,
losing their rice to rain, theft or confiscation or to pay
for transport out of isolated areas.
e4The study team did conclude that Kisangani
should receive imported rice mainly in the off-
season (which, as noted in Chapter Four,
corresponds with the campaign season in Kivu).
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As rice in some areas could go unsold for months or never
be sold, farmers could not coordinate planting and harvest
with demand. Traders could arrive to find no rice to buy
or rice that was not yet dry or infested with insects.
Farmers who invested in clearing a large field for rice
one year could find that their investment was in vain.
Another year, traders would come but they would not have
much, if any, rice to sell or the price offered would be
derisory.
6.4 The Impact of Liberalization on Rice Production and
Marketing
Liberalization was supposed to open the way for small
traders to be recognized, for expensive and time-consuming
controls to be lifted, and for the market to determine
prices for food crops, eliminating farmgate price fixing.
One study carried out in 1989 based on interviews with 200
farmers found that liberalization had in fact stimulated
production in Bandundu and Shaba and increased sales had
translated into a net gain for producers, as the cost of
education and health had remained constant.
Liberalization did not do away with compulsory
cultivation, however, and "all merchants reported the
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existence of obstacles to trade," primarily roadblocks
(van de Wetering and Kingsbury 1989).
One must question the conclusion of this report, however,
that liberalization benefitted farmers. Increases in
fines could substantially offset gains made by farmers
even if other expenses held constant. Not counted in the
report as expenses, fines were given as a household's
major expense by 13~ of 108 women farmers surveyed in
Central Bandundu in 1989 and fines were excessively high
relative to income (Russell 1990). The overall total
income reported--$63 per capita per year--is so low that
it would be hard to imagine any surplus being generated,
and the major expenses in health and education translate
into purchases of ineffective medicines, compulsory clinic
visits (village midwifery, for example, being illegal) and
schools totally devoid of any resources.
Liberalization's Impact on Trade
The liberalization measure had contradictory effects in
the case of the rice trade in Haut Zaire. It was never
interpreted to mean that the trade was open to all comers,
for example, including lolema, nor did officials feel that
farmers had the right to raise prices as they wished.
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Officials continued to require rice traders to buy a
license, with the cost of the license rising steeply every
year (Table 5.1) and initiated a collective bargaining
session that fixed the farmgate price at the beginning of
each campaign. (For more on the collective bargaining
session, see Chapter Five on the comparison of Banalia,
1sangi and Yahuma, and the case of Citne. Alinga in
Chapter Seven). The fi~;ing of the "buying season"
remained and new barriers to trade were erected, at least
in 1sangi, to eliminate those who did not invest in the
zone. At the regional agricultural conference in 1986,
the major problem was seen to be failure to "c.rganize"
Cencadrer) the peasants to stimulate production. This
encadrement was envisioned as maintaining control of large
traders and officials over distribution of seeds and other
resc.urces to farmers who would be "guaranteed" a market.
Petty traders and farmers had no voice in these
del iberatic.ns.
Thus, large traders tried to restrict liberalization
because they wanted to maintain the advantage over small
traders. They felt that their capital outlay for trucks,
personnel and rice mills justified these advantages,
despite the fact that they had to pay for licenses and
were controlled by zone officials.
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On the other hand, no rice professional was really able to
sustain investment in a way that would develop the trade
and production, with the limited exception of Cit. Tonda,
the president of the Rice Professionals' Association, and
the boss of COOlS. Lacking a viable system to maintain
roads, and credit for purchases and vehicle repair, most
did not even supply the rural areas with merchandise.
Liberalization's Impact on Production
The evidence on liberalization's direct impact on
production in Tshopo, through higher farmgate prices
resulting from increased competition, is very sketchy.
Many sources confirm that rice production and yields
declined steeply after zairianization. In the colonial
era, yields of 1500 to 2000 kg/ha were the norm, while in
the 1970s, the average yield for Haut Zaire was 720 kg/ha
(Jurion and Henry 1969, Clifton and Afifi 1985). The
picture is complicated by the fact that farmers returned
to multicropping after the colonial era, and compUlsory
cultivation was reinstated in the late 1970s to stem the
decline in production. As discussed in Chapter Two,
statistics on rice production and commercialization are
totally unreliable.
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In 1986-87, informants in Banalia noted that rice
production had increased in the zone because of the
proliferation of buyers, surpassing even the colonial era.
This intensification without technical change led to
severe strains on women, as fields were being cut farther
and farther from the village. The fact that some women
had begun to focus their energies on their manioc fields
closer to town indicates that perhaps the limit of rice
production with the existing labor force had been reached.
The zcone agronomist had not been able to obtain improved
seeds or inputs even for his own fields. A reported
decline in the number of large traders coming to the zone
after 1987 could discourage farmers.
In Isangi in 1987, the presence of monopsonies kept
farmers from enjoying the benefits of the policy. No
attempt at a ccollective bargaining session was made, and
barriers to trade were erected. It was said that farmers
were prevented from commercializing their own crop. Two
major rice traders had left the zone in the wake of
political conflict with the boss of COOlS and their rice
mills were shut down. The small COOlS seed distribution
program was reporteuly ineffective because the variety
distributed was attacked by disease and farmers were
obliged to sell all their harvest to COOlS. Farmers at
241
Turumbu Collectivity, discouraged by the longstanding
monopsony, had such low production that traders did not
even bother to go there, despite the fact that it was
closer to Kisangani than any other rice producing area.
American rice was more abundant than local rice in the
marketplace at Yangambi in October 1987 (during the rice
harvest season). Thus, one cannot say that liberalization
really took effect in 1sangi.
In Yahuma, farmers told me that they planned to plant more
rice in the 1987-88 season as they were encouraged by
Azali's enterprise in their area. Unfortunately, neither
Azali nor any other large trader returned to Yahuma the
next year. This uncertainty, along with the farmers'
inability to purchase goods, will undoubtedly affect
future production.
In all areas, the impact of forced cultivation on rice
production should be weighed. For example, it is possible
that farmers at Turumbu would not have grown rice at all
in 1885-87 at the very low farmgate prices offered if they
weren't coerced. On the other hand, there is evidence
that rice is a more profitable food crop than manioc or
banana, if only because it can be stored CTshibaka 1989),
or because sale of a couple of bags of rice brings in
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enough revenue to purchase consumer items such as cloth
and shoes. Although other food crops may be
commercialized more easily, the revenue comes in in small
amounts. Because of urgent family needs and theft, it is
difficult to save money for large purchases in this way.
Money from rice also accrues to men, although much can be
spent on women's items, while other food crops' revenue
goes to women. Thus, men may wish to grow some rice each
year in the hope that there will be buyers.
Investment after Liberalization
In general, very little investment in agriculture was
visible in the area. In Banalia, no investment had been
made in infrastructure and services and only one small and
ancient rice mill remained in 1987. Agricultural feeder
roads leading into the interior were impassible and
villagers even along the main Kisangani-Banalia road
complained about lack of access to basic goods such as
dried fish. Seed distribution programs were negligible
and no other inputs were available, despite the existence
of national programs for their distribution.
In Isangi, the investments of COOlS consisted in
installing electricity, water, a small telephone system, a
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bar and a "luxury" hotel in Isangi town, all of which
served mainly the employees of COOlS. Other operators had
been discouraged and closed their businesses. Busira-
Lomami reportedly discouraged road maintenance because
poor roads kept their palm oil monopsony intact. In
Yahuma, PLZ had allowed the infrastructure of the zone to
deteriorate, in response to liberalization.
Liberalization did not put an end to confusion and
stagnation as there were no provisions to fix roads,
provide credit or other services. As enacted in Tshopo,
it did not limit taxation or collection of fines, or even
prevent other controls in some areas. Nothing was offered
to attract investment in the trade or production of rice.
Both activities remained extremely strenuous, hazardous
and relatively capital intensive (compared to supply of
other staple commodities).
6.5 Structural Obstacles to Investment in Agriculture and
Their Impact on Food Supply
Demand and Potential
The rice trade continued because, as several traders
remarked, "peop Le need t.:.eat." Demand f or rice was very
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high in Kisangani. Rice was quickly evacuated from the
rice mills at all times. An informal survey of women in
the central market revealed that virtually all were
willing to pay for rice, although it cost more than
manioc, even when prices were rising at the end of the
season (Cf. Mukuna 1982 on increased demand for rice in
Kinshasa). Reasons given were that the children preferred
it, that it was more nutritious than manioc, and that they
needed to have a varied diet. More important perhaps, in
terms of household survival strategies, rice could be
traded from the home or resold, unlike other staples. For
many Kisangani residents originating from Maniema, for
Arabisds and expatriates, rice was a staple food.
Local rice was generally available in Kisangani, though
often of poor quality.~e When rice arrived from the
countryside, it was immediately sold, according to rice
merchants. Often large queues were observed at rice mills
where market women waited for a shipment. Imported rice
shipments also sold out very quickly, according to the
owner of one of the importing enterprises.
eeFor example, the Kisangani breweries did not
buy rice from Haut Zaire but used either imported
rice or rice from Bumba, Equateur Region, because
of its more consistent quality.
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Because local production could not meet local demand,
shipments of rice from Haut Zaire to Kinshasa were
restricted in the early 1980s. A study of seasonal price
fluctuations in the Kinshasa market in 1987 found a twenty
percent price differential over the year for rice. The
maximum prices were found in November and December, when
supply was lowest (Department of Agriculture/DMPCC 1988).
This is the peak season for the rice campaign in Haut
Zaire. Thus, rice from Haut Zaire was not reaching the
key Kinshasa market when it was needed (and apparently,
imported rice was not filling the seasonal gap efficiently
either, which was its stated purpose).
With investment in production and coordination of
marketing and transportation, rice from Haut Zaire could
supply the local breweries and be sold in Kinshasa if
imported rice became substantially more expensive or
unavailable. Barges can make the trip from Kisangani or
Isangi to Kinshasa in a week. Another important market is
Eastern Haut Zaire, primarily savanna land with a pastoral
economy. There are already a few traders who specialize
in transporting rice from Haut Zaire to this area. Even
with existing farming techniques, Haut Zaire's potential
for rice has not even begun to be tapped. When farmers
expect to sell rice, they can produce up to 20 sacks (2
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tons) per season, either by clearing over 1-1/2 - 2
hectares or by planting twice in a year.~6 In Banalia
alone, with 54,000 farm households, the yield could exceed
100,000 tons of paddy if the household only produced two
sacks (200 kgs) per year. Haut Zaire's total demand for
paddy in 1985 was estimated at 108,000 tons (R~publique du
Zairel Department of Agriculture 1982). Given such high
local demand and potential, why did rice production and
trade fail to flourish with or without liberalization?
Food Imports
Stagnation in agriculture results in part from increasing
reliance on food imports. One source claims that sixty
percent of Zaire's food needs are filled by imported food
(World Currency Yearbook 1986-87). In 1980, 10,000 metric
tons of rice were imported to Zaire and, by 1986, imports
exceeded 60,000 tons (Clifton and Afifi 1985, Conjoncture
Economique 1987). Wheat imports were expected to increase
500X from 1982 to 1984 (R~publique du Zaire/Department of
Agriculture 1982).
~60bviously, a high level of production could
not be sustained without investment in intensive
methods of production and conservation measures.
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American wheat is used to make bread which is a now a
common food in urban areas. In 1988-89 in Kinshasa, low-
quality frozen chickens from Belgium were more common and
cheaper than local chickens, frozen ocean fish and dried
fish from South Africa replaced river fish in the markets
and was found in rural areas far from the capital. In the
large stores, virtually all vegetables were imported from
Europe or South Africa.
In Lubumbashi, corn from Zambia, subsidized by the Zambian
government, flooded the market in 1988 and inhibited local
corn production <Ariza-Nino and Mueller 1988). Stores
were stocked with foodstuffs from South Africa. Corn
marketing in Shaba also suffered from lack of credit,
monopsonies, regulations forbidding inter-regional trade,
and from poor transportation infrastructure, partly as a
result of the breakdown of the railroads in the wake of
the Angolan civil war and, in 1989, from the Government of
Zaire's failure to fund the Roads Bureau for road
maintenance <Ariza-Nino and Mueller 1988, see Appendix
e7Benguela on the Angolan coast is the major
outlet for mining and agricultural products from
Shaba.
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Loans from South Africa help to cover these food imports,
increasing dependency and encouraging unnecessary imports
(Mabiengwa 1989). In addition, Zairians in the customs,
importing and border control offices benefited from food
imports as "overinvoicing of food imports has been a
standard feature of the Zairian brand of kleptocracy"
(Lemarchand 1987:157). Hence, much of the food imported
to Zaire may not even have been needed and certainly did
not reach hungry people, as many of the poorest are now in
food-producing areas or cannot afford imported food.
Imported rice is sold in Kisangani by two or three of the
large wholesalers mentioned in Chapter Two to smaller
wholesalers, consumers and to market women. Prior to
1986, it was reported that imported rice was less
expensive than local rice because imported rice was
subsidized by the government.ee During 1986-87,
eSThe import of rice is not exactly subsidized
but both the United States and Thailand, the two
major exporters, offer credit packages under which
the importer has 30-90 days to pay for the rice.
In addition, with PL480 (Food for Peace) rice, the
U.S. government subsidizes the exchange rate costs,
that is, the importer will pay for the rice in
local currency at the official exchange rate. If
the importer had to pay for the rice in dollars
without this subsidy it would cost 20-40~ more as
the zaire is not a convertible currency and dollars
have to purchased in the black market. The
availability of foreign currency through the Bank
of Zaire is very limited (Appendix III).
01
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however, local rice was consistently less expensive,
although by only a few zaires a kilo. Even when local
rice was available and cheaper, some consumers prefered to
pay for imported rice as it is cleaner. Local rice
requires removing stones and chaff and rinsing anywhere
from three to eight times in water before cooking.
Those who imported rice were high up in the survival chain
and had access to credit unavailable to local traders.
Importing rice adds to the nation's debt but was justified
by the fact that local production could not fill the
demand and that importing could fill seasonal gaps and
keep demand high (USAID 1987). The latter argument is
specious, for reasons discussed in Chapter Five. The
issue of imported rice was of great concern to rice
professionals, as reflected in minutes of their meetings
and discussions with the president of the rice
professional's committee (ANEZA 1980, 1985) but this group
was not able to exercise any power to stop rice imports,
nor was I able to convince development planners of the
negative impact of rice imports. (See Leplaideur 1989 on
250
similar opposition between rice importers and local rice
traders in Guinea.)e~
Rice imports from the United States have been linked to
lobbying efforts by Mobutu's supporters. The Wall Street
JOllrnal reported in 1990 that Grover Connell, of Connell
Rice and Sugar, a supplier of rice for export and a major
contributor to Congressional campaigns, is one of Mobutu's
strongest supporters. Another lobbying organization, the
Zaire American Research Institute <ZARI), is linked to
AMEX International, a consulting organization which has
the exclusive contract to handle PL480 imports to Zaire.
This pattern linking American farm and business interests
with the Mobutu r~gime holds true for wheat as well, as an
American company, MIDEMA, has a virtual monopoly on wheat
imports to Zaire.
It was not possible to determine the total quantity of
rice imported to Kisangani. When a large shipment came
in, however, the market was flooded and imported rice was
e~When the USAID study team visited Kisangani to
assess the impact of imported rice on local rice
production, a meeting was set up with prominent
rice professional.. Despite their arguments that
rice imports depressed prices and created unfair
competition, the team concluded that rice imports
<under the Food for Peace or PL480 scheme) should
continue.
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found as far away as the marketplace in Yangambi. The
import of rice bolstered large wholesale firms at the
expense of indigenous entrepreneurs. Despite a few
attempts, no plan was devised which would even let local
rice traders import rice to generate revenue because they
were seen to lack stability and sufficient collateral for
the Loan ,
Other Factors Affecting Investment in Rice
In addition to competition from imported rice, there were
other reasons for the failure of policy reform to develop
the rice trade and thus transform the local economy.
Agriculture accounted for only a portion of the region's
economic activity and revenue was largely generated
through trade- -bot h legal and "illegal" (Chapter Two). The
situation rural people in general deteriorated in the
fifteen years after zairianization. In fact , vir tua11y
all studies of the rural areas of Tshopo found that people
(especially men) spend little time in agriculture, that
they are discouraged by low prices and the high cost of
manufactured goods, and that the dearth of amenities and
high rate of taxation and fines, combined with excessive
and arbitrary "cclntrol" generated high rates of
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outmigration (Streiffler and Mbaya 1989, Tollens 1989,
Tshibaka 1989, Yahuma interviews 1987).
Blc.ckages existed to the creatic,n of a more "apprc.priate-
techn,;:.lc'gy"based system as well. These bl,;:.ckageswere
both political and symbolic. Rice professionals,
agronomists and planners saw the rice trade and rice
produ ct Lon as part of the "modern" sector as they were in
the colonial era. Opposition existed thus to hand-
pound ing rice, petty trade and "disorder Iy" (multi cropped i
fields.
This opposition was not just an attempt to control the
commodity, as a related example will show. In Central
Bandundu, a Portuguese merchant opened a palm oil factory
in the mid-1980s in an area that had formerly been
saturated with palm oil factories. He was not able to
make the enterprise profitable, despite offering higher
prices for palm nuts than other companies, and his
operation closed in 1988. Men in the area simply did not
want cut palm nuts any longer because they had more
flexibility and a chance at greater profit by making palm
oil artisanally in a malaxeur. Collectivity officials
forbade malaxeurs and then heaVily taxed them, but the men
continued. The Portuguese merchant was not in a position
253
t,::.reopen the f act ory , but he had a truck. I suggested t o
him that he collect the oil made in malaxeurs and
transport it to Kasai region where palm oil prices were
very high. He shook his head and said no, that was not
right, it went against the order of things. His associate
later explained that it would be a disgrace for him to
turn away from the factory and become a mere transporter.
The major difficulty, however, in creating and carrying
ou t a more "rat Lone l" rice trade system lay in the
strategies that people had to adopt to survive since the
1970s. Rice traders were not able to act as a group to
get access to credit for trucks, mills, spare parts,
buying campaigns or road maintenance (Chapter Four). The
exigencies of Zaire's political economy forced them into
strategies which limited and diversified investment and
mitigated against planning (Cf. Leplaideur 1989).
Political parasitism and economic instability made it
impossible for people to take a long-term view and to
commit to one type of investment. Rice professionals had
other businesses and interests, and quickly abandoned the
trade if it became too difficult or other opportunities
looked more promising. Lolema also seld,:)mspecialized in
one commodity and had varied investment strategies. Rice
farmers could not be sure from one year to the next how
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much of the harvest would be sold, and at what price, or
if there would be anything to buy with the proceeds of the
sale. Officials designated to regulate the trade were
sUbject to abrupt and frequent changes in policy
concerning price controls, access to markets, jurisdiction
over sales and legality of certain types of trade.
As people lived in these circumstances, it became
difficult to change to a more structured economy. There
are advantages to fluidity for the individual, even if the
end result is an aggregate loss. People will invest time
and energy in "unprcd uct Lve " behevLor on the chance that
it might payoff. For example, some merchants remained
(at least nominal) members of the rice professionals'
organization despite the fact that it did not bring the
promised access to credit because there was always the
possibility that it might bring benefits in the future.
In addition, the organization bolstered the conception
that rice professionals were different from other food
merchants and therefore had a right to preferential access
to credit and control over the market.
Networks of patronage and informing for the state enhanced
suspicion and mistrust, making it hazardous for people to
Another constraint t,:, organizing was titlle
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and transportation costs. Local officials often
complained that they could not meet together to discuss
problems because they had no means of transportation.
Outright theft of communal assets such as took place at
the Turumbu Cooperative was so common that it was
expected. Since workers could not live on their salaries,
it was necessary to pilfer and cheat to get by. Business
owners, for their part, negotiated taxes, fines and fees
with officials. Thus, institutions, firms and
organizations were very shaky, as exemplified by the
physical erosion of buildings, lack of furnishings in
offices, and general air of neglect found in both public
and private places in Kisangani.
Although obstacles constantly surfaced, new opportunities
or solutions to problems could present themselves at any
time as well. Western observers were often shocked to
find that, just as President Mobutu frequently pardonned
his most severe critics and led them back to the fold,
business owners rehired convicted thieves. Even the
definition of theft was fluid, as relatives justifed
gaining access teobusiness assets, and "borrow i nq" most
often did not imply paying back. Tolerance of these
conditions reflected people's reluctance to cut off any
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connection that might yield benefits. Also, as Mukenge
(1986) pointed out, family members who steal can be more
easily traced than strangers, and will also work for less.
Thus, the patronage ties built could be strong but not
beneficial for either the patron or the client. The
patron got shoddy work and constant insecurity, while the
client was not paid enough to sustain a family.
wi th mor e "rnodern" busi nesses were either tied into
expatriate networks or did not have family in the region
(e. g., Tond a r , Cit. Azali divorced his four Lokele wives
and married a Mdtise whose father was a prominent Iranian
businessman. Nevertheless, his family was constantly
trying to get to him through sorcery accusations against
his wife and he hired many family members.
From fieldwork in Southen Shaba, Schoepf (1986:211)
con c1udes that "Neither peasant nor capi, talist f ood
production will be developed on a large scale in Zaire
under the present regime. The production crisis is not
merely due to lack of resources, planning and research.
It is an aspect of the class system which has emerged
since independence."
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This class system pits the politically-connected elites
against farmers and traders who do not have access to the
regime, as "the spoils of office draw upon resources
needed for the economic infrastructure." Kennedy (1988)
described how even true entrepreneurs in a statist regime,
when drawn into the system, begin to invest in luxury
goods, real estate, imports, and put their money in
foreign banks because it is rational to do so.
In the case of the rice trade, three out of 22 rice
professionals interviewed had left their businesses in
Kisangani and relocated to Kinshasa. Six others had
business interests in Kinshasa or in Lubumbashi, and there
were several other former rice merchants who were said to
have relocated to Kinshasa. From Kinshasa, they had more
access to the outside world: wives and children could go
to Europe to study or buy goods, foreign currency bank
accounts could be maintained, and political ties could be
made to important decision makers.
Petty traders and independents supplied large centers
because they had no other work, despite the hazards and
low returns (Cf. Pottier 1983, MacGaffey 1989). Although
windfall profits were made by some traders, detailed
studies show that in general traders with trucks do not
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make large profits because of the cost and scarcity of
fuel and spare parts and the need for frequent vehicle
maintenance, the result of the condition of the roads
(USAID/Zaire 1988). In central Bandundu in 1989, the
number of traders had declined steeply because of the
dangers of the deterioration of the paved road to
Kinshasa.50 There was no reason to believe, in 1989,
that the situation of rural dwellers would be improved
through increased investment and opportunity.
In fact, the strategies pursued by both farmers and
traders served to degrade the environment and mitigate
against future productive use. In the case of traders,
the most striking example was the overloading of trucks
which ruined the roads and destroyed the bridges. In
Bafwasende, rice traders destroyed an entire feeder road
into the interior through use of a tank-like truck with
large wheels. When the road became completely impassible,
they abandoned the trade. For farmers, it is the decline
of fallow times, dropping of labor intensive techniques,
and expanding reliance on manioc for food and cash which
6°In one trip from Kikwit
witnessed two truck accidents
fatalities, and learned that
entrepreneur had sprung up
accidents along this road.
to Kinshasa in 1989,
with several
a whole new class of




bode ill for increasing production.
1990 and Fresco 1986.)
(See also Russell
Thus, liberalization did not affect the dominant
socioeconomic system that had grown up since
zairianization. It only added a new dimension and
increased uncertainty in an already chaotic trading
environment. The expected returns to farmers did not
materialize, either because liberalization was not
implemented or be~ause higher returns on rice did not
translate into increased access to goods or mobility.
The story of Cit. Azali (Chapter Seven) illustrates the
frustrations of those with high potential to effect
change. A creative entrepreneur, he was willing to invest
in rural areas, for example by funding local construction
and paying farmers cash at the time of the sale. Other
traders were following his lead and he was admired for his
independence. Yet he felt that he could not continue in
the trade and joined the ranks of Kinshasa-based
merchants relying on the import of merchandise.
Kisangani, and Zaire in general, do not lack creative and
intelligent people. Their very survival is witness to
immense creativity, as described in numerous publications
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eVansina 1982, Newbury 1986, Roberts 1986, MacGaffey
1987). People continue to try new things and do not give
up hope. For example, in 1989 the rice professionals'
committee was being revived and a couple of new rice mills
had sprung up in Kisangani. Rice traders were trying to
fight a steep rise in the cost of a license to buy paddy.
Many officials also had a vision for what needed to be
done, as witnessed by the stories of Zone Commissioner
Kassa and Agronomist Loso recounted below, although they
rarely were able to actualize these ideas. Under a
different system, most officials could benefit their
communities rather than preying on them.
Thus, the structure of the rice trade as depicted above
does not preclude the possibility that a more efficient
system that benefits farmers could arise. For example,
with better roads and access to fuel and spare parts, rice
mills could be located in the interior. This Lo cet Lon
makes more sense, as noted by Cit. Tonda, because white
rice is much cheaper to transport than paddy. Rice mills
could once again be a focus of rural development. Petty
traders could still buy paddy in remote areas and bring it
to rice mills. Studies by Timmer (1975) and Spencer
(1976) have revealed the importance of small rice mills in
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stimulating the rural economy. Spencer recommended, for
Sierra Leone, that investment be concentrated in hand
processing and small mills and emphasis be placed on
maintaining "the level of rural employment and incomes in
the rice processing industry" (p. 72).
These are not superficial changes, hl~wever, because
investment in roads or in research on increasing
productivity means shifting priorities from funding the
political apparatus to the productive sector, a step which
the Mobutu government has consistently failed to make
(Wall Street Journal 1990). Discussions in 1990 centered
around a more pluralistic democratic system have not
touched on issues of use and control of the country's
wealth (Jeune Afrique 1990b). Without such structural
change on the national level, it is doubtful that local
traders and farmers will be able to fashion better systems
of rice production and trade.
Comparison with Other Rice Producing Areas
Other rice producing areas of Zaire, especially Bumba in
Equateur and Maniema and Ruzizi in Kivu, were said to be
more productive than Haut Zaire, in part because of
previous external aid, despite the fact that Haut Zaire
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has the largest area devoted to rice (Conde 1981, To11ens
1989). The problems of rice production and trade in these
more favored areas thus highlight the structural
deficiencies in the food supply system.
Sumba exports rice to Kinshasa by river and to the
breweries which substitute rice for other grains. In the
1970s, this area benefitted from a Chinese mission to
promote irrigated rice. Research on the rice trade there
in the 1980s found, however, that rice was unprofitable
for farmers because four large companies dominated the
market and set producer and wholesale prices. Most of the
equipment from the Chinese mission was not in working
order and the seed multiplication program was far behind
schedule (Pragma 1983:56).
Maniema's (in Kivu) rice marketing system was never
characterized by strict monopsonies and rice mills still
functioned in the interior in the 1980s. Local demand for
rice in Maniema is also very high and rice could be
smuggled across the Rwandan border for even greater
profits (Conde 1981). Nevertheless, a World Bank
(1984:42) report found in 1983 that "the Maniema sub-
region, a traditional rice-exporting area, can no longer
263
meet lo ca I demand" as many rice mills had been abandoned
for lack of spare parts.
The Ruzizi area in South Kivu had two stable buyers who
supplied inputs and provided services such as mechanical
land preparation (Thaholokya et al. 1983, Clifton and
Af i f i 1'385) • Rice farming was seen to be profitable, in
part because almost one third of production was smuggled
acr.::tssthe Rwandan border , Despite the fact that rice "is
an important staple food [in Rwanda, Burundi and Eastern
ZaireJ, and although many areas grow rice, they have
difficulty competing with the rising tide of imports"
(Thaholokya et al. 1983: 11). Thaholokya et al.
recommended that the cooperative and project which buy
rice in the area become truly "farmer-c,perated" and
provide services such as storage and credit which would
serve to increase farmers' flexibility.
Thus, these "favored" areas faced compet LbLon from imports
(which must, of course, be transported a very long way to
the interior), domination by monopsonies, and lack of
investment in infrastructure and credit. Other areas have
certainly fared even more poorly than Tshopo. In Eastern
Bandundu, rice was introduced by a local development
organization which planned to buy it, mill it and sell it
in Kinshasa.
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The farmers' response was very energetic and
Bandundu rice began to capture an important segment of the
Kinshasa market. In a very short time, however, the
entire scheme was destroyed by heavy imports of rice to
Kinshasa. No one came to buy rice any more and farmers
stopped growing it (Pragma 1983:72, Bandundu field notes
1989).
Corte Lus Lorie
The policy of liberalization of agricultural markets and
prices instituted in 1983 faced an environment shaped by
years of political parasitism and economic chaos. Forced
by insecurity and penury to prey on farmers and traders,
government officials did not want to give up controls that
brought in revenue. "Liberalizati()n" became an arena in
which to institute new controls (investment in the zone),
while many of the old ones persisted Croad blocks,
licenses). Traders, especially rice professionals, went
along with controls in an attempt to block the mobile
lolema from dominating the trade.
For farmers, liberalization did not bring the desired
benefits. In areas with increased trade activity such as
Banalia, few if any means existed to invest in
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agriculture, and limits to productivity were reached
because of labor shortages and lack of technological
change. In other areas, liberalization never took effect,
as large concerns moved to consolidate their control or
minimize their investment. In Isangi, rice traders
actually left the zone in the wake of political conflict,
while in Yahuma, failure to maintain the roads forced
traders to abandon trade there. While farmgate prices may
have increased, the rural areas were not being provisioned
and farmers had nothing to buy.
The policy of liberalization was an attempt to transplant
orthodox free-market economics to Zaire. Whether these
po LicLes work even in the "develc.ped" wo rld is debatable.
In the case of Zaire, the lack of investment in
infrastructure, basic systems of credit, extension and
research, and the proliferation of individualist survival
strategies made it even more unlikely that such a policy
could effect fundamental change.
rMrmw
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Chapter Seven: Case Studies
7.1 Overview
Thirty-nine lolema and independent traders were
interviewed in Kisangani and the countryside. An attempt
was made to census all the rice mills in the city and
track down their owners. Fifteen rice mills were found
and 22 rice professionals or their close associates
interviewed. Government officials at all levels were
interviewed, including the Chief Inspector for Agriculture
for Haut Zaire and other Agriculture Department officials
in Kisangani and Yangambi, three successive Zone
Commissioners of Banalia (one now assistant Commissioner
in Isangi), the Commissioner of Isangi, the Zone
agronomists in Isangi and Banalia, a Groupement chief in
Isangi and Collectivity chief in Yahuma. Groups of
farmers were interviewed in Isangi (Yalibwa), three
villages in Yahuma, in Banalia and Opala (Yatolema). In
addition, officials of ANEZA and AFECOZA were interviewed
in Kisangani, Bafwasende and Banalia as well as market
women in Kisangani, Banalia and Bafwasende. The
interviews with traders and rice professionals are
summarized in Tables 1, 2 and 3 below.
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Case studies are of RP1, RP3, RP8, 14, 16, L7, L4, the
Assistant Zone Commissioner of Isangi (formerly in
Banalia), Chief Agronomist in Banalia, President of
AFECDZA and ANEZA (also a rice mill owner) in Banalia and
Villages Bolindo in Yahuma and Yalibwa in Isangi. These
case studies are not life histories but portrayals of how
individuals participated in the rice trade.
One issue to be addressed specifically by the case study
of rice professionals is how they fit into conceptions
about the rise of an indigenous merchant class in Zaire
(MacGaffey 1987, Schatzberg 1980). From what sector of
the population have these traders emerged? Are they
representative of a class? What is their relationship to
the state? More broadly, what can their stories tell us
about the local political economy in terms of their
response to changes and the structures they tried to set
up to do business?
Two models of the Zairian political economy which are
particularly relevant to this discussion are those of
Callaghy (1984, 1986) and MacGaffey (1987). Callaghy's
detailed description of the patrimonial authoritarian
state and MacGaffey's findings on the emerging Zairian
merchant class in Kisangani suggest differing views about
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the possible directions for change. MacGaffey's work
emphasizes the dynamism of Zairian merchants and their
relative independence from the state. Callaghy stresses
the state's pervasive presence and its debilitating effect
on merchants, stating that "as [the indigenous merchant
classJ becomes more important, if it does, Mobutu and his
political aristocracy will move more energetically to cut
off or control its development, at least in urban centers
suc h as Kisangani II (1'384: 188)•
By looking at the rice trade as a system involving actors
from different sectors of the political economy, as
described in previous chapters, some of the tension
between these two models can be resolved. We come to see
how both the constraints and opportunities facing Zairian
enterprise were linked to the reproduction of the
parasitic state in a cycle of overall decline, despite the
individual gains made by some.
Rules and institutions in the rice trade arising from
conditions since zairianization illustrate not only the
attempts of the politico-bourgeoisie to retain control
but, more signficantly, the increasingly fragmented and
individualized social relations of survival which make
class formation difficult to track. The "merchant class"
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cannot act like a merchants, as people are forced to deal
with thieving relatives (Azali), predatory officials
(Tonda), and uncertainty in supply of basic commodities.
The case studies of the lolema and independent traders
serve to illustrate the vicissitudes of the trade and give
an idea of how people get started and survive. Some come
from relatively cushioned situations (Mahmet), while
others are living on the margin (the lolema at the mill).
Even the relatively well-positioned, however, find it hard
to make good on their investments due to difficulty in
gaining access to affordable tools and means of
transportation. Maurice was not able to purchase a
outboard motor for his canoe, and Basosila's truck--and
only asset--was so ancient that it threatened to fall
apart on every trip.
The case studies of the rural areas present preliminary
information on the farmers' viewpoint of the rice trade
and how it had changed in the 1980s. Not enough is known
from these informal interviews to do justice to the
complex web of survival strategies employed by villagers
in Tshopo. The villagers in Yahuma, however, discuss the
central dilemma of liberalization policies. In the past,
they lived under the oppressive, paternalistic control of
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PLZ. They had debts at the company store, but at least
they had a company store. When traders started to break
the monopsony, the villagers rejoiced, thinking that
finally they would get a decent return for their
production and be paid in cash. Farmgate prices did rise
(not, however, in keeping with inflation), but merchandise
was no longer available and, by 1988, the roads
deteriorated to the point where no traders could get
through.
Government officials' cases reveal how difficult it would
be for even competent and concerned people to effect
conditions which could foster productive investment in
agriculture. Because they lack basic resources such as a
means of transportation, they become beholden to large
interests to get their jobs done. As very little revenue
"trickles down," they must extract revenue from traders
and farmers to fund their own maintenance, very often in
the guise of fines for a wide variety of misdemeanors.
Because of the priority placed by the MPR on political
organizing, and the lack of coordination between


























































Male Was in Kinshasa 3 stores
Male
Female SOFIDE loan









Continued on next page
Arrived 1984 Trade
Paddy in Kivu Coffee
Casino in Shaba, investments
Was in Kinshasa Furniture
Interviewed by asst., Lubungu
Chief Security Palm oil
,
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Table 7.1 Rice Professionals Interviewed (continued)
Name Ethnicity Sex Other
BlJsiness(es)
+RP21 Topoke Male Hotel, Club (Isangi)
+RP22 Topok e Male Transport, trade (Isangi)
*Operates rice mill in Kisangani
+Close associate or relative interview; owner not
available
****
Table 7 .-;..- Independent Traders and Lolema Interviewed
Name t.o c e t Lon Cc,mments
----------------------------------------------------------II F KOl"et, Yahuma 88 sacks, rio transport
1'-' M Yahuma Cou s Ln of RP1, rented truck,,;,.
I3 M Yahuma Gold tradel";wor ks w/I2
14 M ~~isangani Tr u ck , wo r ks in Isangi
15 M Rice mill, Kis 3 trucks, rice mill inter.
16 M Kisangani Farmer, sells f o r coop.
17 M Kisangani 3 men sell Kindu rice
IS M Rice mill, Kis Has depot in Opala (350)
I9 M Rice mill, Kis Truck, 54 sacks
110 M Rice mi 11, Kis Truck, coffee planter
continued on next page
mterntKcerrrlttrm.:nv'Y'Ipnw,mmmwr ,_TWlf. -
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Table 7.2 Independent Traders and Lolema Interviewed
(continued)
Name Sex Lo ca t Lon Comments
111 F Banalia Rice mill in Banalia
Ll M Rice mill, Kis Former rice mill worker
L2 M Rice mill, Kis For mer disk jockey
L3 M Rice mill, Kis For me r student
L4 M Banalia Sc,n c,f large tl"ader
L5 M Kisangani Ac cornp, g,::.ldtrader
L6 M Rice mi 11, Kis Fo rme r p l arrt e t a on mgr.
L7 F Rice mi 11, Kis Family in Ya t o Lerna
L8 M Rice mill, Kis Trades days of f f r om school
----------------------------------------------------------
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Table 7.3 Lolema Interviews at Rice Mills During Campaign
15-21 October 1987
Part 1




























































































Table 7.3 Lolema Interviews at Rice Mills During Campaign
15-21 October 1987 (continued)
Part 2















































































































----------------------------------------------------------*Indicates farmers who have brought their own paddy, price




















Table 7.3 Lolema Interviews at Rice Mills During Campaign










1 SOTRAZ Palm oil Paid Z1500 Sister in ColI.
2 GClld prosp. Gold Paid Z3000 Worked at Univ.
3 Pe b r o l Paid Z3000 II;:'1ema =SUYV iv e I
4 Sell fish/Bunia Paid Z3000 Invest in fish
5 Student Paid Z3000 WI;:.rksw/2 others
6 Stl.ldent No
7 Clclthes Peanuts Paid Z2300 Will cont. paddy
8 Lolema Peanuts Paid Z2500 Works in grc1up
'3 Manager/rice mill Paid Z3000 Broth.-rice mill
10 Trader Trade Paid Z2300 Lives in country
11 Farmer Farm No Fo r rner' schl Oil'.
12 Chauffer Chauffer Paid Z3000 Try to find w(lrk
13 Diy. SchclI;:.1 Coffee N,:, Gave cigarettes
14 Trader Paid Z3000 Only spk Swahili
15 Lolema Trade Paid Z2500 Lo l erna f r om 1981
16 Farmer Paid Z300 Bicycle to river
17 Farmer SClap, cig. Always farmer
18 Farmer Farm Ta:t;
Farmer No Rice mi ll-fami Iy19
Trade Trade No Continue paddy20----------------------------------------------------------
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Table 3: Lolema Interviews at Rice Mills During Campaign
15-21 October 1987 (continued)
Part 4
Other Information


















Total paying "unofficially" 10
Average nurnbe r of years of s choo I 7.5
Range: 0 - State Dd p l orna
Average age 32
Range: 21 - 44
Number with regular clients 16
(including farmers)
Number with family ties t o producers 10
Number paying for license 14
Average numbe r of trips already made 2 (1.75)
Average numbe r c.fsacks bc.ught 14
Observations:
RP7 makes special deals with clients, lower transport cost
Farmers get less per sack at rice mill
Women significantly less educated
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7.2 Case Study One: Rice Professional Azali (RP1)
At the time of the interviews, Cit. Azali was known to be
one of the most successful merchants in Kisangani. With
his astute business sense, he had created a small empire
in the city consisting of two nightclubs, four stores and
the rice business. He had a house in town, a Mercedes and
put eleven children from several marriages through the
best schools. Despite these advantages and qualities, he
abandoned the rice trade after four years. His story
illustrates how the parasitic state can discourage
entrepreneurs from investing in food supply.
Cit. Azali calls himself Lokele but is actually Foma, from
a village on the left bank of the Zaire river in Isangi.
He received four years of post-primary schooling at a
Protestant mission school. He began his career as a
trader in 1969 with one meter of poplin cloth from which
he made six undergarments. The cloth cost 3 makuta (100
makuta = 1 zaire) and he sold each garment for 1 likuta,
thus making 6 makuta which he reinvested in two meters of
cloth. At the end of the year, he had Z100, the
equivalent of $200 at the time. With this money, he
bought a trade license and a canoe, and with the Z50 left
over, a trunk and merchandise.
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The years spent trading, from 1970-73, were difficult. He
was constantly on the move working in the interior. By
1973, however, he had made Zl,800 and was installed in
Kisangani. Not a member of the Kisangani political d1ite,
he did not profit from zairianization. In fact, he was
against the move. In the end it benefitted him
indirectly, however, because he found that the acqu~reurs
did not manage their businesses well and he was able to
outdo them.
In 1973, he started buying 45 rpm disks and wax cloth from
Kinshasa, bringing them in on military planes. Both items
sold well, at about a 100% profit margin. By 1974, he
already had a second store and in 1976 he built the fourth
store, and started on his house and the first nightclub.
In the early 1980s his capital was diminished and
competition was rising and so he turned toward food
supp1y.61 This trade had been neglected because it was
very demanding.
In 1986, Azali bought a MAN four wheel drive army truck
with his own savings. He did not use bank credit, as the
61The shrinking of his capital may have been a
result of demonetization that occured in the late
1970s which wiped out many people's savings.
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interest rate was too high (40-45~). He did, however,
apply twice for a SOFIDE loan, once for three trucks and
another time for two trucks and one jeep. On both
occasions, his dossier was rejected. During the year that
he waited to hear about the loan, the cost of three
vehicles rose from Zl,200,000 to Z6,500,000, so he was
just as glad not to get it. In that year, he also bought
a rice mill.
As a rice trader, Azali was extremely successful and he
confided that the rice trade was the most lucrative of all
of his enterprises. During the 1986 campaign, he bought
2,700 sacks and sold 1,800 in one month for a net profit
of ZI,200,000. He invested this money in his other
businesses, especially, that year, in a new nightclub
which attracted both ~lite Zairians and expatriates.
Azali was able to do extremely well in the rice trade
despite the fact that he had only one truck. First, he
decided to buy in Yahuma, an isolated zone which had few
competitors (aside from PLZ) and a low farmgate price.
Second, he set up a series of dep8ts to store rice and
leased a barge which he placed on the left bank of the
Zaire river in Basoko zone. Thus, it was not necessary to
haul the rice back to Kisangani by truck. Third, he
281
personally supervised every trip, making arrangements for
storage, lodging, road repair, and payments along the way.
Finally, he was lucky that the truck did not fall through
a bridge or break down.
In April 1987, I accompanied Azali on the second of his
campaigns that season in Yahuma. During this trip, the
entire campaign was witnessed including purchase of rice
in several villages, negotiations over road maintenance
and local fees, dealing with competitors and handling of
personnel.
One incident reinforced both the impression of Azali as a
formidable businessman and the difficulties of the trade.
After a survey of villages along one road, Azali left
three foremen in the village to distribute sacks and
negotiate payment. When he returned in a few days to load
the sacks, he glanced at the record book and called one of
the foremen, a close relative. Inside the storage house,
Azali accused the man of stealing four sacks of rice for
his own use. Stunned, the man confessed and begged
forgiveness. It was not the first time he had stolen,
however, nor would it be the last. A few months later,
back in Kisangani, Azali was finally forced to pay the man
off publically, evict him from the house he occupied at
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the rice mill and send him to the countryside. Not being
able to trust even a very close relative meant a need for
constant attention to every aspect of the business.
Azali was a member of ANEZA and the Rice Professionals
Committee but did not hold much store in these
organizations, preferring to make his own way in business.
He expressed disdain for politics, yet he cultivated
important connections. In 1989, I dined with him and the
newly-nominated Ambassador to France, a member of his
wife's family.
Despite this success, Azali decided to close the rice
trade business in 1988. He gave as his reasons that the
situation in Isangi and Yahuma was too dangerous. Ivory
poachers had killed one clerk of Busira-Lomami and
reported wounded the Commissaire de Zone of Isangi. He
sold the truck and rice mill and invested in a store for
building materials.
In 1980, he had married the daughter of a prominent
Iranian merchant, converted to Islam and began to expand
his operations into Kinshasa. By 1989, the two nightclubs
were closed, the Mercedes sold, and he was doing most of
his business out of Kinshasa, at the home of his in-laws.
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His major investment that year was the import of
electrical goods from Nigeria.
Azali claims that he left Kisangani because of the tax
situation. Being a small city, officials were more
desperate for revenue and able to track down merchants
easily. As a prominent merchant, he was a prime t~rget.
Kinshasa, he says, offers more freedom. In 1989, it was
reported that no one was buying rice in Yahuma zone and
the large monopsonies, CODIS-Zimex, Busira-Lomami and PLZ
were once again left virtually to themselves. One cannot
help but speculate if some kind of pressure was brought to
bear on Azali to leave the business, especially from the
boss of COD IS, an extremely powerful politician. Indeed,
an informant from the Isangi Catholic diocese insisted
that the Commissaire de Zone of Isangi was called on the
carpet by the Governor for allowing Azali to buy rice in
the zone ,
7.3 Case Study Two: Rice Professional Molibo (RP3)
Cit. Molib.:;.--called"Teacher" in Swahili by friends and
employees--was the only rice professional interviewed
whose rice business was his sole enterprise. He
maintained his business by keeping constant vigil over the
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rice mill and supervising the rice campaign personally.
He has had a rice business for a long time, but had to
move it from the countryside to the city, where he feels
constantly harassed by officials. In addition, he now
buys rice in an area where the roads are very poor, so
vehicle maintenance is a central concern.
Cit. Molibo came from Kindu to Kisangani first as a
teacher, and soon realized that he wasn't going to make a
living that way. ~is first business activity was to build
four carts and hire them out for 1.20 makuta a day. Thus
he was able to supplement his teacher's salary of Z50 a
month by an additional Z18-20 a month. He then tried to
sell beer, but was not successful.
Molibo started in the rice business in 1978, with a rice
campaign among the Topoke, 200 km from Kisangani. He
installed a rice mill there and was successful, remaining
there until 1987. In 1987, he relocated the rice mill to
Kisangani because there was no fuel to run it in the
countryside. At the end of July 1987, he became very
discouraged because of competition from American rice and
rice coming from Kindu. He was one of the most outspoken
critics of imported rice and a member of the Rice
Professionals Committee.
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In 1987, he had one truck which was in bad repair. He was
buying paddy 200 km out on the Opala road, where he had a
depot. During the 1987 "fuel crisis" (see Chapter Twc.),
he was in a dilemma. Four hundred eighty sacks of paddy
were sitting in the depot but fuel was very scarce and the
cost had quadrupled in a few weeks. He had to calculate
if it was worth it to make the trips necessary to get all
the paddy, which would in any case be sold in a depressed
market. Fortunately, fuel supply increased and fuel
prices went down, and he was able to get the paddy.
Molibo's enterprise appeared very differently from that of
Azali's. Azali's businesses were neat and modern, while
Molibo's rice mill looked like a junk yard.
Nevertheless, appearances can be deceiving. Molibo was
able to send all of his 12 children to school and in 1989
had purchased a new truck. Not visibly tied into the
political hierarchy of the city, Molibo has suffered much
from excessive taxation and visits from officials. He
keeps going because he is constantly present at the
enterprise, supervising every detail.
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7.4 Case Study Number Three: Rice Professional Tonda
(RP8)
When one is tied into the political apparatus, it is
possible to get credit for the rice trade, as the case it
Cit. Tonda illustrates. As President of the Rice
Professionals' Committee, however, he was not able to
bring merchants together. Some say that he was part of
the prob lem.
Cit. Tonda is not from the Kisangani area, but moved there
as an official of the Bank of Zaire. As a result of his
job, he was able to accrue capital for other businesses.
In 1982, he bought paddy with a rented truck to mill in
Kisangani. He had to wait for two weeks to mill the paddy
because there were so few rice mills in those days. He
then decided to open a rice mill in Kisangani, where he
milled his own and client's (lolema) rice. He found the
cost of spare parts too high and the profit too low, and
by 1984 decided not to accept rice from lolema.
Tonda started out with Z50,000 in capital, first buying
coffee. In 1'986,he claimed t.:)have made "millions" of
zaires in the rice trade. He had installed a rice mill in
Opala, between the rivers Lobaya and Lomami and was one of
-: :
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the only rice merchants in Kisangani to benefit from
SOFIDE credit, with which he purchased five new trucks. A
trained economist, he calculated that he could increase
profits by milling the paddy in the countryside and
hauling the white rice to Kisangani. To make this
decision, he needed to have trucks in good condition and a
ready source of diesel fuel for the trucks and the rice
mills. Even for a well-connected man like Tonda, however,
the decision to locate his enterprise in the countryside
was also made to escape local taxation and embettement
(harrassment by officials).
Tonda was President of the Rice Professionals' Committee
in 1986, but he expressed little respect for the other
rice merchants, saying that they were unprofessional and
unwilling to work together.G2 He acknc,wledged,
however, that no credit had been available to the
Committee and this caused the members to be discouraged.
Other rice merchants privately stated that no credit was
avai lable because "Tonda b:,,:.kit all."
62He did, however,
Azali, saying that he
merchant in Kisangani.
express
was the admiratic.n fc'1-most able rice Cit.
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Tonda evidently has other business interests, as he was
often away from Kisangani. He went often to Kinshasa,
where he also maintains a residence. His house in
Kisangani was large and well-furnished and he was driving
a Mercedes. To maintain his enterprise in Opala, Tonda
claimed to have set up services for the local people,
including road maintenance and supply of goods. It is not
known whether he discouraged competition in his area by
collusion with the local authorities, like RP20 and RP17,
who also had rice trading enterprises in the interior.
Several other rice merchants and lolema buy paddy in
Opala, however.
According to Tonda, the most serious problems of the rice
trade are the lolema, imported rice and conflict among
rice merchants--especially between rice millers and rice
professionals who buy rice. The lolema disrupt the trade,
he explained, by allowing the farmers to sell rice without
weighing and by accepting the farmers' price. Not knowing
what price the farmers will accept causes difficulties for
the rice professional who borrows or sets aside a certain
amount of money for the buying campaign, and has certain
costs such as truck maintenance, licenses and personnel.
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Imported rice disrupts the market for local rice because
it is cleaner and easier to cook. It is sold by
expatriates, which takes business away from Zairian
merchants, often at prices competitive with local rice.
As for the conflict among rice merchants, Tonda introduced
a resolution to add a Z5 tax on milling rice in Kisangani
to discourage rice mill owners from attracting lolema.
The tax was not implemented, however, because even in 1989
certain rice mills which did not buy rice kept milling
costs low to attract lolema (RP5 and RPI0, for example).
In 1989, a new Rice Professionals Committee was being
formed. One informant claimed that Tonda was still
president, while another (RP4) claimed that Cit. Bafalo,
RP12, was the new president. Tonda's dominance of the
committee may have discouraged others who were jealous of
his access to resources.
7.5 Case Study Number Four: Independent Trader Basosila
(14)
An independent traders' biggest obstacle is financing and
maintaining a means of transportation, as seen in the
cases of Basosila and Maurice below. This obstacle became
more difficult to overcome in the 1980s as fuel prices
"P-'
2'30
increased, spare parts became less available due to scarce
foreign exchange and the cost of a new vehicle or motor
climbed out of reach for all except the most wealthy. At
the same time, credit for buying dried up because
inflation made terms so uncertain.
Cit. Basosila is a second-generation trader whose father
still operates a store and trading business in Yangambi.
He has a house in Kisangani and an ancient Bedford truck
which makes a reg4lar run to Yangambi. As a young man, he
went to Kinshasa to make a living, but was not successful,
after having tried the transport business and trade in
fish and manic.c.
In 1'386, he started buying paddy in Isangi from the
Topoke. Following the lead of Azali, he decided to buy in
Yahuma in 1'387,as did 12 and 13. He rented a barge from
Azali and was able to bring back 600 sacks to Kisangani.
The conditions were very hard in Yahuma, however. He sold
soap in Koret, a large town, but found it difficult to
evacuate all the merchandise. At other times, he tried
discounting the price to attract farmers. Living
conditions were dangerous, water was unsafe, roads muddy
and bridges broken, and his truck was not really up to it,
so he abandoned the trade in Yahuma.
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Thus the next year, Basosila decided to buy rice from the
nearby Turumbu, despite the fact that RP17 officially had
the monopsony for the rice trade in that area, being the
manager of the Turumbu Cooperative. Basosila knew the
area well, as he traveled there weekly, and knew that a
lot of rice remained unsold. He is a regular client of
RP2's rice mill and is committed to continuing in the rice
trade, saying "l am what I am today because of rice. II
Nevertheless, he has not been able to attain the success
of his father, who maintains one of the only stores in
Yangambi and has eight wives.
Basosila's truck is his only asset and its continued
functioning is nothing short of miraculous. We travelled
with him to Yangambi from Kisangani. The trip took eleven
hours to go 94 kilometers as the truck broke down twice.
The truck could barely make it up even the smallest hills
and at times, all the passengers were forced to get out
and walk. Since there are no spare parts, he fixes the
truck with home-made parts.
not be able to replace it.
If the truck dies, he will
EWRT-"'-'" r,rmMC"wy"'tS,'"'g '75it"it-ntetewtm11fl,"'"Mt, iette-.
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7.6 Case Study Number Five:
(16)
Independent Trader Maurice
Maurice is unique among the traders studied because he is
primarily a farmer. A Mongando, he was born and raised in
Kisangani where his father worked for a Belgian merchant.
The family was relatively well-off in the colonial era but
the father did not invest his earnings and is now
impoverished. Maurice received a primary school
education and went back to his mother's village, a two-day
canoe ride from Isangi, at the time of her death in 1960.
He was well received by his uncles there and encouraged to
stay.
He married two Topoke sisters and started grOWing paddy.
In 1986-87, he cleared 1 ha and claimed to produce 35
sacks. That year, he made his first trip to Kisangani
with 140 sacks of rice grown by himself and other farmers
who had formed a loose cooperative. He also tried to sell
25 jerrycans of palm oil but was not successful, as the
market was flooded.
With the money earned from the paddy sales, Maurice hoped
to buy an outboard motor for his canoe, but could not
negotiate terms with the store in Kisangani. He had about
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two-thirds of the amount needed for the motor, but the
store would not even let him put the money down as a
deposit on the motor, thinking that someone would be able
to pay the full price. The store did not want to
guarantee a price for any length of time, given inflation.
Maurice knew that it might be difficult to amass that
amount again.
The trip from the village to Kisangani is arduous, he
says, and presents the danger of spoilage by rain.
Nevertheless, he does not have the fear of going to
Kisangani that other farmers do because he was brought up
there and still has family in the city. Despite his
knowledge of the city, Maurice had many troubles. When he
arrived he was lured to the rice mill of RPII only to find
that the milling machine was broken. He waited days at
the mill for it to be fixed and ended up spending a great
deal of money on beer and prostitutes. He had no
knowledge of the spread of AIDS and did not possess the
skills to open a bank account.
Two of his brothers are traders on the boat from Kinshasa
to Kisangani and live in Kinshasa. They live one day at a
time, unable to save or invest money. Two sisters died in
Kinshasa of "unkown causes," their bodies never retrieved
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from the hospital, leaving several children. In 1987, a
third brother in the military died in Kinshasa and Maurice
took on the care of three orphaned nephews and a niece.
The next year, he planned to clear 3 ha with the
additional labor but one niece and nephew fled the village
claiming that Maurice did not feed them.
7.7 Case Study Number Six: Lolemas Charlotte and Pierre
(L7)
People from all walks of life become lolema and develop
many different strategies to pursue the trade. Some have
family ties in the rural areas while others have ties to
large traders. The business is precarious and lolema must
diversify and turn over their revenue qUickly.
I met Charlotte at the rice mill owned by RP7 where she
was waiting to mill and sell paddy bought in Opala. It
was decided that I would accompany her and her husband on
a rice buying trip 74 km on the Opala road, traveling with
RP7's brother who bought rice for the company.
Charlotte lived in Lubungu, on the left bank of the Zaire
river, in an abandoned house with no roof shared with
other Mbole. Her daughter and daughter's child also lived
with her. She had no education and no skills other than
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as a trader. Other informants claimed that she was ndamba
with the implication that she was or had been a
prostitute. Charl.;)tte's"husband," Pierre, was a
"lokeleized" trader (a Topok e raised in a Lokele area who
spoke Lokele) who bought paddy and sold merchandise and
sometimes accompanied her on rice buying trips.
Charlotte is Mbole from Yatolema, the site of a Busira-
Lomami plantation on the Opala road. We stopped there for
three days to buy rice in nearby villages. Workers in
Yatolema are no longer paid by the plantation but continue
to do some work so that they can stay in their houses.
Charlotte had a locked room in the house of her sister
whose husband lived in one of the plantation houses, and
she came regularly on trading expeditions. Her sister was
a midwife in the village. On the trip, we brought
makayabo (dried fish) to sell in the market and also some
children's clothes made by a friend. Our main purpose,
however, was to buy paddy. It proved quite difficult,
however, to find paddy at a reasonable price within the
village of Yatolema. Pierre went scouting out on his
bicycle and eventually found a few sacks at a high price.
::==:fir rrr
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Meanwhile, RP7 had gone down the road to 124 km where
paddy was more abundant and the price was lower. Up until
Yatolema, the road was passable but after 74 km the road
became so difficult that it often took an hour to go five
kilometers. RP7 returned with a truck full of paddy,
while the lolema had been less successful in their quest.
I was unsuccessful in finding any paddy to buy in Yatolema
because no one wanted to sell to me. Despite the small
amount of rice purchased, we returned with RP7 because it
was likely that no other transport opportunity would be
available.
Charlotte and her husband were "mid-level" Lolema in the
sense that they had some consumer goods and were
established in one area. They possessed a bicycle, a
radio, some suitcases, music tapes and nice clothes.
Pierre had some secondary school education. They were
regular clients at RP7's rice mill which gave them
advantages as this rice trader charged less for
transportation than others. Despite these "advantages,"
Charlotte became destitute a few months after the trip as
a result of a prolonged illness. She was not able to pay
back debts or make trading trips and Pierre disappeared
f rom the scene. We did not meet again because of her
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shame in not being able to pay for the baby clothes taken
on consignment from my friend.
7.8 Case Study Number Seven: Lolema Mahmet and the
Anonymous Lolema at the Rice Mill
Mahmet is the son of a Popoy trader who owns a motorcycle
and travels regularly to Banalia and on to Panga,
reportedly buying ivory and gold. This man has had many
children with several women and is one of the few elite
Popoy in Kisangani. He decided to invest in his son as a
lolema buying paddy around Banalia. Mahmet was born in
Kisangani and currently lived there in the cite of Tshopo.
Mahmet was 22 years old in 1987. In his third year of
secondary school (commerce section), he dropped out. In
1982 he started trading from Kinshasa to Brazzaville but
competition was very tough. He returned to Kisangani in
February 1987 and started the rice trade. October 1987
was his first trip to buy rice. He bought a license for
buying 25 tonnes of rice and brought sacks. His father
was in the area during the sales and he was working with
another trader. In one day, he had already bought 20
sacks a few kilometers from Banalia town and planned to
buy another 35 sacks. His father was to come back from
2'38
Panga to assure that everything went well and that
transport was assured. Meanwhile, a retired military
officer, now an independent trader, arrived in Banalia,
and agreed to transport Mahmet's paddy. After the
campaign, he planned to mill at RP15's rice mill where he
Mahmet was a knowledgeable and serious young man, not yet
married, a convert to Islam who did not smoke or drink and
had many questions about reggae, rastafarians and the
cultural scene in the United States. He became a lolema
because "there wasn' t anything else to do , II Eventually he
wants to finish school and become an auto mechanic.
On the same day as the interview with Mahmet, another
lolema from Kisangani was at Citne. Alinga's rice mill in
Banalia (see below). She was reluctant to talk, but
finally revealed that she had brought two sacks of paddy
to mill and had paid SOZ per sack to the local agronomist
(Agronomist Loso) for evacuation. She represents the
lower end of the lolema scale, while Mahmet is at the
upper end. Mahmet had good contacts. His father had many
relations in Banalia and was there to assure that he got
along in the trade.
and at the rice mill.
He knew people with transportation
The lolema at the rice mill, by
Fer" "~I",nUT
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contrast, would fight to get on a truck to Kisangani and
perhaps make enough from the sale of the two sacks to pay
for a return trip to Banalia, after transport, milling and
other costS.53
7.9 Case Study Number Eight: Zone Commissioner Kassa
Local officials tried to make a place for themselves in
the shifting regulatory environment. Many wished to
ameliorate the situation in the rural areas and at the
same time raise their own status and standard of living.
These desires were frequently contradictory as revenue for
salaries and running the local government had to be
extracted from farmers and traders. Nothing came down
from the top. Nonproductive functionaries such as the
MOPAP and security policy, however, often commanded
greater resources than other Zone officials (Schatzberg
1988).64 When I discussed the findings of this stUdy,
63The cost of a sack of rice in Banalia was
Z1800, transport for one sack was about Z500 and
milling Z500/sack. Rice was selling at Z3,000 in
Kisangani, thus a net profit of Z200 (she had
already paid Z100 for evacuation).
64At one collectivity in Bandundu, the MOPAP and
the department of agriculture shared a room at the
collectiVity headquarters. The agronomist confided
that he scarcely was able to use the facility and
had no funds for activities (Russell 1990).
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specifically the barriers to liberalization, with
officials in Kinshasa, many blamed the local
administrators for failure to implement the policy. As
seen below, the situation is more complicated.
Cit. Kassa had been the Assistant Zone Comissioner in
Banalia in the early 1980s during the time of the
introduction of liberalization measures. He was very
articulate about the difficulties of both traders and
farmers and the need for change. At the time of the
interview, he was Assistant Zone Commissioner in Isangi,
in charge of the Lotokila sugar complex area of the zone.
He had held several posts in the territorial service but
had not advanced beyond Assistant Commssioner.
A Nande, married to one woman--unlike many other local
officials--Kassa kept a residence in Kisangani and engaged
in trading activities, such as bringing mattresses from
Kisangani to Lotokila. Transport provided by the sugar
factory facilitated this trade. His wife knitted baby
clothes to sell in the market. They were in their
fifties, with grown children. Their house in Isangi was
freshly painted and attractive. Officials in Banalia and
Basoko, by contrast, squatted in decaying colonial houses
which were never repaired.
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Kassa organized the first collective bargaining sessions
in Banalia following the liberalization decree of 1983.
He worked in cooperation with Cit. Alinga (story below),
with whom he has maintained relations after his move to
Lotokila. His stated purpose was to help farmers and
consumers. He was concerned, on the one hand, that
farmers get some input on marketing. On the other hand,
he worried that if farmers could set their own prices,
rice would become too expensive and consumers would
suffer.
He noted that, beginning before liberalization, Banalia
was opened up to trade as a result of proximity to the
artisanal gold mining north of the town. This situati.:,n
led to:. a more "liberal" attitude than that f ound in
Isangi. Lolema had already begun to appear in the late
l'370s. Like his successor, the Zone Commissio:onerin 1987,
Kassa felt that Banalia was a very difficult zone to
g,;:.vernbecause of this "anarchy." In 1987, there had been
seven different Commissioners in seven years.
In Lotokila he was to some extent aided and protected by
the presence of the sugar company, like the Assistant
Commissioner in Lokutu who lived in PLZ housing and the
Commissio:onerof Isangi who:osehouse was electrified by
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COOlS. In Banalia, visiting officials could only call
upon the Commissaire for hospitality and help. Seeing to
their needs was the most difficult aspect of the job,
according to the Commissioner in 1987. Thus, the local
officials benefited from relations with large companies
and relied on them for services which the state did not
provide.
Kassa's biggest headache at Lotokila was relations between
the workers, the surrounding Topoke people and the sugar
company. At the time of our first visit in September
1987, a villager had been tortured to death by the local
police after having been accused of stealing a canoe.
Kassa eventually had to call in more police support from
Yangambi across the river to handle the situation, as the
family refused to take the body and people were protesting
at the police station.
The workers at the plantation were in a state of near-riot
as well. They had not been paid for four months, and had
no money to buy food. There was little food in the market
in any case as traders had stopped coming. Sanitary
conditions were execrable, even for the ~lite cadre of
agronomists and managers and housing was crowded, dirty
and unavailable for new arrivals. Four people had died
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from exposure to pesticides and many more were sick, with
primitive medical facilities. Workers were paid 40Z a day
(enough to bUy one cup of rice) and given a meal of raw
manioc and water. If they became sick in the afternoon,
they missed the whole day's pay.
Because of these problems, Kassa was usually gone from 6
am to the evening during our stay and after dinner
received people in his front yard. Despite his efforts,
conditions had not improved a month later when we made
another visit. The sugar company was a joint investment
of the People's Republic of China and the Executive
Committee of the MPR, hence beyond the control of Cit.
7.10 Case Study Number Nine: Zone Agronomist Loso
Agronomist Loso had been in Banalia for eleven years as
head of the Department of Agriculture for the Zone. He
married a local woman and had eight children. His family
situation prevented him from leaving the zone and so he
eeUltimately, however, the Zairian partners were
forced out and the Chinese took over. The Chinese
were so strictly segregated from and disinterested
in the Zairians that this takeover did not
necessarily mean better conditions for the workers.
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had come to the conclusion that he had to take up farming
seriously, enlisting the aid of his children.
Loso had ambitious plans for farming, but acknowledged
that the resources available were very limited. It was
difficult to get selected seed, and fertilizer and
pesticides were out of the question. Good land near the
village was becoming scarce because of "the influx of rice
traders from Kisangani.
Agronomist Loso was one of the main participants in the
collective bargaining session at the beginning of the 1987
campaign. He described how the farmgate price was first
set at Z9/kilo, but officials soon realized that that was
too low and raised it to Z13/kilo. Meanwhile, Loso said,
farmers were already getting Z1800 the sack from traders
who buy at night. He affirmed that given these
"clandestine" sales it was very difficult for him to:)
estimate the level of commercialization in the zone. The
price of a license was raised quite signficantly in 1987
from 1986 (Z2,500 from Z500) because the zone needed more
revenue. Nevertheless, Loso acknowledged that, at that
price, fewer people were paying for licenses.
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There were 16 monagris under Loso's jurisdiction who were
responsible for a population of 54,120 heads of household
(HAVs), approximately 103,000 people. With this small
cadre, it was impossible to collect valid statistics and
the rules for compulsory cultivation were unevenly
applied. Loso claimed that Banalia was producing even
more paddy than in the colonial era, an assertion
confirmed by an old man interviewed on the Banalia road.
He said that the conditions for traders were favorable in
Banalia, in that the zone did not require investment in
order to trade (as in Isangi) and he insisted that there
was a lolema organization which met with zone officials.
These lolema, however, were trading more in merchandise
than in paddy, and came up from Kisangani for the weekly
market.
As a farmer himself, Loso had an investment in agriculture
and had tried to get resources for the zone such as seeds
(promised but not delivered by the Governor) and
fertilizer (enough for one field cost Z4,000). He found
the seed distributed by INERA to be highly vulnerable to
the most common insect diseases and was concerned about
declining fallow time around the town, which was at the
time 4-6 years, not sufficient to regenerate the forest.
If the fields moved farther and farther out, however, it
."5'1
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would be very difficult to evacuate the paddy which is
headloaded by women (see below).
Despite his knowledge of and concern for farming, Loso
felt that ordinary farmers should not be free to sell rice
at whatever price they wished. The produ cera '
representatives to the bargaining session which fixed the
farmgate price for rice included five collectiVity chiefs,
an unspecified number of groupement chiefs and capitas and
"a few farmers f rom around tc,wn" (Zc.neo f Banalia October
20, 1'387). These individuals apparently spoke for all
54,120 farm households in the zone. Al though Los,:.
acknowledged that clandestine sales took place at higher
prices, the law clearly stated that those who did not obey
the rules were subject to confiscation of their paddy and
jai 1. Farmers were also required to set aside one sack at
the end of the season for seed and, in theory, cotton,
peanuts and rice had to be planted each year by each
household. As a top official, Loso directly benefited
from all sales and revenue from licences and taxes, and he
could add substantially to that revenue through fines.
The 1987 document gave officials, including the military,
the right to stop any vehicle or canoe to search for
licenses. These regUlations, which were certainly
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contradictory to the spirit of liberalization, put him in
opposition to farmers and small traders.
7.11 Case Study Number Ten: Citne. Alinga and Women of
Banal ia
Citne. Alinga was a remarkable woman, the only woman MPR
official observed who commanded respect from men on their
own turf (not as a CONDIFFA representative or wife). In
addition to being President of AFECOZA, she was president
of ANEZA for Banalia. In this capacity, she had helped
negotiate the first collective bargaining sessions with
Commissaire Kassa. One of the reasons for her prestige
was that she was one of the few investors in the zone.
Al inga had orice been the "wife" of a Greek mer chant who
owned a store and rice mill in Banalia. When he retAIA\
A(307AS «ece, she inherited the business and tried to keep
it going, al thol.tghshe never heard from her "hIJsband"
again.
She also rented a house in Kisangani where her daughter,
two sisters and the children of another sister lived. In
Banalia, she lived with a sister-in-law who was waiting
for her husband to return from a job in Central African
Republic.
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In 1987, the rice mill, by then ancient, functioned
sporadically and was the only one left in Banalia. Alinga
managed to provision the store with a few staples like
soap, salt and matches. A kerosene refrigerator could
have functioned but Alinga rarely was able to purchase
fuel for it. The concrete building was in good shape and
she kept a room there with some furniture.
To survive and support her family, Alinga tried everything
from buying paddy to selling in the Banalia market. Much
of her capital was depleted, however, by illness and death
in the family and her subsequent takeover of relatives'
children. She had only a primary school education and
could not speak French and thus her advancement in the
political realm was limited. One strategy was to become
the third wife of a prominent Kinshasa based trader. With
this tie she had access to resources in Kinshasa and also
created relationships with the two other wives who were
traders as well.
Alinga set up a meeting in 1986 for me with women of
Banalia representing different sectors of the population:
officials and wives of officials, traders and AFECOZA
women, and farmers. Some of the same women were
interviewed again in 1987. Although the first interview
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setting was quite formal, with MPR songs and an address by
Alinga on the role of women, it nevertheless revealed
important interactions among different sectors of the
population. The wives of officials were given seats and
behind them stood the AFECOZA women who trade in the
marketplace and in Kisangani. The mamans paysannes stood
at the other side of the room, noticeably poorer in dress
and submissive in demeanor to the other women.~6
Each group of women was asked to describe her day and the
kind of work she did, including the difficulties of each
type of work. The women traders talked about bringing
crops to Kisangani and how all can be lost in the rain,
through theft or delay if the truck breaks down. The
first wife of the Commissaire de Zone described her day as
a housewife, shopping, cooking, cleaning and washing
clothes. Her remark about preparing food once in the
morning and once in the afternoon prompted a maman
paysanne to declare that "not all women eat twice a day;
some of us eat only once a day. " This interjection caused
a small uproar from the ~lite women and murmurs of
approval from the other mamans, but the remark opened the
GGThe women classified as mamans paysannes
carried out the labor involved in setting up
meeting, such as fetching chairs and tables.




way for the mamans to talk about their daily work:
travelling as far away as 14 kilometers to get to fields,
returning with packs of up to 50 kilos on their backs,
wading or even swimming through streams. Many said that
they did all of the work themselves, including clearing
the forest. One woman fished from a canoe and said "I can
catch the biggest fish and wrestle it Lrrto the boab,II
Later, a visit was organized to the fields and I attempted
to carry a 20 kilo pack back to the village, causing much
amusement. The packs make it impossible for women to look
up or down, right or left and truly make one feel like a
draught animal. The women themselves commented on this
feeling. The maman who accompanied us demonstrated her
skill with a machete and hoe, showing that she was capable
of doing all the work in the field, but on return from the
field asked that we pass her house to appease her
husband's brother who had objected to her taking time off
from work to accompany us. As a man remarked in Yahuma,
"you [whites] have your boys, but here our boys are
women."
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7.12 Case Study Number Eleven: Bolindo Village, Yahuma
Because of the isolation of the villages in recent years,
the children in Yahuma had never seen a white person.
Many screamed when they saw my face and then crowded
around in amazement. In contrast, the villagers at
Yalibwa were used to being studied and ushered me into the
chief's house immediately upon arrival to negotiate for
gifts that I might provide for their information. The
Yahuma villagers were content merely to have their story
told and, despite their poverty, they gave me small gifts.
Proximity to Kisangani gave people in Yalibwa greater
access to markets, as reflected in their clothes. The
women of Yahuma were dressed in rags and many children ran
naked.
While the rural areas of Tshopo differ in terms of access
to resources, they nonetheless share a common sense of
despair. Agriculture has not been a good way to make a
living, despite the abundance of land and diversity of
crops. Concessions, plantations and monopsonies have
controlled prices and selling terms and independent
traders have failed to provision rural areas with needed
merchandise. Organizing to improve conditions has been
virtually impossible, given the cooptation of
=
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"co,:.peY'atives,"the corrupt Lon of officials, and the
eXigencies of tY'ansportation and communication.
Bolindo Village is a composite of a series of villages
visited on the fringes of Yahuma, close to the border of
Equateur Region. The Ngando living there populate
Equateur as well. Bolindo is also within the hinterland
of the giant Lever (PLZ) Plantations that stretch to the
Zaire river. It is a small village of some twenty-five
houses. A very degraded road leads from Bolindo to a
larger village 17 kilometers away where the closest school
and "clinic" (withol.ltsupplies) can be f ourid, With a MAN
four wheel drive truck it took from four to six hours to
make the trip to Bolindo from the larger village. In the
rainy season, it would be impossible to travel there. It
is 375 kilometers from Kisangani and a two day drive to
Lokutu, the PLZ headquarters on the river.
On a trip to bUy paddy in the area, a group of men and
women was interviewed in the village and the sale of paddy
was observed. The first concern of the villagers
interviewed was to paint out that they had no market, no
store and no other way to get merchandise because traders
weren't bringing it in. They said that it was very
difficult to get to Kisangani or even to Lokutu to buy
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merchandise because transport cost was high and soldiers
on the road could steal everything. As one man put it,
"our moriey is just sitting there."
When asked what they would do with money, the men said
that they would buy a radio, bicycle, and sewing machine.
One woman said that she would like to fi~ up the house and
buy a mosquito net. One man mentioned credit for
rehabilitating abandoned coffee plantations. Women said
that even basic necessities such as soap and salt often
could not be found. All were concerned about schooling
for children. Without that possibility for advancement
for thei r children, they felt, "1ife has no meaning."
People in Bolindo were proud of the natural resources of
thei r terr itc.Yy. One man b,:.asted"we have mo re variety in
our f ood than you Americans!" Indeed, they described
different kinds of game, domestic animals, large and small
fish and several crops which they cultivated. They felt
very frustrated that no one was interested in buying from
them, except during the paddy and coffee campaigns, when
traders would tear into the village, buy up only what they
came to buy and leave without having invested anything.
314
The money made on these sales is spent the same day. A
man will earn Z5,OOO for the whole campaign which goes to
buy clothes for his wife and children. A bicycle, at
Z25,OOO, is out of the question. When people posed for a
picture after the interview, they held up their most
prestigious item, an empty cigarette pack.
Growing rice is very difficult, they say, and they do it
mainly for the money. They eat rice too but hand
decortication is hard work so rice is not eaten as
frequently as manioc. The timing of burning fields is
tricky. The year before, in 1986, they burned too late
and the fields were soaked with water before they had been
well burned. To clear and plant limenand women are out
all day in the field sweating, blackened by the sun." At
the time of winnowing, the chaff gets into the skin and
they have no soap to wash it off.
In the past, things had been different. People could name
several clinics which had been located nearby in the
colonial era. Children went to school. The area was
provisioned by canteens run by PLZ. Now very few people
get out of the village and only a few small traders get
in. The Village manager (dirige~nt) who did a lot of
talking had never been to Kisangani, although his father
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had traveled as far as Kinshasa to buy clothes to trade.
PLZ had let the roads deteriorate and many bridges were
near collapse, or had already collapsed.
When asked why people don't fix up roads or create markets
themselves, the villagers explained th~t money was given
to the the People's Commissioner, as an attributaire, to
fix up the road in their collecitivity but they had seen
no results from that money. They were tired of doing work
for nothing (salonga) when they knew that someone had been
paid for it.
As for markets, one woman claimed that she had tried to
organize a market but that women were reluctant to spend
time on it when they would only be selling what everyone
produced anyway.
7.13 Case Study Number Twelve: Yalibwa Village, Turumbu
Collectivity, 1sangi Zone
Yalibwa is a much-studied village and as such can give
some historical perspective on the situation of rice
farmers. It is within the Turumbu Collectivity, five
kilometers from the rice research station at INERA
(Institut National de Recherche Agronomique) and 23
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kilometers from Yangambi village. The fate of rice
farming at Yalibwa is to some extent linked to the fate of
INERA and agricultural research in Zaire, as well as to
the Tururnbu C.::ooperative,as Yalibwa has been a "model
village" since the colcrua I era. It is thus o f interest
to discuss here observations about the institute, the town
and the cooperative which convey the sense of decline and
decay surrounding this national center.of rice.
Located at Yamgambi, INERA and the Faculty of Agronomy
(IFA) are the major research and training centers for
Zaire's agronomists. In the colonial era, Yangambi was an
important town and market center. Over 400 expatriates
resided there who worked at INEAC and ran plantations, and
2,000 Congolese were also employed by the Institute
(Drassouchoff 1965). The buildings which housed these
people still stand, as do the houses built for the workers
in the large cite around the town. The town was built for
people with transportation, as it is very spread out. For
example, it took two hours to walk from IFA to town.
There was no transportation system there in 1987 to get to
and from Kisangani or to move around the town. Few
bicycles were in evidence and the local market was
provisioned by canoe. Local rice could be bought in the
market, but there were more traders who only had America
=+:
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rice for sale. It must be noted that Yangambi is also the
capital of Tshopo subregion thus in theory one of the most
important towns in the region.
For several months there had been no electricity at the
institute and it had been years since the water system
functioned. Thus it was difficult to run the research
labs and many professors had become discouraged and gone
to Kisangani. The management of the institute was moved
to Kinshasa because of the isolation of Yangambi, but this
served to isolate the institute even further.
At the experimental station, research assistants
demonstrated different trial fields of rice (most
overgrown and diseased), experiments for chasing birds,
and seed multiplication fields of RY1 rice which were sold
to the national seed distribution project and to the
public. For the Turumbu, it was explained, one sack of
rice was distributed and two sacks were returned after
harvest. It was not clear how quality control was
maintained in their fields, however, and this was a
sensitive issue with the Villagers (see below). The sheds
and drying areas for the paddy were in good condition.
Some of the fields belonged personally to the Director of
Research and his rice was stored in the sheds. The
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researchers left at the station (two upper level students)
felt abandoned in their work. They were trying very hard
to keep up some semblance of research but had few
resources. Communication with management was sporadic.
The infrastructure was still usable but with no means of
transportation or communication, no labor, no water or
electricity, the experimental station functioned at a very
low level.
The headquarters of Turumbu Cooperative are a half hour
walk from the center of Yangambi. The road was in very
poor shape although it is also the road which connects
Kisangani to Isangi. Arriving at the Cooperative, one
would be hard pressed to describe its function. An
abandoned truck sat next to a ramshackle building
surrounded by high grass. One building was intact with
two functioning rice mills and two manioc mills. There
was no fuel for them, as they operate only during the
campaign season upon the arrival of the manager of the
cooperative, RP17, who had a house in Kisangani but whose
most extensive business interests were in Shaba region.
The cooperative had a solid infrastructure at the end of
the colonial era when it was a paysannat (Chapter Three).
During the rebellion, however, most of the buildings were
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burned and its stock stolen by rebels, mercenaries and the
populace. Afterwards, a series of outside managers
pillaged the cooperative and brought it to financial
collapse (Gakuru 1981). Mbaya's study showed that, in the
1970s, the "members" of the coope ret Lve felt that they
were slaves of the state, forced to produce rice and sell
it at derisory prices (Mbaya 1980). In 1983, the Governor
of the region granted the cooperative as a concession to
RP17, giving him exclusive rights to buy rice there. One
other small player, Cit. Basosila, bought rice among the
Tu r umbu , Because production was so low, it was reported
that few lolema bothered to buy and as such, in 1986, the
farmgate price for rice in Turumbu was less than that for
Yahuma, almost 300 kilometers further from Kisangani.
This state of affairs evoked our curiosity to talk with
villagers at Yalibwa and find out Why rice had been
abaridoried ,
Yalibwa Village is divided into three parts, with about
600 HAVs in 1987. Compulsory cultivation was enforced,
with 1 ha allocated to a married man and 1/2 ha to a
single man or woman. A man with two wives was allocated
1-1/2 to 2 ha. The monagris for the village in September
1987 was the relative of Cit. Azali who had stolen from
him and been ejected from his residence in Kisangani. In
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the course of negotiating for transport to Yalibwa, he
stole from me as well. His employment by the collectivity
thus did not bode well for the supervision of fields in
Yalibwa.
Farmers in Yalibwa had expressed discontent with the state
in the 1970s, when students from the University of
Kisangani did research there (Kilumba 1975, Tshibaka-
Mukende 1975, Ntamulyango 1974-75, Kaseko 1976, Ngoy 1976,
Mbaya 1980). Another group of students studied the
village in the early 1980s and found rice farming to be
neglected and unprofitable as opposed to manioc (Tshibaka
1983, Muanasaka 1982-83, Tshiunza 1~82-83, Mvumbi
1984).137
The decline of rice farming in Yalibwa was attributed by
the villagers to the bad road leading to the village, and
67The first group (except Mbaya) studied under
Prof. Tollens while the second worked under Prof.
Tshibaka, a student of Prof. Tollens (see Tshibaka
1989, Tollens and Huybens 1988). These researchers
coordinated their work in an attempt to get a
unified picture of the rice farmer's economy. For
example, in the first gn'l.tp, orie studied "capital, II
ano che r "labor," a third "revenue and e:t;penses,"
while a fourth applied the Cobb-Douglas Production
Function to the data collected (respectively, Ngoy,
Tshibaka-Mukendi, Kilumba, Kaseko). In the second
group, the impact of swidden farming on forest
reserves was studied.
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subsequent lack of buyers. The villagers felt that INERA
should fix up the road and take care of services which had
been done in the past. In the meantime, many people had
gone to Kisangani, and others were entailed in more
lucrative trade of palm oil, smoked fish and game. Good
hunting grounds were a six hour walk from the village. In
contrast to Bolindo village, people in Yalibwa did not
complain about lack of merchandise because they had access
to the Yangambi market. A primary school was nearby, but
health facilities were completely lacking medicines. A
study in 1984 found 99.3X of the Turumbu were illiterate
CMvumbi 1984). Like the Bolindo villagers, the Turumbu
claimed that they had enough to eat because of the
largesse of the forest.
The issue of saving seeds after the harvest provoked
controversy. The chief and some others claimed that seeds
were saved, while others said that they did not save seeds
after the harvest. RP17 himself had claimed that the
Turumbu did not save seeds after the harvest as they sold
them for money. It is possible that people did not save
seeds because they did not want to return two bags
received under the INERA seed distribution system, if they
had participated. Farmers interviewed in Shaba saw this
type of system as exploitative and would have preferred to
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pay for the seed or felt that they should get it free
(Russell.1988, field notes).
Farmers at Yalibwa were both advantaged and disadvantaged.
They had never forgotten that they had once been a part of
the paternalistic INEAC system and expected its successor,
INERA to provide the same services. At the same time, the
monopsony of the Cooperative had stifled any incentive to
produce rice and it seemed that people only continued
because they were obliged to (Lokomba 1987). Their
proximity to Kisangani made it possible to trade, migrate
and sell forest products directly, thus agriculture was
less interesting. In fact, many researchers commented on
the very low labor time taken up by agriculture (eight
percent of total labor time: Mvumbi 1984). No one
followed the system of rows and rotations set up during
the paysannat era, despite the continued exhortations of
the monagris, and the villagers claimed that there was
still plenty of good land for farming (see Mbaya 1980 on
the conflict between Turumbu farmers and the monagris).
As discussed in Chapter Two, the farmers' choices made




7.14 Analysis: Class and Mobility in the Rice Trade
Approximately one=third of the rice professionals
interviewed were acquereurs or beneficiaries of state
largesse (Table 7.1: RPs 2, 8, 9, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22 and
perhaps others).ss Of this number, only one, Cit.
Tonda (RPS), discussed above, had retained a major
investment in rice. Two others had important businesses
in other sectors (furniture and palm oil). Three had
virtually gone out of business and two were rarely found
in Kisangani.
The other major investors in the rice trade can be divided
into two categories: expatriates and indigenous
entrepreneurs. In the former category are RPs 1, 3, 4,
10, and 15, and in the latter RPs 5, 7, 11, 14, and 16.
Not enough information is known about RPs 6, 12, and 13 to
place them in a category. The expatriates stayed in
business by retaining ties outside of Zaire.
RP14 had ties to Somali and Kenya, where he regularly
seAs discussed in the Introduction, it was not
possible to ascertain with complete certainty who
was an acqa~reur. The individuals noted here were
alleged to be so by others, and their lifestyle fit
the model of the acqa'rear.
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visits and trades. RP11 is married to a Belgian and is
herself half Belgian.
The indigenous entrepreneurs are those who built their
businesses without major political ties, including RP1 and
RP3, whose stories are recounted above. RP4 is the wife
of a Nande trader. The Nande derive their economic power
from being situated on the border and from trade in
vegetables to Kisangani and Kinshasa.s~ Nande help one
another in entering trade and have formed a national
network of entrepreneurs CKabagambi 1990). RP10's career
parallels that of RP1, albeit on a lesser scale. Indeed,
RP10 claims to have been inspired by RP1's success. His
location, in Kabondo Zone, has attracted many lolema and
farmers along the Bafwasende road and as such his rice
mill has carved out a niche for itself. RP15 appears to
be a self-made man as well who goes himself on rice buying
trips to Opala and is one of the few rice traders to sell
merchandise in the interior.
Of the lolema interviewed, six were farmers (two of these
probably owned fermes--registered farms--being former
69For example, Conde's





over the Rwanda border
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school directors). They come from very diverse
backgrounds. One woman had no formal education, while two
had state diplomas. Seven had been in trade in the past,
and other occupations included chauffer and gold
prospector. Their investment plans were equally diverse,
with five planning to remain in the food trade, others
planning to try a different trade, one wanting to return
to school and another to return to a job as a chauffer.
Thus, there is no evidence that either the rice
professionals or the lolema arose from any particular
sector of the population or that the growth of petty trade
or the indigenization of the rice professionals
represented a social force capable of developing the
region's resources. This weakness was not from lack of
trying but from being blocked at every attempt to organize
around a concrete goal, such as credit, road maintenance
or even milling policy. The economic and political
conditions blocked traders from accumulating and
consolidating their capital to plan and develop business
strategies. "Internal" factors such as problems with
workers and relatives combined with "external" factors
such as lack of access to credit and foreign exchange to
make a very uncertain environment. Traders were thus
forced into unproductive strategies such as going into
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rural areas without merchandise because they lacked the
time to sell it and credit to purchase it.
Both rice professionals and lolema had to deal with
obstructive authorities and constantly changing
regulations. Their lack of unity as traders prevented
them from acting together to fight obstacles to trade.
Rice Professionals pitted themselves against lolema and
agreed to market controls at the zone level to gain
advantages over other traders.
In the rural areas, there were dLvLsLorrsamong "ord Lnery "
farmers and ~lites represented by access to resources and
ability to tap into the political system. Inequality in
rural Africa is common but often large farmers subsidize
smaller ones with credit and officials invest in rural
areas to gain political advantage (Hill 1986, Berry 1985).
In Tshopo, no such integration was observed. Cooperatives
were organized by ~lites who were not even farmers
themselves but city-based merchants (COOlS, Turumbu).
Officials were responsible to the party but not to the
populace. Farmers interviewed claimed that little work
was done communally on fields. Thus there were few bases
for organization.
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In terms of rural-urban transfers, isolated areas like
Bolindo village have very little contact with the city,
while people living near market centers such as Banalia
have more access to the city. Not much in the way of
goods flows from city to countryside, however, and
villagers along the relatively well-traveled Banalia road
complained about lacking basic commodities. Research in
Bandundu revealed a net outflow of resources from
countryside to city (Russell 1990). More research needs
to be done in rural areas, however, to understand rural
urban ties (for example between lolema and their farmer
clients).
In Tshopo, as in other parts of Zaire and Africa, food
production was mainly a woman's occupation, with men
carrying out extractive activities or working on cash
crops (Cf. Henn 1986, Russell 1990). The low status of
farm women, as reflected in Case Study Number Eleven,
inhibits significant investment being made in women's
farming (Russell 1990). The gap between men and women in
terms of access to resources may have increased with
declining opportunities in rural areas (Schoepf 1990).
Women are left behind in the village and the burden of
supporting the children falls on them (Perrault 1978).
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With little access to education or employment, the vast
majority of rural people are stuck at the lowest levels of
the survival chain, with women at the very bottom.
Mobility is possible only in the city. In the city,
however, uneducated and unskilled people rarely find
employment and, if they do, they are paid less-than-
sUbsistence wages. Workers in Azali's rice mill earned
ZI,500 (taxablel--about eight dollars--a month in 1987.
Even skilled workers' salaries doomed them to poverty.
The Director of Azali's enterprise, with a University
degree, was paid Z10,000 a month. Z2,000 was taken out
for taxes, rent was ZI,500 and one sack of rice to feed
the family cost about Z4,000. Lc.w levels of
industrialization and the assimilation of the (single)
labor union into the party apparatus also precluded the
rise of a working class.
All sectors of the population manipulated networks to get
ahead, however, the most important being family,
neighborhood, ethnic, church and school in addition to the
political network if one had access to it. Mutual aid
organizations arose out of these networks and people used
them to get jobs and favors, but the overt use of these
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networks for political organization was strictly
forbidden.70
Given the above conditions, it is hard to speak of classes
emerging that represent social forces which engage in
productive activity (Cf. MacGaffey 1987, Schatzberg 1980).
The rice trade could be an important base for such a
force. It relies on a local product with high local
demand involving both the rural and urban workforce. If
resources were made available, merchants could use credit
to develop rural areas. The quality of the product could
be improved, perhaps even for export. These developments
were envisioned by officials and merchants, but never took
place because the parasitic state diverted funds and
energies elsewhere. Chapter Six detailed the
repercussions of this failure for Zaire's food supply and
the inability of cosmetic policy shifts to promote
investment in agriculture.
700ne can make a case, however, that certain
groups have gained advantages in certain areas.
The Nande dominated the Goma area through
manipulation of political and busines~ ties and the
Luba have several power bases in the country, as do




This thesis employed an experimental fieldwork method to
uncover the workings of a food supply system and describe
how this system evolved. The use of ethnographic methods
enabled the study to look at the rice trade from the
different actors' points of view, while its theoretical
focus placed these actors within the framework of a
national and international political economy. In this
chapter, we conclude by looking at changes in the rice
trade in the light of theories about class formation,
agrarian change and development policy in Africa.
Changes in the Structure of the Rice Trade
Significant changes occured in the rice trade from the
1970s to the mid-19BOs. The expatriate-dominated
monopsony system was replaced by a more open system run by
Zairians. Price setting was still practiced, however, and
barriers to trade remained. The aftermath of the
rebellion, zairianization and the flight of expatriate
investors served to isolate the rural areas of Tshopo.
Rice mills moved from the countryside to the town.
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Farmers were exploited in this isolation by repressive
regulations concerning compulsory cultivation, control of
movement and by the coop tat Lon of "peasant' s
organizations." "Collective bargaining" sessions set up
in the wake of liberalization served more to reinforce
controls on trade than to bring the farmer into the
prc.cess.
Indigenization of the rice trade and the proliferation of
petty traders did not serve to develop rice production or
trade. Fifteen ye~rs after the collapse of the old
system, the rice trade had become an artisanal and chaotic
enterprise in which traders and farmers pursued a
multitude of survival strategies. Deteriorating social
ties resulted from competition over scarce resources.
Because communal action and state investment was very
weak, some strategies have the long term consequence of
degrading the environment and inhibiting future
investment.
Agricultural Policy and the Rice Trade
Nationally, agricultural development policies emanating
from Kinshasa were totally ineffective in arresting the
decline of agriculture. None of them involved significant
investment in infrastructure, credit or other services to
traders and producers. The emphasis on liberalization and
privatization which was pushed by donors did not increase
investment in agriculture because the parasitic state
continued to drain resources from the productive sector
(Table 4.2).
In the case of the rice trade, several schemes were
proposed or attempted and failed to promote the
profession. SOFIDE supposedly existed to lend money to
merchants such as the rice professionals. Much of the
money lent, however, did not go to active rice merchants,
and merchants with high potential were passed up. As the
exchange risk was borne by the borrower, those who
received the money found it extremely difficult to pay
back. (See Appendix III for analysis of the intersection
of the political and the economic in Zaire.)
Although merchants attempted to band together, the
Committee of Rice Professionals was an ineffective
organization, criticized even by its president for lack of
motivation. CICA, another merchants' committee, was
similarly blocked from any productive action. Networks of
informers and difficulties in communication and
transportation hampered collaboration. Merchants thus
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tended to hire relatives who in turn stole from the
business with impunity.
Both rice professionals and lolema came from diverse
sectors of the population and were involved in many other
types of business aside from the rice trade. Studies show
that rural people actually devoted little time to
agriculture, preferring less controlled activities.
8 .-,...::.. Class Porrnat Lorr, Agrarian Change and "Deve loprnerrt"
How do the transformations described fit into theories of
agrarian change? Has there been a trajectory of change
that could lead to some recognizable class structure,
ethnic, kin-based, patron-client or other system of
cooperation and resource allocation in the rice trade?
What are the implications of the patterns described for
development policy?
Callaghy depicts the Zairian ruling class as "real, but
weak" (1987) and compares the r~gime to other patrimonial,
authoritarian states (1984). He believes that the type of
IIstate-s.:=tcietystruggle" g.:=tingon in Zaire is typical of
states at a certain stage of development. In this stage,
investment is inhibited as the state functions largely to
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maintain the ruling class. MacGaffey describes the
emergence of a "true" merchant class investing in
production and also finds kin-based trading networks
(1987). These findings have implications both for
development and for analysis of the Zairian political
economy. If such a merchant class exists, liberalization
and privatization could enhance its prospects.
An analysis of the backgrounds and strategies of
Kisangani's merchants who have invested in a local product
(rice), however, reveals a more complex picture. Many
were in fact tied to the state and, more important, the
others had to work in an environment shaped by decades of
economic chaos and parasitism. As such, they were not
able to act like "true" entrepreneurs, building firms and
investing rationally in a local product with high local
demand. The transformation from the monopsony system to
"liberalizati.::.n"had, in sl::.meways, shifted the balance o f
power from merchants to officials, who were in a position
to bargain over licenses, trade restrictions and access.
Other theorists do not see a clear pattern of class
formation and highlight the uneven nature of patronage
relaticlns, whereby "clients" receive very little, if any,
reward for their loyalty (Lemarchand 1988, Sang-Mpam
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1986). Mukenge (1986) outlines the implications of this
type of patronage system for Zairian businesses. In the
case of the rice trade, rural "clients" of traders and
plantations lost out both under the old monopsony system
and under "liberalization" because the terms o f access tel
resources did not change. At no time were there
provisions for bringing rural people into the political
process, even in projects and domains that directly
affected them (cooperatives, seed distribution programs,
road maintenance policy).
To explain Zaire's persistent decline, the development
literature focuses not on class or patronage but on
technical and organizational blockages such as bad roads,
lack of management skills and scarcity of foreign exchange
(USAID/Zaire 1988, van de Wetering and Kingsbury 1989,
Adelski et a l, 198':'0. In dealing with the Zairian state,
the solution posed is to bypass it through investment in
the "private sectl:tr"(USAID/Zaire 1988). This type of
analysis stems in part from the orthodox economic point of
view taken and in part from barriers to frank discussion
of the nature of the Zairian state. Development efforts
in agriculture were thus geared toward "band-aid" type
solutions such as introducing new seed varieties, training
agronomists and road rehabilitation. Other projects
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benefitted both American manufacturers and farmers and
large business in Zaire (PL480 and other commodity import
prc,grams)•
This thesis confirms the views of scholars who link
declining food supplies to the structure of the state, and
agrees with Ford and Holmquist that this decline is not
the inevitable result of socioeconomic evolution, but is
the process of shoring up a particular r~gime--in the case
of Zaire, mainly in order to maintain access to strategic
minerals. As such, the process of class formation has
been distorted, and has not allowed entrepreneurs and
produ cers to act in "ret Lone l" ways predicted by ort hodo x
economic and marxist theory.
These trends are consistent with those found in other
parts of Africa where political and economic insecurity
have persisted. No t ab Iy, "many Africans have become
locked into multiple channels of access and strategies of
resource management which perpetuate low productivity."
Thus, most rice professionals diversified their businesses
and could spend little time planning for the rice trade.
They had to diversify because one year they might have no
credit, no truck, or the roads might be impassible. Some
tried to minimize the insecurity by supporting controls on
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trade such as costly licensing, limiting seasons for the
campaign, requiring investment in the rural areas, and
raising the cost of rice milling. In the case of COOlS in
Isangi, competitors were eliminated by political means.
Lolema might cultivate clients and family ties in the
rural areas and try to ally themselves with one rice mill
or truck owner. The rapid turnover necessary to keep
ahead of inflation, intense competition, struggles over
licensing and hazards of transportation made it difficult
to build up a business over time. Thus, for many (if not
most) lolema, the trade was a survival strategy and not a
path to founding an enterprise or even increasing their
standard of living.
Rural dwellers were almost totally neglected as social
actors and retreated to strategies which maximized
diversity and minimized contact with the state. Wc.men,
the major producers of food, were left with added labor
burdens and fewer resources to cope with these burdens.
Labor shortages took their toll in declining fallow times
resulting from inability to apply intensive techniques.
No inputs were made available and seed quality had
degenerated since the colonial era. These
transformati.::ons,combined with "external" factors slJch as
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food imports, had a negative effect on food supply. The
decline of agriculture was not halted by policy changes
which failed to address structures of access to resources
None o f the actic.ns described here are "iYratic.nal" or
unique t.:,Zaireo Maychant capital "strives, wherevey
possible, to secure a monopoly so that it can impose its
own terms and prices on consumers and pYoducers" (Kennedy
1988:17). Elites and Yuling rdgimes do whatever it takes
to yemain in powey. What has been YemaYkable about Zaire
is the extent to which conditions for the vast majority of
Zairians deteyiorated without major political unrest.
In 1989, women demonstYated in the marketplace in Kinshasa
against Yising prices and inability to feed theiy families
and, in 1990, in response foY a call from Mobutu to
discuss the nation's situation, over 5,000 groups and
individuals wYote letters detailing their grievances.
Many of these letteYs explicitly referred to the
oppressive nature of the MPR, the wastefulness of
expenditures on political, rather than productive use, and
the neglect of rural ayeas and agricultuYe. The gyOUpS
included chapters of the national laboy union, chuYch
organizations and rural collectivities (Jeune Afrique
75 :
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1990). These protests confirm that the Zairian people
were well aware of the source of problems in their
country. The massacre of students at the University of
Lubumbashi in May 1990 showed why people have been afraid
to protest (Africa News 1990).
Actors in the rice trade understood the foundations of
many of the obstacles confronting their efforts to build a
viable rice supply system yet they were forced to act in
ways that enhanced their chances of survival in a state
which provided no fall-back resources (Mukenge 1976).
Their efforts to work collectively were not rewarded, and
that which was rewarded did not contribute to building a
The burden of decline fell on both workers
and rural people's shoulders, with neither sector gaining,
as e:t;emplified-bv the o:.ft-citedand dramatic fall in their
standard of living since 1960.71 Only by looking at
the socioeconomic structures which emerged in the wake of
the parasitic state can one understand Why consumers,
farmers and even most traders felt their situation to be
deter Lora t ing.
71This decline is
earning power of the
six percent of that in
illustrated by the fact





8.3 Directions for Further Research
Under the Mobutu r~gime it will be difficult to study many
of the issues discussed here overtly. My roles as
researcher at the local University, "wife" o f a respected
manager, friend to rice merchants, and consultant in
international development facilitated the exploration of
several levels of interaction concerning the rice trade
and the broader issues discussed here. The explicit focus
on the rice trade deflected most suspicion.72 Hence,
any further research must take into account limitations on
access to information and concern over collection of
sensitive information which could reveal the links between
the decline in the Zairian agricultural sector and the
nature of the parasitic state. Althbugh intended to raise
the level of the debate, this thesis may add to this
The situation of rural people in Haut Zaire remains
understudied. Grinker's (1989) thesis explores relations
among Efe pygmies and Lese villagers in Bafwasende Zone.
Many of his observations are of interest to the
72The two individuals who expressed suspicion
about the author's motives for research were the
boss of CODIS/Zimex (covertly) and the owner of an
establishment which sells imported rice (overtly).
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understanding of survival strategies of rural dwellers.
Nancy Hunt, of the University of Wisconsin, finishing
research in 1990, will provide important information on
the history of women's lives among the Turumbu, Topoke and
Lokele and links between colonial policy and current
practices (Hunt 1988).
There are several topics related to food supply which need
to be elaborated. The most important is how farmers in
Banalia have responded to increased demand for rice. What
avenues are open to them for investment? What are the
differences between men's and women's attitudes and
strategies in relation to increased production? What
impact has increased production had on farming systems?
What is the nature of the ties linking lolema and clients?
(See MacGaffey 1989).
Another topic is the reported increase in cost of
bridewealth and polygynous marriages in Isangi. Do these
trends (if real) reflect class formation in rural areas?
A related issue is to discover how the trend, found in
other regions, toward land sales and privatization of land
has developed in Tshopo. Land is sold to urban ~lites or
local chiefs and party members for fer~es, alienating it
from control by lineage elders. This land is often left
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idle o~ used unp~oductively (Gaud~eau and Almy 1986,
Newbu~y 1986, Schoepf 1986, Russell 1990).
Resea~ch on p~oblems of ag~iculture and food supply that
fc,cl.lseson technologi caI "constraints" without ana Iyz ing
the social, political and economic st~uctures unde~lying
these constraints will be at best ineffective and at wo~rst
highly misleading (Berry 1978:19). Uninfo~med research
also leads to dangerous conclusions such as that proposed
in a 1989 study of agricultural production and marketing
in Bandundu (Adelski et al. 1989). There the authors
recommend that marketing cooperatives be set up at the
level of the collectivity, not taking into account the
long history of exploitation of farmers by collectivity
officials, and the tendency in Zaire for development
"suggestic,ns" to become new laws, comp let a with taxes,
fines and punishments for non-compliance (e.g. PRAAL). In
any case, "technica1 Lmp rovemerrte have 1itt1e meaning
unless power considerations are taken into
account •••Clearly, how problems are identified, dissected
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II. Letter to Village Chiefs from Collectivity Chief
(Yahuma Zone)
Translated by Yuma Jumaini from Lingala
May 10, 1987
Copies of letter to [Citizen AzaliJ, "ecc.n,;)micoperator"
on mission to buy agricultural products in groupements
Yembu and Bolombo
To: Chef de Groupement Bolombo II, Yampete II
Chef de Localitd Koret, Koret
From: Chef de Collectivitd
Concerning: Fixing up the road Koret-Bekote
Citizen,
In order that everyone reap the fruit of the work they
have done all year round, I ask you, village chiefs of
Bekc.te and Koret to provide help f,:.r"ec.:.nc,micope rat or "
[Cit. AzaliJ.
What kind of help is required? I will give you an
answer: Several "economf c ope ratora " only come to take
out products, then leave without giving any thought
thereafter. Others make it difficult for the population
to get the money to which they are entitled.
The bridge over the river Loleka was broken down and
neither the Roads Bureau nor PLZ cared about it. But
[AzaliJ in his love for his friends and brothers fixed it
with his own money! !! Hence the help I am talking about
is that from today forward make sure that all the people
work on fixing the road so that [AzaliJ can get through
with his truck!!! How can one buy your products if the
road is not fixed? [AzaliJ has the willingness to help
out his brothers so that the products do not go to
rot!!! I think that next year, provided that you help
him out fixing the road, the buying of your products will
proceed smoothly. This kind of work springs out of the
love of developing the land (salonga), you should not ask
him for any pay!! Your only pay is being able to sell
your products!!!
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Now all the buyers are going out to buy only coffee!!
But [Azali] wants everybody to enjoy not only coffee but
rice as well, and so forth!!! Others don't have ideas
like him about the well-being of others.
The bottom line is that you should put people to work
on the road in order to make the road better so that
trucks can get by safely.




III. Thoughts on the Relation of Economics and Politics
in Food Supply in Zaire
The study of food supply is inherently political because
it deals with access to the most fundamental human need.
Since the rise of the state, food producers and consumers
have been to some extent pitted against each other, and
producers have tended to be sUbjugated as they are less
mobile. Under a feudal system, producers are subjugated
to the landholder, whose interests mayor may not coincide
with other elites. The domination of capitalist
agriculture has changed the balance of power in
industrialized courrtrLes s':'that "produ cers " may part o f
the ruling elite.
Traders in staple foods are not as likely to amass wealth
as those who specialize in luxury goods or export crops
unless they create a monopoly or monopsony situation by
controlling producers, consumers and competitors, or
through hoarding and creation of artificial scarcity.
This control can be attained through alliance with the
state. In some cases, the state becomes the trader, as in
the creatie,n of marketing boards and ",::official"trade
channels. Theoretically, the surplus extracted from
agriculture either directly by the state or indirectly
through taxation on trade or emergence of
trader/entrepreneurs, funds the creation of industry,
leading to the ultimate decline in importance of the
agricultural sector.
In a parasitic state, which exists primarily to serve
outside interests, control is exerted on production and
trade for the purpose of extraction of surplus value.
Producers, trad~rs and consumers do not benefit unless
they are tied into the extractive system. If they are
tied in, however, it becomes more and more difficult to
make productive investments which take up substantial
capital. In the insecure environment of the Zairian
ruling class, one is also reluctant to expose too much of
one's assets, which might at some point be confiscated or
subject to high rates of taxation. Discussions with high
level management of industrial firms in Kinshasa revealed
the kind of strategies needed to do business: extensive
use of informal networks for navigating the maze of import
regulations, falsifying profit and loss statements,
becoming tax write-offs to parent companies in Europe and
offering partnerships to individuals at the highest level,
preferably the President's immediate family. These
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strategies do not yield a strong and independent
capitalist sector.
In Zaire, high rates of inflation, which were blamed on
the "ec.:.nomy"and seen as causing a reluctance to invest
in fact stemmed from lack of productive investment.
Inflation increased primarily due to the Bank of Zaire's
proclivity for printing money to balance the budget to
make up for shortfalls in revenues which had been directly
removed from the bank or resulted from declines in
exports. Subsequent decline in access to hard currency
resulting from inflation handicapped Zairian industry
which is heavily reliant on imported inputs (USAID/Zaire
1988).73
The impact of this fiscal environment on food supply
should be, in theory, that Zairian businesses rely more on
local rather than imported goods, thus stimulating local
businesses. This is one of the stated purposes, for
example, of structural adjustment measures which channel
hard currency into debt repayment. The IMF's continued
frustration with Zaire, however, stemmed from the fact
that even if debt repayments were made on schedule, which
they very rarely were, the pillaging of the state treasury
continued, resulting in disastrous shortages of foreign
exchange. (See Africa Confidential 1990 for an
illustration of how the dlite pillage the country.)
Investment was not made in either manufacturing or in
agriculture by Zairians because of their insecurity about
losing their assets.
The impact on food supply of this fiscal environment was
direct. In Fall 1'38'3, for examp Le, the Government of
Zaire was unable to pay its fuel bill because of lack of
foreign exchange, despite adequate funds appearing in the
budget. Consequently, the fuel companies refused to pay
taxes which directly support the Roads Bureau. The Roads
Bureau's maintenance program ground to a halt in the
middle of the corn campaign season in Shaba, putting into
jeopardy a multi-million dollar USAID-funded corn
731n an inflationary environment, the cost of
hard currency goes up, as there is an increase in
the gap between the official and parallel rates of
exchange. Thus, it costs more to buy hard currency
on the parallel market and less is available in
relation to total money supply as the zaire is
devalued.
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production project, and corn supply for the mining areas
of Shaba. This situation continued through 1990.
The IMF and structural adjustment, however, were not part
of the solution but part of the problem. Fundamentally,
structural adjustment extracts from the Zairian people
repayment for debt incurred in their name for projects
which did not in any way benefit them. Those who incurred
the debt are not repaying it but extracting it from the
lower levels of society. They have been supported in this
effort by a combination of collusion with foreign
businessmen and foreign concern over security issues (Wall
Street Journal 1990). The Zairian people are paying the
debt through increases in the level of extraction. Recent
decentralization measures reflect this trend, as the state
has now said that regions, zones and collectivities must
support themselves and continue to provide revenue for the
national coffers. Hence, the steep rise in the cost of a
license to buy paddy in Haut Zaire in 1989 and sharp
increases in fines for neglecting compulsory cultivation
reported by farmers in Bandundu in the same year (Russell
1990, Schoepf and Walu 1990).
Donors purporting to aid the agricultural sector work at
cross purposes to their own goals. Local costs of USAID's
agricultural development projects, for example, are in
part funded by PL480 food imports. The goal of these
imports are explicitly stated in an official USDA
pUblication: "U.S. Government export programs,
particularly those that guarantee credit, have helped
maintain market share" in a market depressed by develcoping
countries' debt crisis (Shane and Stallings 1988). A
large percentange of this "aid" finances expa t rLet e
salaries and import of machinery, vehicles and other
"coperating costs" (Hancock 1989). Most agricultural
development projects do not even target food producers
(women) much less reach them (Russell 1990).
Thus, the situation of food supply in Zaire cannot be
examined without an analysis of the parasitic state. In
addition, "economic" f actors such as LrrfLa bi ortand
scarcity of foreign exchange are fundamentally shaped by
the priorities of the state and its partners. Perhaps the
on ly truly "external" variables to affect the Zairian
economy are changes in the world market prices for
minerals and palm oil.
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